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Abstract
After more than two decades of policy inertia, since the late 1990s a new
interest in labour migration arose across Europe and at the EU level. This
translated into a new season of policy experimentation which expressed itself
in very different forms across the continent. Such an uneven wave of policy
change has not been interrupted by the crisis, which however has deeply
altered its dynamics, propelling innovation in some countries and blocking it
elsewhere. Based on in-depth fieldwork carried out in the framework of a
comparative research project (www.labmiggov.eu) in six European countries
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and at EU level, this
special issue aims at generating fresh empirical knowledge and new theore-
tical insights into the complexities of labour migration governance in Europe.
In an attempt to go beyond a limited understanding of labour migration
policies as admission of foreigners for working purposes, all the articles share a
common theoretical framework based on the concept of ‘migrant labour supply
(MLS) policies’. Under this conceptual umbrella, different functional equivalents
of (and alternatives to) direct labour migration policies are considered.
Besides setting the broad empirical scene, illustrating the common conceptual
foundations of the special issue and providing an overview of the articles’main
findings, this Introduction formulates some core arguments. It is argued that
determining and constantly adjusting the composition of MLS policy mixes is a
fundamental expression of states’ agency in the field of labour migration,
especially in times of major economic fluctuations. I also contend that such
national MLS policy mixes can be explained as country-specific attempts to
find and constantly adapt ‘paths of least resistance’ meant to maximise
fulfilment of labour immigration demands while minimising resistances to it.
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This special issue focuses on the regulation of labour migration and of the
access of international migrants to labour markets in a crucial phase of
transformation linked to the multidimensional crisis – financial first, then
in sequence productive, occupational, budgetary and institutional – which
has been asymmetrically hitting Europe over the last seven years.
One of the starting assumptions of this collective work is precisely that
the crisis, by affecting all the dimensions which are generally acknowl-
edged as structural determinants of labour migration policymaking (mate-
rial interests, public perceptions, regulatory capacities), is inducing policy
changes which are not superficial nor transient. On the contrary, the hy-
pothesis is that these crisis-related policy shifts are theoretically relevant
and have the potential to illuminate some fundamental dynamics of this
policy field.
The crisis is thus taken here not just as an encompassing and durable
factor of empirical transformations, but also as a ‘revealer’ of deep con-
stants and commonalities, as well as of areas of sometimes unexpected
differentiation among national policy approaches. The protracted econom-
ic downturn, with its repercussions at social and political level, is thus
conceived and used as a lens which can help us better understand, also
from a theoretical point of view, the functioning of labour migration gov-
ernance in Europe.１
In order to pursue these overarching research objectives effectively, we
deemed it necessary to cast our conceptual net more widely than what is
usually done in the field of labour migration policy studies. A comprehen-
sive assessment of the impact of ongoing macro-economic transformations
on migration policies required to go beyond a narrow focus on labour
migration policies stricto sensu, i.e. meant as targeted admission of foreign-
ers from abroad for specific and explicit working purposes. The multi-
situated and comparatively oriented fieldwork from which this special
issue arises２ convinced us of the necessity of a wider framing of the re-
search object, and brought us to adopt the concept of migrant labour
supply (MLS) policies.
As we will see in greater details below (paragraph 4), this entails widen-
ing the research focus as to include, in the first place, national implemen-
tation of EU legislation on labour mobility and, in particular, over the last
decade, the actual regulation of transition periods for the purposes of full
recognition of freedom of movement to workers from Eastern European
acceding countries.
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In the second place, focusing on country-level migrant labour supply poli-
cies implied giving specific attention to what we propose to define ‘func-
tional equivalents’ of strictly meant labour migration policies, or ‘indirect’
labour migration policies. By this we intend all policies aimed at granting,
facilitating or boosting access to domestic labour markets to immigrants
originally admitted for reasons other than work (humanitarian, family,
study, etc.).３
The last, but certainly not least set of policies that we have posed as a
structural component of the migrant labour supply policy field is what we
have termed as ‘functional alternatives’, understood as all policies and
measures (mainly situated in the fields of employment, education or train-
ing) which are explicitly meant to reduce the dependency on immigrant
labour by increasing the presence of native workers in given employment
sectors (for a groundbreaking contribution in this direction, Devitt, 2010).
Labour migration policies stricto sensu, management of intra-EU labour
mobility, functional equivalents and functional alternatives to ad hoc ‘im-
port’ of foreign labour: all these tools are simultaneously mobilized by
most European states in order to match and reconcile the different and
often conflicting sets of interests which operate in the field of labour mi-
gration. Migrant labour supply therefore needs to be understood as a com-
plex and constantly evolving policy mix.４
Our contention, in this article and more broadly in this special issue, is
that the evolution of the composition of such policy mix is crucial to
understand the role of the state in the field of labour migration. As a matter
of fact, we argue that acting to determine and modify over time the com-
position of country-level migrant labour supply policy mixes is a key ex-
pression of the agency of states in this field, probably a more effective and
relevant one than the often proclaimed but usually failed ambition to
determine the magnitude and skill composition of overall inflows.
From this point of view, the ongoing economic crisis, with its highly
uneven impact in different parts of Europe, acts as a revealing factor, in
particular by affecting the ratio between direct and indirect labour migra-
tion policies. While in the least crisis-affected EU countries, a reduced
public anxiety about the economic impact of labour immigration and
more vocal employers’ demands induce governments to enhance direct
labour immigration admission, the opposite seems to take place in more
severely hit contexts where explicit and straightforward admission of for-
eign workers is nowadays harder to implement without stirring popular
rejection. As Devitt effectively puts it in her comparative study of France
and the UK included in this special issue, admission of indirect labour
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immigrants is politically easier. Devitt: “As the government does not permit
the latter to enter in order to work, it is [p. 446] less likely to be blamed for
irresponsibly facilitating labour immigration in the context of an economic
slump”.
Diverging evolutionary trends in the regulation of migrant labour sup-
ply clearly emerge from the six country-level case studies (France, Italy,
Germany, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) which represent the empirical
basis for the articles included in this special issue. A few words are needed
here to explain the rationale for the case selection. A first criterion,
although not the most important one, was one of quantitative relevance
in economic and demographic terms: as a matter of fact, five out of six
among our national contexts of reference – i.e. all but Sweden – represent
the largest EU countries in terms of both overall population, foreign im-
migrant stocks and immigration flows (at least until the outburst of the
crisis, which brought to a steep decrease in inflows in some of them)
(OECD, 2013).
Qualitative criteria, however, have been even more crucial in driving
our fundamental methodological choices, and in particular in suggesting to
include a Scandinavian case. Our qualitative strategy for case selection
aimed at grasping the widest possible spectrum of country variation in
terms of migration history (both established and ‘new’ immigration coun-
tries are covered), models of welfare (social-democratic or ‘Nordic’, conser-
vative, liberal, familialist or ‘Southern’: see Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera
1996) and varieties of capitalism (coordinated/liberal/mixed market econo-
mies: see Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007).
As I will illustrate in greater details in the final section of this Introduc-
tion, not all the studies presented in this special issue are based on a wide-
ranging comparison of all six countries. Actually, two of the articles have a
narrower focus on pairs of countries. While referring to individual articles
for more circumstantial explanations of tailored case selection criteria in
these cases, an example can be given here by pointing out at Finotelli’s
article on international recruitment of physicians, where the two cases are
selected as typical of different models of healthcare systems (social secur-
ity-financed as in Germany versus tax-based as in Spain).
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１ Changes of season in European labour migration
policies
The last quarter of the past century represented a long ‘winter’ for labour
migration in Europe. International flows for working purposes were signif-
icantly reduced compared to post-WWII decades (Bade, 2003; Castles,
1986; Hollifield, 1992; Kindleberger, 1967). Following the formal stop to
recruitments from abroad enacted by most traditional immigration states
in the first half of the 1970s, labour migration policies underwent a process
of atrophization, consisting in a loss of administrative weight, political
salience and visibility in the public debate. In the meantime, other forms
of migration gained relevance and other specialized branches of migration
policy climbed the ladder of political priorities. In particular, at both na-
tional and European level, the regulation and management of irregular and
forced flows conquered the centre of the (broadly defined) migration
arena, sharing it with the quickly escalating concerns over the integration
of immigrants and their descendants (Joppke, 1999; for an analysis of such
priority shifts as ‘evolutionary patterns’, see Zincone, 2011, in particular pp.
412 and ff.). In parallel with the changes in the demographic composition
of immigrant minorities, also the impact of immigration on national and
local welfare systems gained centrality as both a political issue and a scho-
larly topic (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 2002; Bommes and Geddes,
2002; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006).
This deep restructuring of the European migration policy agenda and
the growing focus on asylum, undocumented movements and integration
were mirrored in the evolving composition of migration research agendas,
which were in the meantime becoming increasingly Europeanized
(Bommes and Thränhardt, 2010; Favell, 2001). Among researchers, just like
in the political sphere, the nexus between migration and labour was gra-
dually shadowed by prevalent attention given to other ‘nexuses’, perceived
as increasingly important, such as those between migration and security,
development, or social cohesion.
Under the frozen surface of alleged ‘zero (labour) migration’ doctrines,
however, linkages between population movements and labour dynamics
were persistent and still strong, although in less evident forms than in the
era of ‘fordist’ migration. Even if often labeled as ‘unproductive’ in the
political debate, migrants admitted for reasons other than work (e.g. family
connections with already settled immigrants, international protection ob-
ligations of the receiving state, common descent with natives) had proble-
matic but nevertheless significant access to labour markets, as clearly illu-
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strated also by the comparative analysis of Labour Force Survey data car-
ried out in this special issue by Alessio Cangiano. The economic impor-
tance of what we define ‘functional equivalents’ of official work-oriented
flows (see below, para. 4) is even more evident for undocumented migra-
tion, especially in the case of low-skilled arrivals to southern European
states, which by the end of the last century had become sizeable and
were in rapid expansion (Calavita, 2005; Colombo 2012; King et al., 1999).５
It was precisely in southern Europe in the second half of the 1990s that
the first burgeonings of a new labour migration policy season appeared
most spectacularly and unexpectedly. Starting with the reversal of Italy’s
net migratory balance in the late 1970s, during the 1980s and 1990s all
southern European countries had gradually turned into net receivers.
States followed suit by adopting policies which on the one hand acknowl-
edged market trends by means of mass regularizations and, on the other,
tried to channel and regulate inflows via planning mechanisms and legal
admission procedures (Doomernik and Jandl, 2008; Einaudi, 2007; Finotelli
and Sciortino, 2009; Sciortino 1999, 2009; Zincone, 1998).
In general, these policy experiments did not prove very effective, sug-
gesting that the ‘gap hypothesis’ (according to which, in its influential
original formulation by Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield: ‘the gap between
the goals of national immigration policy [ . . .] and the actual results [ . . .] is
wide and growing wider’; 1994: 3), although originally tailored primarily on
more mature immigration states, could find in this new group of destina-
tion countries a particularly fertile ground of application (for a critical and
analytical review of the debate on the effectiveness gap, see Czaika and De
Haas, 2013; among theoretical discussions, Bonjour, 2011; Boswell, 2007).
The beginning of a new cycle in labour migration policies was not only
witnessed in the southern part of the continent. The late 1990s and early
2000s were also a period of major transformation in discourses and policy
approaches in the United Kingdom (Boswell, 2008; Somerville, 2007) and,
in connected and partly similar forms, in Ireland (Barrett and Duffy, 2008;
Devitt, 2014; Messina, 2009). Along the Atlantic rim of Europe, however,
migration policy change took place in a very different political and eco-
nomic context, with a more vocal role of employer’s lobbies and of eco-
nomic expert knowledge (the latter mainly in the British case: Boswell,
2009a; Boswell, 2009b), a stronger official emphasis on the linkage between
an increase in the supply of skilled foreign labour and national competi-
tiveness, and a decisive impact of liberalization of intra-EU mobility in the
framework of the first wave of EU’s enlargement to the East (2004). Such
important differences imply that explanations of the change of season in
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0390
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the field of labour migration policies based on such concepts as ‘competi-
tion state’ (Lavenex, 2006) or ‘managed migration paradigm’ (Menz, 2008)
do not apply as convincingly everywhere. Tailored on traditional receiving
countries with a special eye to the British case, they do not fit equally well
southern European countries where what has been defined a ‘low cost
immigration’ (Pastore, Salis and Villosio, 2013) has been more functional
to the preservation of a dysfunctional and highly segmented socio-eco-
nomic model than to its structural transformation through liberalization
and enhanced competition.
Giving account and providing explanations for the specificities of south-
ern European approaches to labour migration is indeed one the goals of
this special issue. This is done through in-depth issue-based comparisons
of two Mediterranean cases – Italy and Spain – and some other important
European receiving countries (France, Germany, Sweden, United King-
dom). At the origin of this comparative endeavour is a certain degree of
dissatisfaction with the way in which the historical novelty represented by
the emergence of southern Europe as a major labour migration destination
has been interpreted in the field of migration policy studies. For instance,
the Spanish case, as analysed here by Finotelli, goes against an often un-
differentiated presentation of southern European labour migration policies
as exclusively focused on ex-post regularization of low-skilled foreign
workers drawn in the country by job opportunities in poorly regulated
labour markets.
In her comparative analysis of national responses to labour shortages in
the care sector, Salis elaborates on the paradox of a country (Italy) where
the demand for immigrant labour does not stem primarily from organized
employers – as almost taken for granted in most theoretical appraisals of
labour migration policymaking since Freeman’s path-breaking work (1979,
1995) – but rather from an atomized and unorganized plurality of micro-
employers. In Italy as in other (relatively) recent destination countries,
such a silent and highly ambiguous pro-immigration constituency is
formed by small and often informal enterprises and, ever more promi-
nently and characteristically, by private households. Families, in particular,
play a key role in recruiting foreign care workers to fulfill an expanding set
of ‘new’ welfare needs associated with growing (although slowly) female
activity rates and above all with acute population ageing, in a context in
which such booming care demand is not adequately met by a shrinking
and anachronistically designed public welfare (Salis in this special issue for
references).
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２ The crisis as a factor of policy change
In the pre-crisis decade (roughly 1997-2007), southern Europe and the UK,
with Ireland following a similar path, emerged in the European context as
the two main labour immigration basins and as the most dynamic contexts
for policy innovation in that field (Pastore, 2012). But similarities between
the ‘Mediterranean laboratory’ and the Atlantic one did not go much be-
yond comparatively high levels of sectoral policy dynamism. As for the
actual contents of labour immigration reforms in these two very different
groups of countries, they differed significantly. The six country studies
produced in the framework of the international research project from
which also this special issue arises, all of them based on extensive field-
work and available at www.labmiggov.eu, provide a detailed description of
such heterogeneity. In particular, they show how national specificities
emerge at different levels (policy justifications, advocacy coalitions, reform
methods, technical tools used, policy outcomes), and not only across the
two groups but also within groups (Arango, 2012; Baldwin-Edwards, 2012;
Finotelli, 2014; Peixoto et al., 2012), thus questioning the existence of a
single and coherent Mediterranean immigration policy model that was
hypothesized by earlier regional studies (see for instance Baldwin-Edwards
and Arango, 1999; King and Black, 1997).
The multidimensional crisis which has been propagating since 2007 has
had a deep but highly differentiated impact on migration and mobility
trends, as well as on integration processes. It would go beyond the scope
of this introduction to provide here an overview, however rapid (for sys-
tematic evidence, latest issues of OECD’s International Migration Outlooks
are the key source; see also IOM, 2010 and other research reports available
at http://www.labourmigration.eu/). However, one essential figure referred
to the six countries more directly targeted in the articles collected here
may be useful to exemplify how uneven the repercussions of the downturn
on labour market outcomes of immigrants have been, both in absolute
terms and relative to natives.
In almost all EU countries of immigration, unemployment rates of both
native and foreign-born workers have been growing during the crisis, but at
very different pace. If we consider the five largest receiving countries in the
European Union plus Sweden, Germany stands out as the only one where
unemployment has been decreasing altogether, and more so for foreign
workers than domestic ones. Elsewhere, the growth in unemployment
was everywhere higher for immigrants than for natives except in the Uni-
ted Kingdom, where the latter lost proportionally more jobs. In all other
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countries, the unemployment gap by origin grew, but in some (Spain, of
course, but also Sweden, although starting from incomparably lower le-
vels) more than in others (See Fig. 1).
Figure 1 Changes in unemployment rates by place of birth (between Q1-Q3 2008
and Q1-Q3 2012)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD, 2013: 72
The impact of the crisis has been highly differentiated also on political
debates and policy developments. Some of the early attempts at assessing
such impact have understandably focused mainly on convergences among
economically advanced immigration countries in migration policy re-
sponses to the crisis, pointing in particular at the proliferation of quantita-
tive and qualitative restrictions imposed on new inflows, especially on
‘discretionary’ (as opposed to rights-based) ones (Awad, 2009; Martin,
2009). Such perspective conveys the general idea of a relapse into ‘winter’,
after the short and unaccomplished ‘spring’ of European labour migration
policies that we recalled above. However, this ‘seasonal’ metaphor appears
less convincing if one adopts a slightly different perspective, focusing on
the several substantial divergences and exceptions that, seven years since
the outburst of the crisis, are countering the initial perception of an un-
differentiated ‘restrictive wave’. From this point of view, the six European
countries taken as case studies in the LAB-MIG-GOV project, and which
represent the primary empirical ground for the comparative analyses car-
ried out in this special issue, offer a few interesting cues.
The most evident outlier – if one takes for good the general picture of a
‘restrictionist mainstream’ – appears to be Sweden. As a matter of fact, at
the end of 2008, when recession was spreading across Europe, this Scandi-
navian country carried out a sweeping liberalizing reform of its migrant
labour admission policy, strongly limiting the traditional role of trade un-
ions as gatekeepers and unconditionally adopting an employer-driven
model without any kind of skill-based filter nor a priori defined quantita-
tive thresholds (Bucken-Knapp, 2009; Spehar, Bucken-Knapp and Hinn-
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fors, 2013). As the Swedish minister for migration, Tobias Billström, put it
when interviewed for the LAB-MIG-GOV project: ‘ . . . now it is up to the
market to assess its own needs, not to the minister, or the parliament, or
another State authority. Of course politics has to make sure that rules are
followed, but the starting point is that the individual employer best knows
the recruitment needs of his business’ (cited in Quirico, 2012: 14).
Apparent Swedish exceptionalism, however, appears less such when
one widens the comparative lens to include, in particular, Germany. The
first symptoms of a new policy climate had already been emerging at the
beginning of the 2000s, starting with the temporary recruitment pro-
gramme for 20,000 highly-skilled migrants launched in 2000 by Gerhard
Schröder’s ‘red-green’ majority (Laubentahl, 2008). But it was not until the
end of the decade that the trend took momentum: in the years of the
‘black-yellow’ coalition (2009-2013), while the unemployment rate was
sinking from slightly below 8% to little over 5% and the shortage of skilled
labour force (Fachkräftemangel) was increasingly perceived as a national
issue and a limit to further growth, a quiet revolution in admission policies
was undertaken. The ‘style of reform’ was less explicit and spectacular than
in the Swedish case, and more based on targeted regulatory adjustments
than on comprehensive legislative changes, but the results are equally
tangible, particularly in the (diminishing) degree of selectivity of the sys-
tem: “While the ‘German model’ in its rhetoric still exclusively focuses on
highly qualified immigration, the actual definition of highly-qualified has
considerably changed during the last years” (Laubenthal, 2012: 28)６. Such
discreet shift was implemented through a variety of technical tools
amongst which the lowering of the required minimum income for recruit-
ment from abroad, the adoption of a positive list of needed professional
profiles, the reception of the EU’s Blue Card directive according to rela-
tively liberal criteria and an important (although adopted with little media
coverage) law for the recognition of foreign qualifications (Laubenthal and
Finotelli, both in this issue). Even a new job search visa was introduced,
which stands out as a quite heterodox tool in the European policy land-
scape and which ‘introduces a skills-based element into the hitherto exclu-
sively demand-oriented German labour migration regime’ (Laubenthal,
2012: 28; Kolb, 2014).
Also in national political systems dominated by a much more cautious
(if not hostile) official rhetoric on immigration than in the two cases just
recalled, no undifferentiated restrictionist turn was witnessed as a re-
sponse to the crisis. As Devitt convincingly shows with regard to France
and Britain in her article for this special issue, both states have shielded the
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categories of more skilled migrants, for which labour market demand per-
sists, from the harsh closure proclaimed in the public discourse.
Even among the countries more severely hit by the crisis, newly intro-
duced restrictions to labour immigration varied significantly. If we com-
pare the two largest southern European recruiters, such divergence stands
out clearly. While in both Italy and Spain planned entries for non-seasonal
working purposes were curtailed to negligible numbers, the Italian Centre-
Right government – in charge until November 2011 – persisted in an estab-
lished tradition of ambiguity. This translated itself, on the one hand, in the
adoption of several pieces of harsh flagship legislation targeting also reg-
ular immigrants, and, on the other hand, in the repeated relapse in the
hard-to-eradicate habit of mass regularizations (in 2009 and again in 2012,
this time under a technocratic, non-partisan executive; see Sciortino, 2013).
As for Spain, the change of majority in 2011 contributed to a rather abrupt
correction of the previous, confidently open, policy direction (Arango, 2013;
Aja, Arango and Oliver, various years). Such u-turn expressed itself not
only in virtual closure to new entries of non-EU foreign workers, but also
in a controversial reintroduction of restrictions to the freedom of move-
ment of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, and in unprecedented limita-
tions to basic fundamental rights of undocumented migrants, especially in
the sphere of health (Royo-Bordonada, Díez-Cornell and Llorente, 2013).
On the whole, these changes reveal a high degree of responsiveness of
labour migration policies to changing sets of economic and political op-
portunities and constraints, in the context of crisis. Such responsiveness, in
some cases even volatility, is observed not just at the level of political
discourses but also of policy design, and even in the countries where path
dependency trends are more evident (such as in Italy with regard to peri-
odical large-scale regularizations). From a comparative point of view, the
evolution documented by LAB-MIG-GOV country studies and by the arti-
cles in this issue adds up to a radical reshuffle of the geography of labour
migration governance in Europe, with a de facto overturning of alignments
which took shape in the pre-crisis decade. Southern European countries,
UK and Ireland, which had previously emerged as the main engines of the
conversion to a more proactive and open policy attitude, now clearly rank
among the ‘cautious’, with rhetorical peaks of strong policy discontinuity
as with the new British conservative government’s explicit challenges to
the principle of intra-EU freedom of movement (Cameron, 2013). In the
meantime, the torch of labour migration policy innovation has seemingly
been taken by countries which until recently were among the most rigor-
ous guardians of the hyper-selective labour immigration orthodoxy.
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３ How to explain complex patterns of policy change?
Assessing and explaining the diverging policy paths outlined above is cer-
tainly not easy, but it seems essential for a theoretically grounded under-
standing of policymaking dynamics in the field of labour migration. In
particular, it is difficult to distinguish what in these policy shifts represents
a merely contingent response to a transitory economic slowdown and
what instead may be understood as the result of a deeper process of adap-
tation to structural changes brought about by the crisis itself or by more
fundamental and longer-term trends such as neoliberal globalization.
In 2010, Georg Menz and Alexander Caviedes claimed that we are wit-
nessing a ‘systematic and fundamental transformation of migration policy
design [the one associated with broad ‘neoliberalization’ trends and consist-
ing in a growing openness to ‘managed migration’] that is unlikely to be
affected by the worst economic recession since the early 1930s’ (Menz and
Caviedes, 2010: 19); they also judged it ‘unlikely that this recession will play
a similar functional role to the OPEC crisis of 1973’ (Menz and Caviedes,
2010: 19), which as we saw in the beginning brought to a lasting stall in
active international recruitment policies by European states.
The authors of the lines cited above are important voices in one of the
most fertile streams of recent scholarly literature on labour migration po-
licies, which attempts to develop an international political economy per-
spective on the subject, mainly by adopting and adapting the ‘Varieties of
Capitalism’ (VoC) paradigm which gained considerable influence and vis-
ibility during the 2000s (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes and
Thatcher, 2007; Menz, 2005). Through their recent contributions (Caviedes,
2010b; Menz, 2008; Menz and Caviedes, 2010), Menz and Caviedes have
developed an articulated theoretical view of European labour migration
policies emphasizing on the one hand their convergence towards selective
openness as a result of neoliberal globalization and, on the other hand,
persisting specificities due to the embeddedness in distinct national pro-
duction systems which crucially affect the design of such policies, primar-
ily by determining employers’ interests, attitudes and policy preferences in
the field of labour migration (Menz, 2010).
An interpretation of recent policy trends as anything more than tem-
porary reactions to transitory labour market oscillations would challenge
the rather univocal theoretical stance according to which ‘[t]he re-concep-
tualization of migration policy as a national human resources strategy as
opposed to a largely defensive security-driven domain more likely marks a
long-term paradigmatic shift, notwithstanding the recession of the late
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2000s and a largely sceptical public’ (Menz and Caviedes, 2010: 3). Besides,
if we conceive the recent policy changes as anything more than a wave of
superficial and transient adaptations, a rethinking of the fundamental ca-
tegories of the VoC literature would be needed (in this direction, but with-
out a specific focus on migration, see Bosch, Lehndorff and Rubery, 2009).
As a matter of fact, convincing theoretical explanations seem so far lacking
for such important empirical developments as the gradual but constant
opening of a Coordinated Market Economy (MME) par excellence like
Germany to high- but increasingly also medium- and even low-skilled
migration (see endnote 6), or the spectacular and not very contentious
Swedish metamorphosis into a rather unselective receiving state, or also
to give account of the singularities of anomalous Mixed Market Economies
(MMEs) like the Mediterranean ones, which in the last decade have been
oscillating wildly between deregulated openness and harsh closure.
Our contention is indeed that we are going through a phase of deep and
not univocal restructuring of the labour migration policy field in Europe. In
order to understand such evolution, we cannot stick to a homogeneous
conceptualization of the structure of the field of interests driving policy
design, one in which employers’ preferences inevitably prevail (although in
a more or less crushing way) and where trade unions are forced to accept
managed migration as a lesser evil against greater ones like social dumping
through irregular migration and delocalization of production (Menz, 2010).
A more flexible conceptualization is required: one in which the agency of
states (or, more broadly and accurately, of complex and dynamic struc-
tures of multilevel governance still centred on states; see Zincone and
Caponio, 2006) is acknowledged in a more articulated way, in particular
by recognizing the key role played by indirect channels for the admission
of migrants in domestic labour markets.
In the next paragraph we will elaborate further on our key argument,
namely that state agency in the field of labour migration expresses itself
not only (and perhaps even not so much) in the determination of overall
volumes of admissions and the profiles of the entrants, but more effectively
and more specifically in influencing the composition of migrant labour
supply in terms of channels of entry and modes of access to the domestic
labour market. But before turning to this final section, it is worth briefly
reviewing two in many respects rather different scholarly efforts which
have nevertheless in common a flexible and pluralistic conception of the
determinants of labour migration policymaking.
The first is the model of labour migration policy as a ‘choice under
constraints’ recently put forward by Ruhs (2013, see in particular Chapter
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3). The main focus is on how high-income liberal democracies design
labour immigration policies in order to pursue a ‘core set of four interre-
lated and sometimes-competing policy goals’ (p. 5), namely economic effi-
ciency, distribution (in particular, avoiding negative impacts on low-skilled
natives), national identity and social cohesion, national security and public
order. Nation-states’ agency is constrained by a complex grid of macro-
level factors the most important of which are i) structural limits to the
capacity to control immigration, ii) national and international liberal
norms and institutions, and iii) specificities in national political systems,
production regimes and welfare systems. Based on these conceptual foun-
dations, Ruhs finds sophisticated although not always equally compelling
quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of three fundamental hy-
potheses on the dynamics of labour immigration policymaking: positive
relationships are identified between targeted skills and both policy open-
ness and levels of recognition of some categories of migrant rights, while a
negative relationship is found between openness and (some) rights.
Among the merits of Ruhs’ theoretical framework is indeed its flexibil-
ity, which allows inter alia to account for more or less deep policy fluctua-
tions across periods of crisis:
The argument that states are simply passively reacting to different interests and
have no substantive policy objectives of their own is [ . . . ] difficult to defend in
practice. The economic interest of employers may well be the driving force of
immigration policy in certain countries at certain times, especially during eco-
nomic growth where concerns about distribution and national identity may be
less of a priority, but evidently do not describe policymaking processes in all
countries and at all times. In times of economic downturn, for example, states
are likely to increase the importance of protecting low-skilled workers (Ruhs,
2013: 32-33).
But what is not entirely satisfactory, from our current point of view, in
Ruhs’ otherwise comprehensive and clear model, is its explanatory capa-
city with regard to specific key features of some contemporary European
cases. Here too, a narrow conceptualization of the research object (‘policies
for regulating the number, skills and rights of migrants who are admitted
for the primary purpose of work’, Ruhs: 10) appears as a limitation and it is
again southern Europe, in particular, which represents a puzzle and pro-
vides theoretically challenging empirical material. We have already re-
called the crucial role that ex-post large-scale regularizations have con-
stantly played, over the last two decades, in southern European attempts
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to regulate labour migration (Barbagli, Colombo and Sciortino, 2004).
However, this central policy feature does not seem properly explained by
a theoretical account in which one of the fundamental propositions is that
of a reverse proportionality between ‘numbers’ (of admitted foreign work-
ers) and ‘rights’ (granted to them) (Ruhs, 2013; Ruhs and Martin, 2008). In
regulatory environments essentially based on periodical legalizations of
undocumented populations (accompanied by amnesties of their irregular
employers) a fundamentally different logic seems to operate. Namely, until
underground foreign workers represent a tiny and little visible category,
their fundamental rights can easily be denied. But such strategy of sys-
tematic denial of (primarily) economic and social rights has proven to
become unsustainable when ‘numbers’ get sufficient to set in motion the
heterogeneous advocacy coalitions supporting regularizations, generally
composed by trade unions, churches, migrant rights movements and im-
migrant associations (Zincone, 2006). In such cases, the quantitative open-
ness of the system in terms of actual intakes of foreign workers plays a
critical role in explaining dynamics of rights expansion through regulariza-
tions which represent the outcome of peculiar forms of social and political
mobilization.
Explaining the complex and often ambiguous but still critical role of the
state in shaping labour migration and making sense of the ongoing com-
plex transformations of the European labour migration governance field
are also the essential goals of another important theoretical contribution,
Boswell’s theory of the functionalist imperatives of the state (2007). In her
search for convincing alternatives to both political economy and neo-in-
stitutionalist theories of migration policymaking, Boswell bases her analy-
sis on a conceptualization of the state as a complex actor constantly striv-
ing to secure, reinforce and perpetuate its own legitimacy, which is as-
sumed to be based on various possible combinations of four fundamental
criteria (fairness, accumulation, security and institutional legitimacy)
(Boswell, 2007: 89). It is argued that labour migration policy is an area
where the potential conflict among these different sources of legitimation
is particularly acute and where ‘a state unable to meet all functional re-
quirements may have an interest in the persistence of contradictions and
inefficiencies in policy’ (Boswell, 2007: 93); more specifically, as Boswell
adds, ‘such malintegration usually takes the form of a gap between pro-
claimed, restrictive migration policy, and the de facto toleration or covert
implementation of more liberal measures’ (Boswell, 2007: 93).
Such a flexible theoretical model allows Boswell to propose an articu-
lated but convincing typology where even the generally elusive Italian case
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finds a satisfactory location in a policy type significantly baptized ‘Uncon-
trolled’. In this particular policy configuration, ‘[t]he Berlusconi govern-
ment [but the idealtype which is proposed catches a good amount of biparti-
san continuities in Italian migration policy history] has adopted a highly
restrictionist rhetoric, whilst tolerating substantial levels of irregular mi-
gration and employment, and even encouraging these through periodic
regularizations’ (Boswell, 2007: 95; Zincone, 2002). As correctly stated by
the author, this formally contradictory policy mix is typical but far from
exclusively characteristic of Italy, as some of its elements ‘can be discerned
in the policies of many other European countries as well as the US, insofar
as these countries fail to introduce robust measures to control irregular
immigration and labour’ (Boswell, 2007: 95).
The awkward combination of (economic) openness and (cultural and
political) closure incorporated in this latter policy type as singled out by
Boswell might even gain ground in a context of ‘chronicized’ economic
crisis where labour market positions of immigrants tend to deteriorate,
competition with natives is reactivated, but no large wave of returns or
secondary migration flows is observed. As a result, while the overall im-
migrant presence is not significantly reduced, the economic bases for eco-
nomic integration become thinner and risks of ‘wars among poors’ grow. In
such an environment, which may be spreading even beyond southern
Europe, populist calls for more closed communities are not necessarily
perceived as irreconcilable with neoliberal campaigns for more ‘open’ and
competitive societies. Further structural weakening of the labour market
position and further social exclusion of immigrants may thus emerge as
the implicit strategic goal towards which traditionally opposed sets of
interests converge. In such a context, spurious coalitions of pro-immigrant
employers and anti-immigrant native workers and/or welfare beneficiaries
(an odd alliance which is hardly conceivable in the framework of most
political economy and neo-institutionalist theories) do not appear as
hardly viable anomalies any more. Facing these apparent contradictions,
neo-marxist accounts emphasizing the discriminatory segmentation of la-
bour markets (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Piore, 1979), which seemed to have
been made outdated by ‘neoliberalization’ trends and by the parallel evo-
lution towards the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘competition state’, re-
gain explanatory potential (Castles 2004).
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４ Comparing foreign labour supply policy mixes
The distinction between ‘front-door’ and ‘back-door’ immigration policies
(the latter mainly referred to the toleration of undocumented low-skilled
immigration) is traditionally used in policy debates in the United States,
where scholarship has devoted specific attention to the interplay between
these two fundamental branches of immigration regulation (for a masterly
example of this kind of analysis, see Zolberg, 2008). This is less frequently
the case in Europe, where on the one hand specialists of labour migration
policies have given prevalent attention to official admission channels
while, on the other hand, control and repressive policies against irregular
flows have frequently been dealt with as an autonomous research field. As
a consequence, the interdependence between policies on ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’
migration, and the porous nature of the boundary between the social and
legal spheres of regularity and irregularity (in both ways: as a result of
different forms of regularizations, in one direction, of refusals of residence
permit renewal and consequent relapse into an irregular condition, in the
other) have often been neglected (among the exceptions, for a conceptua-
lization of irregularity as a ‘very dynamic condition’ structuring a ‘foggy’
social space, see Bommes and Sciortino, 2011: 219).
This special issue tries to avoid these shortcomings by framing its object
in a more comprehensive way. However, given the complexity of the reg-
ulation of the access of foreign workers to European labour markets, a
dualistic model based on the metaphorical juxtaposition between a front-
and a back-door appears insufficient and unable to grasp effectively the
actual variety of national policy mixes.
In the first place, over the last decade, a crucial role has been assumed
by the ‘open gate’ of free movement for (new) EU citizens next to the
traditional front-door of legal admission of third-country nationals for
working purposes. The different use made of the limited discretionary
power recognized to ‘old’ EU member states in managing the labour mar-
ket access of citizens of Eastern European accession countries has emerged
in this period as one of the main factors of differentiation in national
approaches to the regulation of international mobility of labour (Black et
al., 2010; Galgoczi, Leschke and Watt, 2009; OECD, 2001). This policy di-
mension and its interplay with the regulation of labour migration from
outside the EU are thus given specific attention in the LAB-MIG-GOV
country studies and in the comparative articles collected here.
In the second place, we have included in our analyses what we define
functional equivalents (of narrowly defined labour migration policies): all
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policies giving access to domestic labour markets to immigrants admitted
for reasons other than work. This covers profiles as diverse as family mi-
grants (including spouses, offspring and in some national contexts even
parents of labour immigrants admitted through family reunion proce-
dures), different types of humanitarian migrants, international students,
so-called co-ethnics (e.g. Aussiedler in Germany or descendents of emi-
grants in Italy). In most European countries, this ‘side-door’ consisting in
granting or extending the right to work for persons belonging to these
(often rights-based) immigration categories has been opened more widely
in the pre-crisis decade. This trend, based on a growing awareness of the
actual and potential labour market role played by these groups, has since
the early 2000s been fostered and streamlined by the European Union. This
liberalizing role was exerted by the supranational legislator through ad hoc
clauses aimed at limiting the possibility for Member States to exclude
asylum seekers or family migrants from domestic labour markets.７
Besides the policies aimed at giving (usually delayed) access to domes-
tic labour markets to immigrants originally admitted for reasons other
than work, our concept of functional equivalents encompasses also post-
entry regularizations of undocumented migrant workers which have until
recently played a very significant role especially in southern European
countries. It is interesting to point out that, contrary to what happened
with policies aimed at fostering labour market participation of non-labour
migrants, the attitude of the EU towards large-scale regularizations has
systematically been negative, with even some unsuccessful attempt to for-
mally restrict the use of such policy tool.８
Beyond labour immigration policies stricto sensu, the management of
intra-EU mobility and the use of functional equivalents, the addition of a
fourth component in the framing of our research object was suggested by
the preparatory fieldwork carried out in the six target countries in 2011-
2013. In national policy debates, and in the words of the policymakers,
officials and stakeholders we interviewed, references are often made to
the interplay between migration policies and other labour-related policy
fields. In particular, in the context of discussions on how to increase na-
tional competitiveness in response to the economic crisis, raising natives’
and settled immigrants’ activity rates while reducing the need to import
foreign labour is often singled out as a desirable strategic goal. This
prompted us to include in our research design a specific attention towards
what we propose to call functional alternatives to labour migration policies,
defined as all policies and measures (mainly situated in the fields of em-
ployment, education or training policies) which are explicitly meant to
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reduce the dependency on immigrant labour and to increase the presence
of native and settled immigrant workers in given employment sectors. The
article by Devitt in this issue explores the different extent to which this
trend is gaining ground, on the basis of a comparison of the French and
British cases.
By widening our empirical scope as to include the different sets of
policy tools described above, the goal of this special issue is to construct
as a unitary research object a functionally integrated policy field which we
define as a migrant labour supply (MLS) policy field. The essential structure
of this complex policy field is schematically represented below in Figure 2.
Figure 2 The structure of the Migrant labour supply policy field
This is just a standardized representation of what we conceive as the four
essential components of MLS as an intrinsically pluralistic field of regula-
tion. The actual configurations of this composite policy field, including for
instance the relative weight of each component, vary substantially in time
(see above, para. 3) and in space.
From an institutional point of view, it is clear that MLS policies are still
primarily defined at national level and this explains why cross-national
comparison is the fundamental methodological choice on which the re-
search presented in this special issue is based. This does not exclude, how-
ever, the awareness of the importance that sub-national and supra-na-
tional levels of regulation may take in this area, as well illustrated in the
article by Laubenthal in this issue. It is thus certainly possible to concep-
tualize MLS as a field of multi-level governance (for an application of the
concept, originally proposed by Marks, 1993, to the field of migration, see
Zincone and Caponio, 2006; Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, 2014), even
though – as some analyses of specific EU policies produced in the frame-
Functional
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Labour migration policies 
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work of the LAB-MIG-GOV project clearly show (Lazarowicz, 2013 and
2014; Pascouau, 2013; Pascouau and McLoughlin, 2012) – the degree of
actually achieved Europeanization is low compared to other domains of
EU legislative competence (Pastore, 2004).
As for the sub-national levels of regulation, their role in regulating la-
bour migration is generally limited, with a few partial exceptions among
which the German Länder as studied here by Laubenthal. However, in the
framework of future research assuming the paradigm shift that we propose
towards a more integrated consideration of the MLS policy field, even the
role of sub-national institutional and political actors in shaping the govern-
ance of migrant labour supply could stand out more prominently, given
the institutional competences on employment and training issues that
regional and local governments hold in many European countries.
Notwithstanding the multi-level perspective adopted in some of the
articles, our approach essentially consists in ‘comparing places’ (in the
broad sense proposed by Martiniello, 2013: 12; for another recent reflection
on the role of comparison in migration studies, see Bloemraad, 2013). More
precisely, our comparative lens focuses on how some important European
states deal with the complex task of regulating the supply of migrant
labour on the domestic labour market, struggling to find advantageous
and sustainable compromises in the simultaneous pursuit of different
functional imperatives. Two of the articles (the ones by Cangiano and
Salis) adopt a broad comparative angle including all or most of the target
countries of the LAB-MIG-GOV project and making more systematic use of
quantitative methods; other two contributions (by Devitt and Finotelli) are
based on bilateral comparisons in each case with a specific rationale for
the selection of pairs (in Finotelli’s article, for instance, Germany and Spain
are taken as ‘most different cases’: see Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
Laubenthal’s contribution is the only one where the comparative method
is not applied across countries but across institutional levels within one
single national system, by focusing on the different uses made of EU legis-
lation between the federal state and a Bundesland.
Before providing a concise overview of the key contents and findings of
the articles that will follow, it is worth dwelling a little more on the deter-
minants of the significant cross-country variations in the composition of
national systems of regulation of migrant labour supply. How can such
variations be explained? What drives the complex and constantly adjusted
choices by which states compose the ever changing palette of MLS poli-
cies? From the comparative work presented in this special issue, some
common explanatory principles can be singled out. In broad terms, it can
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be stated that liberal democratic states (such fundamental political iden-
tity is common to all our case studies) tend to choose the MLS policy mix
corresponding to the path of least resistance across the main sets of politi-
cal constraints characteristic of each national political environment. Of
course, the two key sets of such constraints are represented by politically
organised demand for immigrant labour and politically organised resis-
tance against it. As several scholars – following Gary Freeman – have
argued, the mere existence of a certain amount of demand for, or resis-
tance against labour immigration is not in itself sufficient to shape policy-
making. What is crucial is indeed the level of organization of such collective
interests meant as collective capacity to a) identify and express a unitary
economic interest, b) to translate it into a clear and viable policy option,
and c) to channel such policy option effectively into the policymaking
circuit. The research presented in this special issue shows that the level of
organisation of pro- and anti-(labour)immigration constituencies varies
very significantly across European states, and that such patterns of varia-
tion are themselves deeply affected by the euro crisis.
Making sense of such variations in terms of their impact on MLS policy-
making evidently requires to focus on the changing relation between levels
of organisation of the demand for labour migration, on one side, and of the
resistance against it on the other. In a simple heuristic model where such
levels of organisation can vary only from ‘high’ to ‘low’ and vice versa (as
shown in Table 1), four ideal-typical situations can be envisaged: A) High
(level of organization of) demand + high (level of organization of) resis-
tance; B) High demand + low resistance; C) Low demand + high resistance;
D) Low demand + low resistance.
Table 1 Types of relations between levels of organisation of demand for and resistance
against labour immigration – A heuristic tipology
DEMAND
High level of organisation
DEMAND
Low level of organisation
RESISTANCE
High level of organisation
A C
RESISTANCE
Low level of organisation
B D
One of the key findings of the collective fieldwork carried out for this
special issue is that when both demand for and resistance to labour immi-
gration are high (situation A in the heuristic typology summarised above
and visualized in Table 1), the pressure to reduce the public visibility of
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policy choices aimed at enhancing migrant labour supply discourages
direct admission of migrant workers while generating specific incentives
to boost indirect policies (i.e. functional equivalents) and in some cases to
adopt, or at least envisage the adoption, of functional alternatives to di-
rectly tackling shortages with immigrant labour. Of course, this is not with-
out counter-indications, as direct labour immigration policies tend to be
more efficient in terms of both quality of the micro-level matching
between labour demand and supply (especially if based on a sound assess-
ment of labour market needs: see Martin and Stark 2014, Ruhs and Ander-
son, 2010), and of economic and social integration outcomes of migrant
workers in the receiving context (fresh evidence for this latter statement is
found in Cangiano’s article in this special issue). The tension between the
political advantages and the technical weaknesses of a MLS strategy rely-
ing more heavily on functional equivalents are evident, for instance, in the
case of France, where in presence of high levels of organisation of resis-
tance against labour immigration (mainly represented by the Front
National) the share of indirect labour immigration remained compara-
tively high in spite of the alleged policy goal of boosting skill-based selec-
tivity (immigration choisie).
In contrast, in situations marked by highly organised demand for, and
low resistance to labour immigration (situation B in Table 1), it becomes
easier for policymakers to include in the MLS cocktail a larger share of
direct admissions thereby aiming at better results in terms of both short-
term labour market efficiency and longer-term integration. Such configura-
tion seems for instance to adequately describe pre-crisis Spain in which
explicit entrepreneurial lobbying for a more open admission policy was not
countered by any strong and vocal anti-immigration movement.
One last argument is worth adding here with regard to possible expla-
nations of cross-country variations in the composition of MLS policy
mixes. In some cases, such explanations are sector-specific, i.e. they apply
specifically and sometimes exclusively to one or few labour market sectors,
or even to specific occupational categories. A good example is provided by
Salis in her analysis of the determinants of national policies on immigra-
tion of care workers (in this special issue). In her compelling account of the
Italian case, the author shows how governments of different political or-
ientation have been giving a privileged treatment to migrant care workers
(MCWs) (through ad hoc admission channels, ad hoc regularization pro-
cedures, etc.) while systematically tolerating dubious exploitation of such
special procedures by other types of migrant workers. The author explains
such a peculiar policy choice precisely as an attempt to find a path of least
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resistance between a persisting demand for (different types of) low-skilled
labour and a public opinion environment marked by a relatively more
extensive and stronger consensus about the immigration of care workers,
perceived as socially more desirable and sustainable than other categories
of migrant workers. In Salis’ words, “ . . . the openness towards MCWs has,
at least partially, allowed the Italian authorities to open the doors to all
other labour migrants while presenting them as good and useful for the
Italian society”.
In conclusion, I will briefly sketch the structure of the issue and the
essential contents of the five articles that follow. Each of these centres the
analysis on one specific dimension of national migrant labour supply sys-
tems. In Cangiano’s piece, the starting question is how entry channels
(typified in five categories: labour, family, study, asylum, permit-free) affect
subsequent occupational careers of individual migrants. This relation is
explored by using the dataset generated by the 2008 Ad-Hoc module on
migrant workers of the EU Labour Force Survey. The results provide theo-
retically interesting and practically relevant insights on the different ‘out-
puts’ of distinct national MLS systems in terms of labour market integra-
tion.
Devitt compares the composition and the evolution of policy mixes
(and accompanying public rhetorics) governing the supply of migrant la-
bour in France and United Kingdom. She highlights both similarities (a
continuing favour towards high-skilled migration in spite of the economic
downturn) and differences, mainly explained by the embeddedness of MLS
policies in different institutional contexts. Different national traditions in
the fields of social protection and active employment policies, among
other factors, are used to explain differences in the recourse to what we
have called functional alternatives to labour migration.
In the next piece, Laubenthal explores the forms and dynamics of
Europeanization in the field of labour migration in the German context.
By focusing on the process of transposition of the EU’s ‘Blue Card’ directive
in national law, she shows how a convergence of policy aims between the
domestic and the European level became a precondition for a substantial
policy change. From a traditional setting in which Länder were generally
seen as braking Europeanization and the federal government as ‘using’ the
EU mainly to legitimize restrictive changes at the national level, a new
posture is emerging whereby European regulation becomes functional to
a more open attitude towards labour migration.
In her dense comparative study of the norms and practices regulating
the access of foreign health professionals to domestic labour markets in
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Germany and Spain, Finotelli provides a fascinating insight on the every-
day management of a crucially important type of high-skilled migration,
under the veil of official political discourses. By focusing specifically on the
role of foreign credentials recognition and of language knowledge in inter-
national recruitment, she reveals the tensions and compromises lying be-
hind the ‘competition state’ rhetoric on the ‘attraction of talents’.
The special issue ends with an article by Salis on the governance of
another crucial sector for immigrant employment, namely the market of
elderly care services. Through a careful combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods, she shows first the very different extent to which
European states have been using immigrant labour to address shortages in
the care sector across Europe and then moves to illustrating and explaining
the heterogeneity of national policy mixes adopted. The results corrobo-
rate the hypothesis of a ‘sectoral turn in labour migration policy’ (Caviedes,
2010a, 2010b) but generate also some fresh theoretical insight on the poli-
tical economy of low-skilled migration in a peculiar but crucial sector
where the demand for migrant workers stems from households and not
from organised employers.
The overall picture emerging from this diverse but internally consistent
set of thematic studies is complex, dynamic and does not permit easy
generalizations or forecasts on future trends (Holtslag, Kremer and Schrij-
vers, 2013). What is certainly confirmed is the variety of national ap-
proaches in the MLS field and the importance of the ongoing transforma-
tions, which are taking place at an accelerated pace since the outburst of
the crisis. Structural explanatory principles, such as the peculiarities of
national ‘varieties of capitalism’, political cultures, welfare models or care
regimes are certainly still relevant and useful. But the rough and unsteady
policy landscape that we have been reconstructing suggests the necessity
to complement context-based explanations with a more fine-grained focus
on policymaking processes. Without neglecting the importance of vertical
interactions across institutional levels, this processual perspective still
needs to be centred on states and on the distinct agency they exert in
developing specific national approaches to the complex issue of migrant
labour supply and in progressively blazing the ‘path of least resistance’
across the different sets of constraints that are punctuating this tormented
policy field.
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Notes
1 . For two inspiring examples of theoretically informed analyses of the structural trans-
formations induced or enhanced by the crisis, in the social and political spheres respec-
tively, but with no specific focus on migration or migration policies, see Hall and
Lamont, 2013; Schäfer and Streeck, 2013.
2. The articles collected in this special issue are all based on a three-years comparative
research project on “Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary Europe” (acro-
nym: LAB-MIG-GOV). This collaborative project has been carried out by a multina-
tional team of researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds under the scientific
coordination of Ferruccio Pastore. LAB-MIG-GOV was managed by FIERI (Forum of
International and European Research on Immigration, Torino, Italy, www.fieri.it) and
benefitted from the generous support of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Pro-
gramme, promoted by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and Volks-
wagenStiftung. All the reports and working papers produced in the framework of LAB-
MIG-GOV are available on the project’s website (www.labmiggov.eu).
3. Another strand of policies which could be included in a broad definition of ‘functional
equivalents of labour migration policies’ is represented by all those policies aimed at
granting multinational and transnational companies leeway to move workers across
borders thus introducing exceptions to general labour immigration regulations (e.g.
intra-company transfers, cross-border ‘posting’, etc.). Although it has not been made
object of specific attention in this special issue, this is an expanding area of regulation
that would deserve more attention from migration scholars (temporary staffing has so
far mainly attracted research attention from economic geographers and scholars of
‘transnational labour markets’; for an overview see Coe, Jones and Ward, 2010).
4. The concept of ‘policy mix’ has been originated in the macro-economic field to indicate
the combined use of monetary and fiscal policy (see, for instance, Farina and Tambor-
ini, 2008). We deem it appropriate to describe the combined use of different sectoral
policies to pursue complex systemic objectives also in other fields, such as in the case of
the migrant labour supply policy mix.
5. Besides the policies aimed at giving access to domestic labour markets to immigrants
originally admitted for reasons other than work, also post-entry regularizations of un-
documented migrant workers can be conceived as functional equivalents to legal admis-
sion for working purposes. As we will see in greater details below, in some EU states,
regularizations have indeed played a key role in functionally replacing official and more
straightforward labour immigration policies.
6. Although German admission policies remain highly selective and essentially targeted
on high-skilled and skilled migrant workers, in some important labour market sectors
which are traditionally framed as low-skilled the share of migrant workers is far from
negligible. As illustrated in details in Salis’ article on the governance of labour migration
in the care sector (in this special issue), EU-LFS data show that in Germany the share of
migrant workers among personal care workers is equal to the EU15 average while it is
much higher among domestic helpers. Such significant migrant presence is not the
outcome of direct labour immigration policies but of a more articulated migrant labour
supply system which is relying on functional equivalents especially for lower skills (Lutz
and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010; Shire, 2014).
7. See respectively Council directive 2003/9/EC ‘laying down minimum standards for the
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reception of asylum seekers’, Article 11(2) and Council directive 2003/86/EC ‘on the right
to family reunification’, Article 14(2).
8. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted by the European Council
under the impulse of the French Presidency of the EU in October 2008 contained a
statement whereby “ . . . the European Council agrees [ . . . ] to use only case-by-case
regularisation, rather than generalised regularisation, under national law, for humani-
tarian or economic reasons”. Such agreement, however, did not prevent subsequent
rather ‘generalised’ (although not completely unconditional) regularizations to be
adopted, notably by Italy.
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Abstract
While a number of studies explored the demographic and human capital
attributes affecting migrant socio-economic assimilation, less is known about
the role of immigration status on entry. In particular, little evidence exists on
the employment outcomes of migrants admitted outside economic immigra-
tion channels (family, study, asylum or permit-free) and joining the labour
market once in the country of destination. This paper addresses this knowl-
edge gap. Its conceptual framework for understanding how immigration
status on arrival influences access to the labour market highlights the role of
selectivity mechanisms and of different rights and constraints characterizing
the legal situation of migrants who enter via different admission routes. The
empirical analysis builds on original estimates of the migrant workforce by
immigration status on entry based on the 2008 Ad-Hoc Module of the EU
Labour Force Survey. Logistic regressions show that immigration status on
arrival affects the participation in the labour market, the probability of being
unemployed and the access to a job commensurate to the migrant skills.
While the participation of familymigrants and refugees in the labourmarket is
positively associated with their length of stay, these categories retain a
significant unemployment disadvantage in almost all European destinations.
This gap becomes particularly evident at the intersection of immigration
status and gender. Results suggest the need for a more holistic approach to
the governance of labour migration that takes into account the long-term
trends of migrant labour supply.
Keywords: migration, migrant employment, migration policies, immigration status,
Europe
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１ Introduction
Migrant workers are generally found to experience significant economic
disadvantage relative to the native population. A lower labour participa-
tion of migrant women, consistently higher unemployment rates (for both
male and female migrants of all educational levels) and a high concentra-
tion in underprivileged employment sectors and low-pay jobs (particularly
for non-EU nationals) characterise migrant employment in most EU labour
markets, although migrant/native gaps significantly vary across EU host
countries (e.g. Münz, 2007; Eurostat, 2011). In the current economic climate
the immigrant employment gap has also widened as a result of the crisis in
most EU destinations – Germany being the notable exception (OECD, 2013:
72).
An expanding body of literature investigating the factors responsible for
the lower performance of migrants in European labour markets has shown
that the socio-demographic background (e.g. age, gender, education, mar-
ital status, ethnicity, country of birth) and other measurable attributes (e.g.
host language skills, duration of stay) only explain a part of immigrant
participation, employment and income differentials１ (see for instance Ber-
nardi et al., 2011; Kogan, 2011; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011; Dustmann and
Frattini, 2012). Some scholars argued that other factors underpinning mi-
grant poorer outcomes in European labour markets can be identified in the
institutional context of the receiving country, including: labour market
structures and regulations; the welfare regime; and, most notably, immi-
gration and integration policies – see for example Büchel and Frick (2005),
Kogan (2007) and Wanner (2011)２.
A limited direct evidence of the effects of migration policies exists. In
particular, quantitative research comparing the labour market outcomes of
migrants with different legal status vis-à-vis immigration regulations seems
to be rare in the European migration literature. This evidence gap can be
ascribed, to a large extent, to the dearth of disaggregated data on the
migrant workforce in Europe by legal/immigration status３. A lack of inter-
est in policy evaluation by institutional actors has also been indicated as a
reason for limited research on the “effectiveness gap” in migration policy-
making (Pastore, 2010). The partial exception is some earlier research look-
ing at the employment disadvantage of refugees and/or family migrants
and emphasizing the role of labour market restrictions and integration
policies that vary by entry category (Bloch, 2007; Bevelander and Pendakur,
2009).
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In order to fill part of the knowledge gap surrounding the experience of
different categories of migrants in the EU labour markets, an ‘ad hoc’
module (AHM) of the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) on the situation
of migrant workers and their descendants was carried out in 2008. This
supplementary module included a bespoke set of questions on the reasons
for migration, date of acquisition of citizenship, and country of birth of
both parents. The combination of these variables offers the unprecedented
opportunity to classify the migrant workforce by category of entry. This
paper builds on this dataset to shed new light on the diversity of labour
market experiences among migrants admitted to EU countries on different
grounds (employment, family, humanitarian, ancestry, study etc.). Its over-
arching aim is to contribute to a better understanding of how migration
policies – intended here as the set of laws, rules and practices governing
the admission to the country and access to the labour market of non-
national workers – shape migrant patterns of labour market incorporation.
Analysis is carried out for the EU-15 as a whole and separately for the six
LAB-MIG-GOV target countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden
and the UK).
The paper is structured as follows. Next section provides a comparative
overview of migration policy trends across EU countries. In section 3, I set
out the conceptual links between migration policies and migrant labour
market outcomes. This conceptual framework highlights the role of selec-
tivity mechanisms operating in points-based systems and demand-driven
labour admissions and of different employment rights and entitlements
granted to migrants admitted via different immigration routes. Section 4
describes the methodological approach used for the construction of nine
categories approximating immigration status on arrival, its strengths and
limitations, and illustrates the composition of the migrant workforce by
entry category resulting from this procedure. The core empirical part of the
paper uses standard logistic regression analyses to compare the patterns of
labour market incorporation by category of entry after controlling for the
other demographic and skill attributes typically associated with migrant
labour market performance. My results show that immigration status on
arrival affects migrant participation in the labour market and their access
to jobs commensurate to their skills. In particular, family migrants and
refugees retain a significant disadvantage, with these gaps becoming parti-
cularly evident at the intersection of immigration status and gender. A final
discussion reflects on the main results and highlights some lessons for
migration policy-making that can be drawn from the findings.
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２ Migration policy trends in the EU: an overview
Migration policy-making in Europe remains largely – and perhaps increas-
ingly – dominated by national policy frameworks. More specifically, while
some convergence has been achieved in coordinating measures to prevent
irregular migration and in designing a common EU asylum policy, EU
countries have been reluctant to give up their national sovereignty in the
governance of labour migration. National policy approaches in this field
have taken mostly divergent pathways throughout the 1990s and until the
end of the 2000s (Pastore, 2014).
France, Germany and Sweden consolidated a restrictive and selective
approach in the admissions of non-EEA nationals via labour-related chan-
nels (tab. 1). In contrast, the UK abandoned the restrictive labour migration
approach of post-1973 continental Europe by taking an explicitly open
stance towards labour migration in the years of the Blair’s administration
and admitting significant numbers of skilled workers via a work permit
system (the predecessor of the current 5-tier Points-based system). The
greater openness of the UK to labour mobility was then confirmed by the
decision not to restrict employment of A8 nationals upon the 2004 EU
Enlargement – Sweden also took this stance４. A further feature of the UK
system – in common with France – has been its popularity as a European
destination for international students５. Despite formally restrictive labour
admission avenues, Italy and Spain progressively developed a de-facto
open policy approach to labour migration by regularising the status of
large numbers of irregular migrants (Finotelli, 2012; Salis, 2012), most of
whom had overstayed temporary visas and had been working in the irre-
gular economy (e.g. Reyneri, 2003).
Significant differences are also apparent in the restrictions (or lack of)
used by EU countries to regulate access to the labour market and occupa-
tional mobility of non-EU nationals. The wider formal recruitment chan-
nels for labour migrants to enter the UK have been paralleled by restric-
tions in the occupational mobility of work-permit holders (who are typi-
cally tied to their employer or to the sector of employment). These restric-
tions are generally absent or less binding in other EU destinations. In
countries where many non-EU migrants were admitted via family (e.g.
France), asylum (Sweden) and ancestry-based (Germany) channels, these
categories were generally granted unrestricted access to the labour market,
potentially playing a substantial role as functional equivalents to labour
migration (Pastore, 2014). In contrast, student access to the labour market
is time-limited virtually everywhere in Europe.
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While synthesizing the wide realm of integration policies across EU coun-
tries is beyond the scope of this paper, the last column of table 1 points to
significant differences – e.g. in the use of pre-entry language tests for some
categories of new arrivals and in the provision of post-entry language
courses – but also to some similarity, particularly in the limited provision
for the recognition of qualifications obtained overseas (the UK is a partial
exception as far as Commonwealth migrants are concerned).
３ Migration policies and immigrant incorporation in the
labour market: conceptual underpinning
The potential impact of migration policies on the economic outcomes of
the migrant workforce is multifaceted. First, by establishing the number
and/or individual and professional attributes of labour migrants admitted
to the country, migration policies influence the size and characteristics of
the migrant workforce selecting those workers who are supposedly most in
demand in the host economy. The selection of new arrivals on the basis of
human capital or skills (e.g. educational titles and knowledge of host coun-
try language) is explicit in points-based systems (e.g. in the UK) but some
degree of selectivity is also implicit in quota systems and schemes used to
recruit lesser skilled workers in specific jobs (e.g. care workers) or econom-
ic sectors (e.g. agriculture). Selection mechanisms are also in place when
preference in filling job vacancies is accorded on the basis of nationality,
such as the preferential treatment of EU workers within the EU labour
market, or when bilateral agreements are in place with countries of origin.
Although not driven by an economic rationale, the admission of migrants
via ‘non-economic’ immigration channels (mainly dependants, refugees
and students) also contributes to shaping the labour force because these
categories are generally entitled to work６. The recent introduction of pre-
entry conditions such as language tests for family migrants is another
selection mechanism that supposedly enhances opportunities for econom-
ic and social inclusion (Bonjour, 2014).
The second major way in which migration policies are likely to influ-
ence the demographic composition and labour outcomes of the migrant
workforce is by regulating (and restricting) access to the labour market of
the different categories of non-national workers who are residing in the
country. Different types of residence and work permits carry different
rights and entitlements establishing the duration of the permit and possi-
bility for renewal, access to the labour market, and the possibility to apply
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for permanent residence or citizenship. While highly skilled labour migra-
tion routes (e.g. points-based systems) do not normally carry significant
initial restrictions and lead to a relatively smooth transition to full citizen-
ship rights, temporary labour migration schemes typically allow migrants
to work only in specific sectors (e.g. agriculture) and restrict settlement
opportunities (e.g. Ruhs, 2011)７. Similarly, access to the labour market of
other immigration categories may be, to some extent, restricted. For exam-
ple, asylum seekers may not be allowed to work while their asylum appli-
cations are pending (Bloch, 2007). International students are normally
allowed to work only on a part-time basis (e.g. in the UK and Germany)
and granted a limited period after the completion of their studies to find a
job offer entitling them to a work permit. In the context of the 2004 and
2007 EU enlargements, the transitional arrangements adopted by most EU-
15 countries to restrict access to their labour market and welfare benefits of
new EU-12 citizens were also an example of normative framework tem-
porarily limiting employment opportunities on the basis of nationality.
Policies regulating status changes (e.g. for people willing to shift from
labour to dependent visas or vice-versa), status regularization (i.e. allowing
previously irregular migrants to take up legal employment) and, at the
other end of the migrant legal journey, access to citizenship (in relation
to the possibility to take up public sector jobs reserved to EU or host-
country nationals) may also affect migrant opportunities in the host labour
market８.
Lastly, employment pathways of different immigrant categories are
likely to be influenced by policies aimed at encouraging labour participa-
tion and improving migrants’ employability. Access of foreign nationals to
the whole set of “mainstream” government programmes, benefits and ser-
vices addressing exclusion from the labour market is often subject to tem-
porary restrictions. However, integration policies aiming to tackle specific
factors of migrant socio-economic exclusion – e.g. language courses, voca-
tional training courses, and support in the recognition of qualification
obtained abroad – may also be in place. Non-economic migrants (espe-
cially dependants and refugees) are the main target groups of these mea-
sures９.
The above discussed conceptual framework and characteristics of na-
tional migration regimes feed into the empirical approach of this paper by
suggesting a set of assumptions that can be placed under empirical scru-
tiny. The overarching hypothesis is that immigration policies are likely to
shape not only the categorical composition of immigration flows, but also
the labour market outcomes of the different categories of migrants. In the
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short term, an advantage for economic migrants should arise from profes-
sional/skill selection mechanisms that fine-tune migrant characteristics to
labour demand – as well as from the different nature and motivations of
non-economic migration. Nevertheless, the impact of the immigration ca-
tegory may be assumed to decrease with the duration of stay because
restrictions to employment and benefits are lifted and/or because of the
role of employment support structures targeting immigrant exclusion.
Category-specific selection processes are also likely to operate, particularly
for immigration categories that are more temporary in nature１０. Impact of
the immigration category on entry is also expected to vary by sex because
of the gender-specific nature of some immigration channels (especially
family reunification). While some consistency in the differential outcomes
of labour and non-economic migrants can be expected in all national con-
texts, potentially divergent trajectories for some categories as a result of
country-specific entry criteria, conditions attached to the different immi-
gration statuses and the different capacity of national integration policies
to maximise employment opportunities of newcomers can also be antici-
pated.
４ Empirical estimates: the migrant workforce by
category of entry
Empirical analyses included in this paper are based on statistical exploita-
tion of the EU-LFS AHM 2008１１. Despite some well-known limitations in
quality and coverage１２, the LFS is commonly used across the EU to produce
data on migrant workers in employment and includes sample sizes for the
migrant workforce large enough to conduct disaggregated analyses in most
EU-15 countries (Eurostat, 2010). Given the policy-related nature of the core
questions addressed in this paper, I focused my analysis on first generation
migrants, namely foreign-born individuals who migrated to the country of
destination when they were 15 or older – and were in the age range 15-64 at
the time of the survey. The core component of the methodology consisted
of the construction of nine categories approximating immigration status
on arrival. Due to the lack of specific information on the type of permit/
visa (or lack of) held by migrants when they entered the country, immigra-
tion categories were derived by combining information provided by the
core LFS module on country of birth, nationality and year of arrival, with
2008 AHM variables on the country of birth of parents, main reason for
(last) migration and the year of acquisition of citizenship. Nine immigra-
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tion categories were defined: 1) ancestry-based１３; 2) EU-15 / EFTA１４ mi-
grants; 3) Post-enlargement EU-12 migrants１５; 4) labour migrants with a
job found before migrating (including intra-company transfers); 5) labour
migrants with no job found before migrating; 6) migrant students; 7) inter-
national protection (asylum seekers); 8) family migrants (including both
marriage and family reunification); and 9) other migrants (residual cate-
gory). For non-EEA nationals (categories 4 to 9) immigration categories
were attributed building of the assumption that the reported reason for
migration (variable MIGREAS) was a proxy for the type of entry visa. For
Germany, a bespoke procedure (based on the correspondence between
year of entry and year of acquisition of citizenship for migrants coming
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) was used to capture
ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler)１６.
This approach is affected by apparent limitations. Employment-related
categories are defined in generic terms, with no explicit reference to coun-
try-specific visa types for the admission of labour migrants. Importantly in
countries highly affected by irregular migration such as Italy and Spain１７, it
is not possible to identify those who entered the country without a resi-
dence authorization (including both irregular migrants and those overstay-
ing tourist or visitor visas). More in general, the assumption that the stated
motivation for migration corresponds to the actual type of permit/visa
held by the migrant on arrival is a strong one, with implications for the
definition of immigration categories that are hard to gauge. The identifica-
tion of descendants of emigrants is also imprecise because the dataset only
includes information on the country of birth of parents and not of the
previous generations. In addition, analysis based on the retrospective ob-
servation of the stock of migrants living in the country at the time of the
survey is affected by the potentially highly selective nature of return migra-
tion (or re-migration). Selection processes are likely to differ by immigrant
category because labour and study migration is more temporary in nature
than family and asylum migration, as shown by analyses of UK and Swed-
ish official data (Statistics Sweden, 2011; Achato et al., 2013). While all these
caveats have to be borne in mind in the interpretation of the results, the
broad trends captured by my estimates are consistent with other data
sources – such as the OECD estimated composition of the immigrant
flows by category of entry (Lemaitre et al., 2007; OECD, various years) –
and with prior expectations based on policy differences in the national
admission systems reviewed in section 2.
The results of this procedure reveal a very different composition of the
migrant workforce by category of entry across the six LAB-MIG-GOV target
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countries１８. Labour admissions account for only 1 in 10 (or less) of the
recent migrant working-age population in countries where immigration
policies predominantly focused on rights-based admissions (France, Ger-
many and Sweden). Sweden mostly admitted non-EU migrants on family
and humanitarian grounds – with the largest proportion of asylum seekers
(20%) and family members (43%) in the six countries. Germany stands out
for the largest share of ancestry-based migrants (17%), reflecting the still
large (although decreasing) number of arrivals of Ethnic Germans from the
former Soviet Union in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the UK, the
relatively high openness to skilled labour migration resulted in more non-
EEA labour migrants entering the country with a job offer (i.e. via the work
permit system) than without, while demand for lesser skilled workers has
been met by post-enlargement EU-12 migrants (1 in 5 among recent arri-
vals). The UK, together with France, has also been the most popular desti-
nation for international students (14% of total admissions in both coun-
tries, twice as large as the EU-15 average). Given that in Italy and Spain
there has long been virtually no provision for obtaining a labour entry visa
without a job offer (Salis, 2012; Finotelli, 2012), it can be assumed that most
recent migrants who entered these countries with no residence authorisa-
tion or overstaying a temporary visa were included in the category ‘em-
ployment without a job’ (41% of the migrant working age population in
2008 in both countries). However, results for the two Southern European
destinations seem to understate the presence of post-enlargement EU-12
migrants – in 2008 Romanians were already amongst the largest immigrant
groups in both countries. This is probably due to the aforementioned lim-
itations of the LFS in recording recent arrivals.
A diachronic comparison of the composition by immigration category
of the recent and long-established migrant workforce (figures 1.a and 1.b)
seems to reveal significant changes over the last decade. With some na-
tional differences, these include: a decrease in the share of ancestry-based
arrivals (particularly in Germany) and of immigration from other EU-15
countries (Spain and Sweden); a decline of humanitarian migrants
(Sweden and Germany)１９; a general increase in the proportion of labour-
related flows (Spain and UK), particularly when the predominantly em-
ployment-oriented characterization of EU-12 migration is taken into ac-
count; and the growing importance of international student mobility
(France, Germany and the UK).
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Figure 1 Composition of the migrant workforce by immigration status on entry and
country of destination, recent and long-established migrants. EU-15 and selected
countries, 2008 (%)
Own estimates based on the EU-LFS, 2008 Ad-hoc module.
(b) long-estalished migrants (entry before 1998) 
(a) recent migrants (entry between 1998 and 2007) 
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５ Regression analyses
Standard binomial logistic regressions were used to ‘isolate’ the impact of
the immigration category on entry after controlling for the demographic
and social attributes (age, sex, education, duration of stay, relation to the
head of the household, language skills) that are typically identified as the
main determinants of migrant labour market outcomes. Estimates of the
differences between categories of entrants and the domestic labour force20
were produced for: i) the probability of being economically active; ii) the
probability of being unemployed (for those who are active); and iii) the
probability of being overqualified for the current job (for those who are
employed and have medium or high qualifications).
All model specifications were statistically significant in terms of labour
market participation, unemployment and over qualification are statisti-
cally significant in terms of both variance of the data explained by the
model and contribution of the main predictor of interest and other control
variables. However, the immigration category contributes to a lower part of
the log likelihood accounted for by the model than some other covariates
typically associated with labour market outcomes such as education, age
and sex. The models describing the determinants of unemployment and
over qualification capture a smaller portion of the variability than those on
the determinants of labour market participation.
Overall results provide support for the assumption that, ceteris paribus,
immigration category on entry plays a role in shaping migrant employ-
ment opportunities and outcomes, with statistically significant cross-cate-
gory variations found for all three labour market indicators – see Table 2.
Unsurprisingly the effect of the immigration category on the probabilities
of being active and unemployed appears to be stronger upon or soon after
arrival (Model 2). Amongst recent arrivals, those who entered with a job
offer are by far the most likely to be active in the labour market. They are
also the only category less likely than the domestic workforce to be unem-
ployed. Labour migrants without a job on entry and post-Enlargement EU-
12 migrants have levels of economic activity and unemployment not differ-
ent from the domestic labour force. In contrast, all other categories are less
likely to participate in the labour market than the domestic working age
population and have higher probabilities of being unemployed, with stu-
dents, asylum seekers and family members showing the lowest levels of
participation and asylum seekers by far the highest risk of joblessness. The
immigrant gap is even higher in terms of probability of being employed in
a job matching educational qualifications, with all categories of medium-
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and highly-educated migrants (except EU-15 workers) more likely than the
domestic workforce to be overqualified for their current job. Labour mi-
grants entering without a job offer, asylum seekers and post-enlargement
EU-12 migrants experience the largest gaps, while comparatively lower
levels of over qualification are found for those with a job before migrating.
Table 2 Logistic regressions for the probability of being economically active, unem-
ployed and overqualified. EU-15, alternative model specifications
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
All
migrants
Duration of
stay <= 5 yrs
Duration of
stay 6-10 yrs
Duration of
stay > 10 yrs
Male, dur. of
stay <= 10 yrs
Female, dur. of
stay <= 10 yrs
Probability of being economically active(a)
Immigration category(b) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EU-15 / EFTA 1.030 0.520 ** 0.558 ** 0.770 ** 0.568 ** 0.497 **
Post-enlarg.
EU-12
2.424 ** 1.023 2.938 ** 0.700 **
Empl. - job found 1.955 ** 4.507 ** 1.377 * 0.837 1.979 ** 2.275 **
Empl. - no job 2.452 ** 1.760 ** 1.668 ** 1.476 ** 1.719 ** 1.588 **
Study 0.468 ** 0.124 ** 0.432 ** 0.661 ** 0.127 ** 0.286 **
Int. protection 0.452 ** 0.100 ** 0.241 ** 0.472 ** 0.191 ** 0.142 **
Family 0.578 ** 0.254 ** 0.372 ** 0.461 ** 0.838 0.266 **
Ancestry-based 1.169 ** 0.450 ** 0.870 0.926 0.885 0.536 **
Other 0.982 0.477 ** 0.502 ** 0.880 0.531 ** 0.465 **
N 603,153 555,106 553,499 576,312 278,738 293,760
Cox & Snell R2 0.218 0.220 0.220 0.219 0.222 0.195
Nagelkerke R2 0.314 0.318 0.317 0.316 0.346 0.269
Probability of being unemployed(c)
Immigration category(d) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EU-15 / EFTA 0.892 1.411 ** 1.252 0.911 1.458 * 1.114
Post-enlarg.
EU-12
0.626 ** 0.920 0.717 1.042
Empl. - job found 0.859 0.652 * 1.010 1.312 0.981 0.869
Empl. - no job 1.090 1.102 1.407 ** 1.194 * 1.726 ** 1.089
Study 1.211 1.511 * 1.956 ** 1.828 ** 1.970 ** 1.132
Int. protection 2.033 ** 6.729 ** 3.393 ** 2.365 ** 4.011 ** 2.910 **
Family 1.616 ** 2.776 ** 2.422 ** 1.825 ** 2.315 ** 2.263 **
Ancestry-based 1.330 ** 2.301 ** 1.944 ** 1.363 ** 2.445 ** 1.694 **
Other 1.850 ** 2.128 ** 2.346 ** 2.175 ** 1.406 2.795 **
N 428,176 400,743 399,749 416,730 219,044 183,162
Cox & Snell R2 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.031
Nagelkerke R2 0.073 0.080 0.080 0.076 0.078 0.074
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
All
migrants
Duration of
stay <= 5 yrs
Duration of
stay 6-10 yrs
Duration of
stay > 10 yrs
Male, dur. of
stay <= 10 yrs
Female, dur. of
stay <= 10 yrs
Probability of being overqualified(e)
Immigration category(f) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EU-15 / EFTA 0.797 * 0.850 0.716 1.083 0.609 ** 1.055
Post-enlarg. EU-12 4.573 ** 5.641 ** 5.481 ** 6.190 **
Empl. - job found 1.897 ** 1.827 ** 3.171 ** 2.170 ** 1.830 ** 3.449 **
Empl. - no job 4.614 ** 7.421 ** 6.113 ** 4.657 ** 4.040 ** 12.0-
48
**
Study 1.448 ** 2.717 ** 1.695 ** 1.230 2.254 ** 1.915 **
Int. protection 3.127 ** 6.419 ** 7.051 ** 2.768 ** 6.914 ** 7.001 **
Family 3.273 ** 4.846 ** 4.799 ** 3.053 ** 4.495 ** 4.983 **
Ancestry-based 2.202 ** 2.985 ** 3.241 ** 2.241 ** 3.055 ** 3.145 **
Other 2.059 ** 1.813 ** 3.735 ** 2.103 ** 3.106 ** 2.538 **
N 277,134 256,060 255,101 265,776 136,147 125,050
Cox & Snell R2 0.063 0.054 0.052 0.046 0.057 0.069
Nagelkerke R2 0.114 0.100 0.098 0.087 0.108 0.123
Covariates(g) Sex, age, education, relation to head of household, language, duration of stay
Legend: ** statistically significant at 99% confidence level; * statistically significant at 95% confidence level.
Notes: (a) Dependent variable: working status (0=inactive, 1=active). (b) Reference category: domestic working
age population (native-born + foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (c) Dependent variable:
employment status (0=employed, 1=unemployed). (d) Reference category: domestic labour force (native-born +
foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (e) Dependent variable: overqualified (0=no, 1=yes).
Overqualification was defined by comparing education (only for those with medium and high educational levels)
with the occupational level (Low = ISCO 9, Medium = ISCO 4-8, High = ISCO 1-3). (f) Reference category:
domestic employment (native-born + foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (g) Age (15-24, 25-39,
40-54, 55-64); education (Low = ISCED 0-2, Medium = ISCED 3-4, High = ISCED 5-6); relationship to head of the
household (head of household, spouse or partner, child or ascendant, other); language (no need to improve
language skills to get a job; need to improve language skills to get a job); duration of stay (native-born, 1-4
years, 5-9 years, 10-19 years, 20 years or more).
Source: Own estimates based on the EU-LFS, 2008 Ad-hoc module.
As duration of stay increases (models 3 and 4), partial convergence of
employment outcomes to those of the domestic workforce is observed.
This implies that after 10 years or more differences across immigration
categories are also greatly reduced: on the one hand, labour migrants lose
all or part of their advantage in participation and employment levels; on
the other, the participation and employment gap significantly declines
amongst all non-economic categories, particularly humanitarian mi-
grants. However, even in the long term those who entered via asylum,
family reunification and – perhaps surprisingly – study routes retain
some gap in their access to employment. The assimilation hypothesis –
that migrant employment outcomes become more similar to those of the
domestic workforce as their duration of stay increases – finds some em-
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pirical support also in terms of access to qualified jobs, but large gaps
remain even after 10+ years of residence for most categories, especially
labour migrants who entered without a job offer. Students are the main
exception, being the only non-EEA migrant group not experiencing high-
er risk of getting a job below their qualification if they stay for 10 or more
years. A singularity is also that there is little or no change in the differ-
entials between native and migrant probabilities of being overqualified
over the first 5-10 years.
Analyses disaggregated by sex (Models 5 and 6) show some significant
gender differences. In terms of activity levels, a gender gap is mostly
visible for two categories: post-enlargement EU-12 male migrants outper-
form labour participation rates of their domestic counterpart (and of all
other categories of male migrants), which is not the case for post-enlar-
gement EU-12 migrant women; similarly, the levels of exclusion from the
labour market of migrant spouses are significantly higher only amongst
women, while migrant men are not less likely than the domestic working
age population to look for a job if they enter the country via the family
reunification route. Comparisons by sex of the probability of being un-
employed display less marked differences across categories, with mi-
grant men generally facing higher risks of unemployment than women
compared to the native labour force for all immigration categories. Per-
haps the most striking gender difference is observed in the levels of over
qualifications of labour migrants, with female migrant workers (particu-
larly if entering without a job offer) experiencing a much larger gap in
accessing qualified jobs matching their educational level than male la-
bour migrants. This result may be ascribable – at least partly – to the vast
increase in the employment of migrant women (many of whom edu-
cated Eastern Europeans) in low skilled jobs in the household and care
sector (Cangiano, 2014). In contrast, similarly high levels of disadvantage
amongst men and women are observed for non-economic entry cate-
gories.
Some methodological caveats in the interpretation of these findings
should be considered in relation to possible selection effects operating
differently for the various immigration categories. The immigrant gap in
the probability of being active might vary by category because of genuine
differences in the propensity to participate in the labour market and not
only because of access conditions dictated by the immigration status. This
does not apply to the probabilities of being unemployed and overqualified,
because only people who are, respectively, willing to work or currently
employed are considered in the analysis. Employment levels might how-
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ever be affected by the type of jobs that different categories of migrants do,
e.g. migrants who enter the country with a job offer are likely to be over-
represented in highly skilled jobs that tend to be more secure and less
exposed to the risk of unemployment. Category-selective impact of return
migration (e.g. temporary migrant workers and students more likely to
leave than family migrants) and the changing composition by country of
origin of immigrant flows over time (e.g. the rise in East-Asian student
migration) can also affect the comparison of labour market outcomes by
duration of stay (Models 2, 3 and 4).
The general definition of entry categories used in this paper does not
allow for separate analysis of the short-term effects of country-specific
admission criteria and restrictions attached to non-EEA immigration sta-
tuses before migrants are granted permanent residency. However, na-
tional-level analyses can provide some clues on the differential capacity
of European migration regimes to enhance labour market inclusion of
different categories of migrants in the long term. To this end, regression
models shown in table 3 only included migrants who spent at least five
years in the host country２１.
Table 3 Country-level logistic regressions for the probability of being economically ac-
tive, unemployed and overqualified (duration of stay > 5 yrs)
France Germany Italy Spain Sweden UK
Probability of being economically active(a)
Immigration category(b) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EEA 1.126 0.816 * 0.577 * 0.519 ** 0.286 ** 0.720 *
Empl. - job found 1.210 0.830 1.848 ** 1.391 2.090 *
Empl. - no job 2.639 ** 2.029 ** 0.745
Study 0.516 ** 0.488 **
Int. protection 0.410 ** 0.300 ** 0.172 **
Family 0.432 ** 0.391 ** 0.709 ** 0.875 0.289 ** 0.184 **
Ancestry-based 0.572 ** 1.223 * 0.639 * 1.272 0.420 **
Other 0.910 0.672 ** 0.853 1.225 0.237 ** 0.405 **
N 37,948 26,412 105,303 66,348 45,373 62,027
Cox & Snell R2 0.296 0.188 0.289 0.220 0.199 0.167
Nagelkerke R2 0.420 0.284 0.395 0.317 0.314 0.248
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0433
<CMS1404_02_CANG_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 13:34>
433CANGIANO
MIGRATION POLICIES AND MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
France Germany Italy Spain Sweden UK
Probability of being unemployed(c)
Immigration category(d) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EEA 1.061 0.577 ** 0.281 1.534 1.460 1.086
Empl. - job found 1.931 ** 1.549 ** 0.530 1.232 1.449
Empl. - no job 1.026 1.564 ** 1.352
Study 1.910 * 1.186
Int. protection 1.776 ** 3.427 ** 2.264 **
Family 2.888 ** 1.046 1.857 ** 1.909 ** 2.846 ** 2.327 **
Ancestry-based 2.248 ** 0.927 2.153 * 2.364 ** 1.319
Other 1.470 1.887 ** 1.095 2.342 ** 3.138 * 1.242
N 26,122 20,268 64,199 45,984 39,051 45,954
Cox & Snell R2 0.036 0.026 0.040 0.043 0.061 0.039
Nagelkerke R2 0.088 0.064 0.104 0.087 0.169 0.116
Probability of being overqualified(e)
Immigration category(f) Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig.
EEA 0.996 0.8834-
402283-
826486
0.576 1.041 1.189 0.913
Empl. - job found 2.834 ** 2.805 ** 12.194 ** 4.492 ** 0.423 **
Empl. - no job 11.128 ** 6.080 ** 1.488
Study 2.516 ** 1.297
Int. protection 3.297 ** 3.848 ** 2.232 **
Family 2.711 ** 3.340 ** 6.374 ** 5.538 ** 3.602 ** 2.358 **
Ancestry-based 1.418 3.717 ** 0.859 1.815 0.614
Other 4.855 ** 1.566 ** 2.714 ** 2.435 ** 1.910 1.763 **
N 17,841 16,128 36,361 23,385 30,668 33,849
Cox & Snell R2 0.049 0.050 0.068 0.112 0.035 0.038
Nagelkerke R2 0.089 0.097 0.158 0.168 0.080 0.065
Covariates(g) Sex, age, education, relation to head of household, language
Legend: ** statistically significant at 99% confidence level; * statistically significant at 95% confidence level.
Categories with small numerosity in national samples are not shown.
Notes: (a) Dependent variable: working status (0=inactive, 1=active). (b) Reference category: domestic working
age population (native-born + foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (c) Dependent variable:
employment status (0 = employed, 1 = unemployed). (d) Reference category: domestic labour force (native-born
+ foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (e) Dependent variable: overqualified (0 = no, 1 = yes).
Overqualification was defined by comparing education (only for those with medium and high educational levels)
with the occupational level (Low = ISCO 9, Medium = ISCO 4-8, High = ISCO 1-3). (f) Reference category:
domestic employment (native-born + foreign-born who migrated when younger than 15). (g) Age (15-24, 25-39,
40-54, 55-64); education (Low = ISCED 0-2, Medium = ISCED 3-4, High = ISCED 5-6); relationship to head of the
household (head of household, spouse or partner, child or ascendant, other); language (no need to improve
language skills to get a job; need to improve language skills to get a job).
Source: Own estimates based on the EU-LFS, 2008 Ad-hoc module.
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Differences across national contexts seem to reflect – or at least relate to –
the aforementioned characteristics of national migration regimes. In coun-
tries with a de-facto open approach to labour migration (i.e. the UK, Italy
and Spain) established labour migrants have generally higher levels of
participation in the labour market than the domestic workforce and no or
small differences in the levels of unemployment. In contrast, amongst the
countries that have been more restrictive in admitting migrant workers,
after five or more years of stay labour migrants experience either a large
participation gap (Sweden) or a significant employment gap (Germany and
France). As regards non-economic migrants, outcomes substantially vary
by country of destination. In Italy and Spain family migrants display small
participation gaps with the domestic workforce, while this is not the case
in the UK and Sweden where settled family migrants – as well as refugees –
are considerably less likely to be active and more likely to be unemployed.
Estimates for Germany suggest that the probability to be in employment
for ancestry-based migrants is not significantly different from the domestic
labour force.
At national level, the skill underutilization of labour migrants is parti-
cularly high in Italy and Spain. In these two countries where migrant
recruitment predominantly occurred at the bottom of the skill ladder,
labour migrants have either same (Spain) or lower (Italy) probability to
be in a job with skill levels congruent to their educational qualifications
than non-economic categories. In contrast, the UK is the only country
where migrant workers who enter with a job offer are less likely to be
overqualified after 5 or more years in the country – and even those enter-
ing without a job offer are not significantly different from the domestic
workforce. This seems to suggest that the demand-driven work permit
system has been relatively effective in meeting the needs for high skilled
labour of the UK economy and in providing migrants with relatively good
prospects to capitalize on their skills. For all immigration systems prioritis-
ing admissions on non-economic grounds, high levels of over qualification
are observed: in these countries spouses, asylum seekers (in Sweden and
Germany) and ancestry-based migrants (in Germany) who joined the la-
bour market have mostly been employed in jobs below their educational
qualifications. This seems to provide some support for the argument of a
functional role of non-economic admissions in meeting labour demand at
the bottom of the skill ladder and in mitigating demand for lesser skilled
work-related admissions from outside the EU (Pastore, 2014). It is also
interesting to note the difference between the two countries which have
recently admitted the largest numbers of international students (the UK
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and France), as migrants who entered the UK for study reason and stayed
on after the completion of their studies had greater chances to find a job
matching their qualifications and to ‘assimilate’ to the domestic workforce.
６ Conclusions
Despite some methodological caveats, analyses carried out in this paper
provide some robust findings that fill, at least in part, significant evidence
gaps in migration research and policy literature. Migrants entering via
labour migration channels have systematically higher employment rates
than the domestic workforce, while humanitarian and family migrants are,
even after controlling for other socio-demographic attributes, the least
likely to be employed in all selected countries. The disadvantage of so-
called non-economic categories becomes particularly evident at the inter-
section of immigration status and gender (i.e. for female spouses and asy-
lum seekers). While it is difficult to disentangle the economic, institutional
and motivational factors underpinning these employment gaps, evidence
that immigration category on entry is associated with differential employ-
ment outcomes appears to be robust. Across national admission systems,
this results in a negative correlation between openness to labour migration
and the gap between domestic and migrant employment rates – i.e. the
immigrant employment gap is lower in the UK, Spain and Italy than in
Sweden, France and Germany where the proportion of non-economic im-
migration categories in the migrant workforce is higher.
This is not to say, however, that ‘non-economic’ migrants are not in-
volved in the labour market once they settle in the country of destination.
On the contrary, the majority of them look for and find a job. Indeed an
interesting finding of this paper is that the gap between labour and other
immigration categories is significantly reduced (or even disappear) for the
long-established migrant workforce as a result of higher participation le-
vels of ‘non-economic’ migrants as well as of lower participation levels of
non-EEA labour migrants. While it was not possible to ascertain the role of
differential return and re-migration patterns by category of entry, there
seems to be strong enough evidence that employment opportunities of
family and humanitarian migrants are also likely to improve as they
acquire language skills and other competences that are valued in the des-
tination country’s labour market.
In terms of ‘quality’ of migrant employment, evidence presented in this
paper reiterates results showing a significant waste of immigrant skills in
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most European economies (e.g. Eurostat, 2011: 51). While all categories of
migrants are more likely than the domestic workforce to be overqualified
for their job, differences exist in the extent of this outcome. The loss of ‘skill
potential’ relative to the domestic labour force is particularly high for
refugees, post-enlargement EU-12 and non-economic immigration cate-
gories. This seems to suggest that in countries with limited provision for
lesser-skilled labour migration, the employment of family members, refu-
gees and ancestry-based migrants (in Germany) below their qualifications
has been functional to meeting the needs for low skilled labour in the
economy. However, in several EU countries the loss of skill potential is
also significant amongst labour migrants. This is particularly the case in
Italy and Spain, where recurrent regularizations of migrants working in
lesser skilled occupations implied that medium or highly skilled labour
migrants experience even higher chances to be overqualified for their job
than non-economic categories. Even more strikingly, female labour mi-
grants (particularly those without a job offer) seem to experience far great-
er levels of over qualification than their male counterpart. This gender gap
is, again, particularly large in Italy and Spain – where non-EU female work-
ers are often employed as domestic helpers and care workers – but also
significant in Germany and France.
These findings suggest some key lessons for migration policy-making.
The first is that EU labour migration debates are often too narrowly framed
– if not misplaced – in portraying a divide between ‘economic migrants’
that help meet labour shortages and rights-based immigration categories
that are referred to as a burden on the welfare system. Our results suggest
that a more holistic approach to the governance of labour migration
should not only take into account the short-term needs of the labour
market (and select those workers who are supposedly most suited to fulfil
these needs), but also the long-term trends of migrant labour supply which
are characterised by increased economic participation of migrants who
entered outside labour migration channels.
The second, related, aspect is that there is still considerable scope for
policy interventions enhancing the economic integration of so-called ‘non-
economic migrants’. Especially in the short run, the labour market disad-
vantage of these categories is large, not only in terms of high levels of
inactivity – which might be partly voluntary and reflect different motiva-
tional factors and migratory plans of these categories – but also in terms of
higher unemployment rates. This is particularly the case in countries such
as Sweden and France where admissions on family and humanitarian
grounds make up a large share of immigrant flows and where much em-
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phasis is placed on migrant integration as a desired outcome of migration
policies. Measures to address the initial labour market exclusion and allow
migrants who want to work to take full advantage of their potential from
(or soon after) arrival should focus on both the removal of institutional
barriers (restrictions in the access to employment support services and
non-recognition of educational titles) and on enhancing employability
(e.g. language and training courses).
Finally, the association between the channels of entry and the levels of
over qualification calls for a deeper reflection on – and further analysis of –
the links between immigrant selection criteria and the matching of
migrant skills to labour demand in the host economy. The limited provi-
sion for recognition of foreign qualifications and low recognition rates in
most EU countries (see tab. 1) clearly testifies to a lack of prioritisation of
this issue in migration policies. The current emphasis on formal qualifica-
tions as selection criteria that maximise migrant prospects of socio-eco-
nomic integration may also prove inadequate if skill-selected migrants
admitted via Points-Based Systems end up working in low skilled jobs
(e.g. Altorjai 2013; Reitz 2013). Innovative solutions are also needed to
address the gender dimension of over qualification, for example targeting
the needs of women who migrate to follow their partners and experience a
disruption in their career path. Yet over qualification has diverse root
causes and its non-transient nature implies that further action such as
labour market reforms are also needed to enhance migrant prospects of
upward socio-economic mobility over the long run. A longitudinal exten-
sion of this study could provide further insights into the relationship
between selective migration policies and the labour market trajectories of
skilled migrants.
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Notes
1 . Less measurable factors may also underpin these gaps, for example discriminatory
practices excluding migrants from the most qualifying jobs; and the migrant ‘temporary
mindset’ which makes them more likely to accept low-skilled or low-paid jobs unap-
pealing to local workers because of the comparative gains relative to the conditions
prevailing in the migrant country of origin (e.g. Anderson and Ruhs, 2010).
2. For example, some comparative work (Kogan, 2007; Wanner, 2011) analysed the deter-
minants of immigrant economic integration with a multi-level framework including
dummy variables and other aggregate indicators representing the migration policy
context in different countries, obtaining varying results on the influence of these vari-
ables.
3. European censuses and major national household surveys do not record immigration
status on entry or the type of permit migrants hold at the time of the data collection.
Similarly, administrative data sources (e.g. population registers, social security records)
do not normally keep track of the legal situation of migrants as they progress through
the system – and also provide limited information on employment. However, register
data from Sweden and other Scandinavian countries do include information on the
category of entry (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2009).
4. In 2004, transitional restrictions of the right to work for citizens of the eight Central and
Eastern European accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) were adopted by all EU-15 member
states except Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Cypriot and Maltese nationals were not
subjected to any transitional arrangements. In 2007, initial unrestricted access to the
labour market for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals was only granted by Finland and
Sweden.
5. Between 2004 and 2010 the UK (16%), Austria (15%) and France (12%) were the EU
countries featuring the largest share of international students in tertiary enrolment
(OECD, 2013: 34). However, in the UK recent policy restrictions in the student admis-
sion and post-study route have produced a marked decrease in immigration for study
reason (ONS, 2014: fig. 3.11).
6. However, the question of whether immigration policies actually succeed in letting in
only migrants with desired skills and attributes (and whose migratory plans match
allocated visas) deserves some critical consideration. Research has shown that some
migrants apply for certain types of visa depending on the expectation they have of
entering the country (Anderson, 2010). For example, if potential migrants perceive
that their prospects of being granted a work permit have decreased as a result of more
restrictive criteria, they may decide to apply for a self-employment or a student visa to
access the destination country’s labour market. In Anderson’s words (2010: 308), «im-
migration controls are not a neutral framework facilitating the sorting of individuals by
intentions and identities into particular categories, rather they produce status». At the
macro-level, these strategies to circumvent the system might lead to increasing irregu-
lar migration or to categorical substitution effects – i.e. the shift of immigration flows
from one legal avenue to another (e.g. from labour to family migration) (Czaika and de
Haas, 2013).
7. Renewal of work permits is typically conditional on the availability of a job, with job-
search periods of variable duration after the end of the previous employment relation-
ship.
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8. For example, studies looking at the role of regularization and naturalization in enhan-
cing migrant employment opportunities confirmed the positive impact of these status
changes (e.g. Carfagna et al., 2008; OECD, 2010).
9. For example, in Sweden Bevelander and Pendakur (2009) find significant differences in
employment trajectories of government assisted refugees, landed refugees and family
reunion immigrants and conclude that these differences result from category-specific
integration policies.
10. This affects particularly international students: while most of them leave after complet-
ing their studies, those who stay are likely to be ‘positively’ selected because of the
requirement to find a job in order to shift to a work permit.
1 1 . A more comprehensive account of the approach used in the construction of the nine
immigration categories can be found in Cangiano (2012).
12. Estimates of the migrant population and workforce provided by the LFS are likely to be
conservative, although their level of inaccuracy is hard to predict. In particular, irregu-
lar migrants are likely to escape the survey. For a detailed account of the limitations of
the LFS in producing migration data see Martí and Ródenas (2007).
13. This category includes individuals born abroad but citizens of the country of destina-
tion from birth; and migrants whose father and/or mother were born in the country of
destination.
14. Nationals of the countries of the European Free trade Association (Iceland, Liechten-
stein, Norway and Switzerland) enjoy unrestricted labour mobility in the European
Union.
15. For the sake of simplicity, different transitional arrangements for the mobility of new
citizens adopted by former member states were not considered. Also, it was not possi-
ble to differentiate between EU-10 and EU2 accessions as post 2007 migrants are not
sufficiently captured in the dataset.
16. The variable ‘Age of acquisition of citizenship’ included in the AHM 2008 is in 5-year
age groups, so it was not possible to identify the exact year of acquisition of citizenship.
It is also possible that ethnic Germans were somewhat underestimated because my
procedure does not capture those whose parents were already German nationals– see
Cangiano (2012) for further details.
17. Regularization data for Italy and Spain suggest that in these countries very significant
proportions of regular migrants acquired a residence permit (mostly for employment
purposes) when they were already living and working irregularly (e.g. Cangiano and
Strozza, 2008).
18. It is worthwhile noting that some immigration categories are clearly gender-unba-
lanced: at EU level, 60% of recent labour migrants and asylum seekers are men; while
70% (or more in some destination countries) of family migrants are women (see Can-
giano 2012).
19. This is the combined effect of declining asylum applications (Germany) and the drop in
recognition rates until the mid-2000s (Toshkov and De Haan, 2013).
20. The term ‘domestic’ working age population is used from here on to include the native-
born population and foreign-born individuals who migrated when younger than 15.
21 . Comparison across countries is however hindered by different labour market struc-
tures. For example, it is no coincidence that immigrant gaps in activity and unemploy-
ment are larger in countries where native workers have higher activity rates and lower
unemployment levels. This is also true for the probability of being overqualified – the
gap is larger in countries with occupational structures skewed towards lower skilled
jobs.
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Abstract
With the aim of developing existing theories of labour immigration policy, I
focus on the question of persisting demand for foreign workers during
economic downturns and how governments attempt to respond to this. The
argument is that, apart from turning a blind eye to irregular labour migration,
there are two ways in which governments respond to demand for migrant
labour during economic hard times. First, despite a rhetorical emphasis on
restricting labour immigration, they continue to facilitate the entry of highly
skilled labour migrants and the employment of migrants who enter a country
with a non-economic motive. Second, they encourage resident workers to
take up jobs in occupations where migrant workers are concentrated. This
hypothesis is borne out in my exploration of French and British government
responses to foreign labour demand between 2008 and 2013.
Keywords: labour immigration, labour supply, policy, Britain, France, economic
downturn
１ Introduction
The focus of the existing literature on immigration policy differs depending
on whether the context is good or bad economic times. In the good times,
scholars analyse government facilitation of labour immigration and the
role of stakeholders, such as employers and trade unions, in the policy
process (Krings, 2009; Menz, 2005). In the bad times, the emphasis is over-
whelmingly on government attempts to control and restrict immigration,
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particularly labour immigration (Cornelius et al., 1994; Guiraudon and
Joppke 2001). The dominant image presented in the latter analyses is of a
gap or disjuncture between public opinion and immigration policies and
above all between policy and levels of immigration (Freeman 1995;
Hollifield 2004; Joppke, 1998). The argument is that the preference among
the public at large, and at times also of governments, for low levels of
immigration is often not reflected in immigration policy or in actual levels
of immigration due to economic and political liberal constraints on gov-
ernment action. For example, Freeman has posited that organised inter-
ests, for example employer organisations, are better able to influence pol-
icy than the public and generally push for liberal labour immigration po-
licies (1995). Similarly, the gap between labour immigration policy and
levels of immigration can be explained by the fact that employers, arguably
especially during economic downturns, have a large appetite for relatively
cheap and compliant migrant labour. Consequently, even if labour immi-
gration policies are restrictive, the strong demand for and supply of foreign
labour results in irregular labour immigration. Furthermore, some scholars
emphasise that governments are cognisant of the economic benefits of
irregular migration and consequently tolerate it (Castles, 2004).
This article focuses more closely on the question of persisting demand
for foreign workers during economic downturns and how governments
attempt to respond to this. The argument is that, apart from turning a
blind eye to irregular labour migration, there are two ways in which gov-
ernments respond to migrant labour demand during economic slumps.
First, they continue to facilitate the entry and employment of certain cate-
gories of migrants who are considered to be important labour market
actors and whose entry they deem will be the least likely to upset public
opinion – and consequently their chances of re-election. I refer in particu-
lar to facilitating the entry of highly skilled labour immigrants, with skills
ostensibly not available on the domestic market and whose education is
perceived to facilitate their integration into society (Ruhs and Martin,
2008). But I also refer to the continuing provision of labour market access
to “indirect labour migrants,” those who enter a country with a non-eco-
nomic motive, for example family reunification or study. As the govern-
ment does not permit the latter to enter in order to work, it is, I argue, less
likely to be blamed for irresponsibly facilitating labour immigration in the
context of an economic slump. Second, they try to substitute migrant
workers１ with resident unemployed workers, by encouraging and obliging
the latter to engage in training and take up employment in occupations in
which migrant workers are significantly employed. It should be noted that
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the opposing pressures of employer demand for foreign workers and public
opposition to immigration are relatively constant fixtures in the minds of
immigration policy makers. However, the subjective pressure felt by pol-
icymakers to restrict labour immigration is much stronger during periods
of economic downturn and rising unemployment, as can be seen by
changes in government policy on immigration across advanced democra-
cies during these periods (OECD, 2009).
Important theorising on immigration policy in Europe in the context of
inclement economic conditions was done between the 1970s and 1990s.
However, the politico-economic climate has changed considerably since
the late 1990s. Governments now work firmly within a paradigm of global
economic integration. Human capital competitiveness has become a key
policy aim in most European states and the facilitation of highly skilled
migrant workers has been viewed, since the late 1990s, as a requirement of
open competitive economies (Devitt, 2010). In this sense, a complete clo-
sure to labour immigration, as occurred in the early 1970s in much of North
West Europe, is, I contend, highly unlikely today. Analyses of government
reactions to the current economic crisis, in terms of immigration, have so
far been largely produced by international organisations such as the OECD
and IOM. The focus of these analyses has been on changes to immigration
policy rather than on the question of labour supply during economic crises.
This paper thus aims to fill gaps in the literature in two main ways; it
approaches immigration policy in economic hard times in a novel way by
focusing on the question of government responses to on-going labour de-
mand; and it focuses on the current international economic crisis, which
has occurred in a markedly different politico-economic context than that
of the 1970s.
In particular, I explore how governments in two large European states,
Britain and France, have attempted to respond to foreign labour demand
between 2008 and 2013, based on analysis of official documents and inter-
views with policymakers and stakeholders in each state (see appendix).
The paper begins with a brief description of labour immigration policy in
the two countries in the period prior to the international financial crisis,
between the late 1990s and 2007, in order to assist readers in gauging the
level of policy change in the following period. Then, the paper compares
government policy across three dimensions: highly skilled labour immigra-
tion; indirect labour immigration; and substituting migrant workers with
resident workers. I then provide an explanation for differences in policy
choice in the two states and finish with some concluding remarks on how
this analysis contributes to immigration policy theory.
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0447
<CMS1404_03_DEVI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 13:44>
447DEVITT
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO FOREIGN WORKER DEMAND DURING ECONOMIC CRISES
２ Labour immigration policies late １９９０s-２００７
In the late 1990s, the discourse on labour immigration began to change in
Western Europe in the context of concerns regarding demographic decline
and labour shortages. British Labour governments decisively broke with
previous discourse, emphasising the contribution that economic migration
can make to the economy. The new policy approach which developed was
based around the concept of “managed migration” (Home Office, 2002).
Managed migration involves strong controls on unauthorised and non-
economic migration, in particular asylum-seeking, and the facilitation of
economic migration.
Between 2000 and 2004, the work permit system was eased and new
schemes were introduced for high and low skilled workers. The number of
work permits and first permissions issued between 1995 and 2005 more
than tripled (Somerville, 2007). New Labour also decided not to impose
restrictions on the free movement of workers from the new EU member
states on their accession on the 1st of May 2004. The strategy was to fill low
skilled labour needs with workers from the new member states and restrict
non-EU migration to the highly skilled. The numbers were far greater than
expected and public opinion polls generally showed an increasingly nega-
tive stance on immigration, with a majority preferring a reduction in in-
flows (Boswell, 2009).
In response to growing public concerns about immigration, Labour’s
third term saw a major consultation on how to manage economic migra-
tion, the outcome of which was the Points Based System (PBS), which was
rolled out from 2008. It consolidated existing work and study routes into
five main categories or “tiers”. Prospective immigrants gain entry if they
reach the required threshold of points, which are based on various criteria,
depending on the particular route through which they are applying. For
example, in the new Tier 2 general, prospective immigrants gain points for
a “graduate” job offer with a licensed “sponsor” (employer), prospective
earnings, English language ability and maintenance funds. Furthermore,
an independent advisory body on immigration policy was created in June
2007: the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).
Since the late 1990s, the French debate on labour immigration has been
fed by concerns over the integration of resident migrant workers and des-
cendants of immigrants, as well as the objective of ensuring economic
competitiveness in a globalised world. The cross-party aim of gearing la-
bour immigration towards the highly skilled – and, particularly among the
centre right, reducing levels of family reunification – has become progres-
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0448
<CMS1404_03_DEVI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 13:44>
448 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
sively stabilised. The basic consensus on labour immigration has been
hidden behind highly charged political conflict on other aspects of the
immigration regime, for example, rights to family reunification and the
treatment of irregular migrants. Immigration had become a major political
issue in the early 1980s with the growth of the Front National (FN) anti-
immigration party (Bertossi 2008).
The first elements of a selective immigration policy were introduced in
1998 by the centre-left government of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, includ-
ing a special immigration status for scientists and scholars (Weil, 2006).
Stimulated by concerns about economic competitiveness, the policy of
facilitating economic immigration was further developed by Minister of
the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, in the following centre-right government.
Sarkozy maintained that at that time legal immigration consisted only of
immigration subie, family and asylum inflows, which France was forced to
accept, as opposed to immigration choisie, which was one selected to
respond to the economy’s needs and integration capacity (Lochak, 2006).
The 24th July 2006 Immigration and Integration Law (loi relative à l’immi-
gration et à l’intégration) aimed to facilitate the access to the labour market
of skilled foreign workers and students. For example, the law introduced
shortage occupation lists and a “Skills and Talents” permit for highly skilled
people. On election to the French presidency in May 2007, Sarkozy ordered
the Minister for the Interior to aim to make economic immigration 50% of
total migrant inflows.
Between 2006 and 2008, economic migration to France rose from a total
of 11,678 to 21,352. This growth was, however, unlikely to have been the result
of the 2006 law. The decree establishing the shortage occupation list for non-
EU workers was only published in 2007 and all of the new permits and
categories represent small numbers. Four years after its introduction, only
317 foreign nationals were issued with Skills and Talents permits in 2010.
３ British and French labour supply policies ２００８-２０１３
The international financial crisis of 2008 led to the re-introduction of re-
strictions on labour immigration in most European states. As noted above,
attempts to place stronger controls on labour immigration pre-dated this
crisis in Britain and can be seen as a reaction to the size of migratory
inflows following the Eastern enlargement of 2004. However, attempts to
reduce levels of labour immigration came following the crisis in both
states. At the same time, in order to ensure that employers could continue
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0449
<CMS1404_03_DEVI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 13:44>
449DEVITT
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO FOREIGN WORKER DEMAND DURING ECONOMIC CRISES
to access skills, highly skilled labour immigration was protected. Further-
more, both states continued to allow the labour market participation of
family migrants, though student labour market participation was con-
strained in Britain. Finally, the policy of attempting to substitute immi-
grant labour with resident labour was more developed in the British case.
３.１ Highly skilled labour immigration
British immigration policy shifted sharply from expansive to restrictive
between 2009 and 2010. However, while governments have attempted to
reduce numbers of non-EU labour immigrants by, for example, raising the
skill threshold and imposing a numerical cap on certain inflows, significant
numbers of highly skilled immigrants were excluded from the new restric-
tions. Indeed, we can see a disjuncture between rhetoric and policy remi-
niscent of that identified in scholarship on government responses to irre-
gular labour immigration (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). Despite strong
political commitments to reducing immigration, there is clearly a simulta-
neous economic interest, in this case voiced by multi-national companies
and other actors, in keeping the door ajar.
In France, the volte-face on labour immigration occurred later than in
Britain, two years later in fact. This was partly because the French economy
began to feel the heat of the crisis later than in Britain (in 2009). However,
levels of labour immigration, already low compared to Britain, did not fall
sharply in France. Thus it appears that despite the crisis, government offi-
cials saw fit to continue to permit skilled migrants to enter the country.
３.１.１ Britain
With the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the approach to labour
immigration in Britain changed definitively. In that year, the House of
Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs published a report on the
“Economic Impact of Immigration”, which questioned the positive consen-
sus regarding the benefits of immigration. It maintained that there was a
risk that too much migration would reduce incentives for training, and was
contributing to the increase in housing prices, among other problems
(Devitt, 2010). The Labour government began to make qualitative adjust-
ments to the PBS in order to reduce inflows, for example strengthening the
Resident Labour Market Test (RLMT)２ in 2009 by lengthening the required
advertising period to four weeks.
Mirroring Thatcher’s Conservative party victory in the 1979 elections
(Schain, 2006), the Conservative party gained votes in the 2010 general
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election due to its tough line on immigration. As Prime Minister David
Cameron stated in March 2013:
As I’ve long argued, under the previous government immigration was far too
high and the system was badly out of control. Net migration needs to come
down radically from hundreds of thousands a year, to just tens of thousands,
and as we bring net migration down so we must also make sure that Britain
continues to benefit from it (Cameron, 2013).
Since in government, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition have
made some qualitative changes to the largest Tier of the PBS, Tier 2 (for
highly skilled migrant workers with a job offer in the UK), in order to
reduce the number of applicants; raising the job skill, language and the
minimum pay thresholds. Furthermore, the list of occupations on the
shortage occupation list was also shortened in September 2011.
Most controversially, in line with the Conservative electoral commit-
ment to reduce net migration to the “tens of thousands, not hundreds of
thousands”, the government introduced an annual cap on some categories
of non-EEA３ economic migrants. Since April 2011, the annual cap for Tier 2
has been set at 20,700. The government also decided to limit Tier 1, the
entry-channel which does not require a job offer in the UK prior to entry, to
investors, entrepreneurs, and people of “exceptional talent” (for whom
there are a maximum of 1,000 permits).
There has, however, been a general acceptance of the Conservative
restrictions on immigration among the main parties and stakeholders,
who display little appetite to oppose the general thrust of policy. While
the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties did not support the idea of a cap
on labour inflows, qualitative restrictions appear to be less controversial.
Only a few employer associations, which are affected by the restrictions, in
particular the ethnic catering industry, have been vociferously critical of
current policy (Interview BIS1, BHA). The trade unions have also tempered
their pro-migrant perspective and have begun to put more emphasis on
the need to upskill local workers (Interviews HO, TUC).
This, I argue, can be partly explained by the fact that the changes intro-
duced by the Conservatives are far less dramatic than might appear from
the party rhetoric. Indeed, Intra-Company Transfers (ICTs) – workers mov-
ing within multi-national companies (MNCs) – are not subject to the cap,
despite the MAC recommendation to the contrary, due to the MNC em-
ployer lobby and diplomatic pressure from the Indian and Japanese gov-
ernments (Interview MAC). This is significant as the ICT route is the most
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used route of the PBS system (about 70% of Tier 2 applications) and it is
the only one, which does not necessitate an assessment of whether there
are suitable candidates in the resident labour force (MAC 2009). The Tier 2
limit also does not apply to other categories including those who apply
from within the UK (in-country applicants) or to those who will earn over
£150,000 per annum. Furthermore, the cap on Tier 1 and Tier 2 routes
introduced in April 2011 was substantially undersubscribed. This is partly
accounted for by the fact that the cap was set at a relatively high level;
indeed, the number of permits available under Tier 2 for 2011-12 was greater
than the number of certificates issued under Tier 2 (excluding ICTs) in
2009 (Migration Observatory, 2011).
Moreover, while the Labour government made the RLMT more oner-
ous in 2009, there is no public certification of the process or pre-admis-
sion checks and post-admission checks on employers are infrequent. In
2009, the MAC asserted that there may be a case for introducing certifica-
tion; however, governments have not done so due to the cost it would
entail and a political antipathy towards red tape and regulation (Inter-
view MAC).
Figure 1 Work-related migration to the UK 1991-2011
Source: Migration Observatory Oxford 2014
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Indeed, the number of people entering the UK with a definite job fell from
145,000 in 2008 to 115,000 in 2011 (see Figure 1), demonstrating a persisting
demand for migrant workers in Britain despite the crisis.４
３.１.２ France
The international financial crisis did not have an immediate effect on im-
migration policy in France. Indeed, France was the first EU member state
to transpose the European Directive 2009/50/EC of the 25th of May 2009 on
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the pur-
poses of highly qualified employment with the law of the 16th of June 2011.
Furthermore, the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII)
“Labour Immigration” website was created in April 2010 in order to make
the French labour immigration procedures more accessible to employers
and prospective migrants.
However, the approach of the government to labour immigration chan-
ged markedly from 2011. Referring to the economic crisis and rise in un-
employment from 7.7% at the end of 2007 to nearly 10%, in late May 2011,
Claude Géant, Minister for the Interior, declared that total immigration
inflows were to be reduced by 20,000 and labour immigration by 50%. He
maintained that “contrary to myth, France does not need skilled foreign
workers. Last year, 730 foreign masons entered the territory; yet when Pôle
Emploi (public employment agency) advertises 20 mason jobs, 100 jobsee-
kers in France apply” (Le nouvel observateur 2013). A decree of the 31st of
May 2011 from the Ministers of Interior and Labour aimed to reduce the
numbers of permits issued (d. l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des collecti-
vités territoriales et de l’immigration et Ministère du travail, de l’emploi et de
la santé, 2011). The prefects were instructed to be particularly restrictive
regarding those with job offers, which were not particularly skilled, as
well as students applying for a temporary residence card in order to search
for a job or changing status from student to labour migrant. Furthermore,
the shortage occupation list for non-EEA nationals was also reduced from
30 occupations, defined on a regional basis, to 14 occupations for the entire
country, by means of a decree from the Interior Ministry (11th of August
2011).
However, the numbers of first work permits issued to non-EU nationals
did not fall sharply between 2010 and 2012. They decreased just slightly
from 18,759 in 2010 to an estimated 17,354 in 2012 (see Table 1) (Ministère
de l’Intérieur 2013).
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Table 1 First work-related residence permits issued to non-EU nationals 2006-2012
(in thousands)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
12,126 12,154 21,792 20,607 18,759 18, 303 17, 354
(estimate)
Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur 2013 p. 23
This suggests that the hardening of the RLMT criteria did not have a huge
effect on inflows. It may be explained by the fact that there were political
rather than economic motives behind the new restrictions imposed on
labour immigration and officials were consequently perhaps not under
pressure to implement the more restrictive policy in practice. Indeed, the
rhetoric was undoubtedly an attempt to siphon some of Marine Le Pen’s
electorate; opinion polls showed Marine Le Pen (FN) as a serious conten-
der for the 2012 Presidential elections, with a few polls even suggesting that
she could win the first round of the election (The Economist, 2012).
This return of a restrictive approach to labour immigration – at least on
a rhetorical and policy level – has been tempered during the Presidency of
Francois Hollande. On the 6th of May 2012, the Socialist candidate
Hollande won the presidential elections runoff with a vote of 51.63% to
Sarkozy’s 48.37%. A parliamentary debate on immigration took place in
April 2013 based on a Ministry of the Interior report on economic and
student immigration (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2013). This report notes the
low level of highly skilled migration to France, queries whether the RLMT
might be made less onerous and discusses the benefits of student immigra-
tion; suggesting that the Socialist government has an expansive approach
to economic immigration. An immigration bill to be published in 2014 will
introduce pluri-annual permits and is also expected to ease the RLMT
(Interview OLI2).
３.２ Indirect labour immigration
Indirect labour immigration, in particular family and student migrants’
access to the labour market has been more protected in France than in
Britain during the current economic downturn. While the British coalition
government examined the question of whether family migrants should be
permitted to access the British labour market in the context of the eco-
nomic downturn, French governments have not – at least transparently –
questioned family migrants’ participation in the labour market. Further-
more, the Sarkozy government’s attempt to restrict student access to the
labour market was unsuccessful, unlike that of the British government.
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３.２.１ France
Family migration is the object of contradictory policy signals in France. On
the one hand, centre-right governments have been intent on reducing
levels of family migration, on the basis that it is not beneficial to the French
economy or society, and on the other, it is recognised by most stakeholders
that family migrants represent an important source of labour for French
firms. Indeed, regarding the latter, non-labour migrant entries into the
labour market more than doubled since 1998, representing over fifty per
cent of new active foreigners in 2003 (Bertossi, 2008).
There have been numerous attempts to stem family migration over the
past decade, for example a 2007 law introduced a minimum level of French
language to be tested when the candidate applies for a visa to France, as
well as the demonstration that s/he endorses the main French constitu-
tional principles. Sarkozy recognised that family migrants were often em-
ployed in the French labour market, however, he argued that the problem
was that they were mainly low-skilled and were thus adding to the low-
skilled labour force.
Notably, however, while repeated attempts have been made by centre-
right governments to reduce levels of family immigration, the idea of re-
stricting family migrants’ access to the labour market has not been exam-
ined by government, as it has been in the UK. Indeed, the importance of
non-economic migrants in terms of labour market activity in France was
noted by the Centre for Strategic Analysis in the Prime Minister’s office in
2006, when it maintained that “we cannot restrict the concept of economic
immigration to ‘direct entries’” (CAS, 2006 p. 65).
French legislation and decrees have facilitated non-EU students’ access
to the labour market since the 1990s. Student immigration has represented
the second largest inflow to France after family immigration since 2006:
nearly a third of inflows in 2010. Between 2009 and 2010, the growth rate
was particularly high (+12%).
Bertossi maintains that the policy of training foreign elites in order to
exert influence on their countries of origin, dominant in the 1990s, has
shifted to a new policy, which aims to retain foreign students in order to
ensure the competitiveness of the French economy (2008). The law of 2006
established that students can work during their studies with an annual
limit of 964 hours (60% of a full-time job, compared to 50% previously).
Also, students graduating from a French university with a Masters degree
can reside in France for six months in order to search for a job. The number
of authorisations to work issued to students increased significantly since
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the late 1990s, in tandem with the general rise in numbers of foreign stu-
dents (from 11,000 to 40,000 between 1998 and 2003).
As discussed above, a decree of the 31st of May 2011 from the Ministers
of Interior and Labour instructed prefects to be particularly restrictive to-
wards students applying for jobs on graduation. However, due to protests
from students and universities (the “Collectif du 31 mai” movement), a new
decree of the 12th of January eased these restrictions, making reference to
the need to ensure the attractiveness of the higher education system and
competitiveness of French firms (d. l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des
collectivités territoriales et de l’immigration, Ministère du travail, de l’em-
ploi et de la santé et Ministère de l’Enseignment Supérieur et de la
Recherche 2012). On entering government, the Socialist government an-
nulled the decree. The strength of the opposition to this decree is due to
the fact that the majority of people issued with work permits in France are
already resident in France with student visas. Indeed, the Hollande govern-
ment is keen to increase the levels of student migration to France as it is
seen as a source of skilled workers (Interview Medef).
３.２.２ Britain
In Britain, labour immigrants’ dependants can participate in the labour
market provided that the PBS immigrant has been granted more than 12
months’ permission to stay in the UK. Allowing the employment of PBS
migrants’ spouses/partners provides employers with additional labour and
reduces demand for an opening of Tier 3 of the PBS for temporary low-
skilled workers (which has remained closed since the establishment of the
PBS). In the second quarter of 2008, 27.3 per cent of the total immigrant
stock had entered the UK in the previous five years to join a family or
spouse; a larger percentage than those entering for work or study or any
other reason. Over half of spouses/ partners were employed (59%) and 81
per cent of spouses/partners were employed in unskilled occupations
(MAC, 2009).
In the context of rising concern regarding unemployment and displace-
ment of resident workers with migrant workers, the MAC was asked to
assess the economic contribution made by the dependants of PBS migrants
and their role in the labour market in February 2009. In its report in August
of that year, the MAC maintained that there was no reason to conclude
that greater restrictions on working rights for dependants would lead to
improved outcomes, either for UK workers or for the UK economy (MAC,
2009).
Student migration has constituted the largest category of migration to
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the UK during the current economic downturn. However, a smaller propor-
tion of students participate in the labour market than family migrants.
According to LFS data５, only about 1 in 4 foreign-born students (both EU
and non-EU nationals) have paid employment (UKBA, 2010).
Concerns over foreign students using the student migration system as
an entry-way into the labour market prompted the Labour government to
restrict the work rights of students on courses below degree level and raise
the minimum level of English language study permitted under Tier 4 (the
PBS channel for students). However, the 2009 LFS suggests that there is
significant working in breach. For those studying below degree level, 53 per
cent reported working more than 21 hours per week (UKBA 2010).
In March 2011, following a public consultation on the student immigra-
tion system, the Government announced that the Tier 1 Post-study Work
visa category would close from April 2012. The Post-study Work visa en-
abled foreign students to remain in the UK for up to two years after obtain-
ing a UK degree. Since April 2012 international graduates are only able to
remain in the UK by switching into Tier 2 of the points-based system or if
they have a strong business proposition (under new provisions for student
entrepreneurs).
３.３ Substituting labour immigrants with resident workers
The two labour immigration systems aim to ensure that foreign workers
are only allowed to enter to take up a job when no suitable resident work-
ers are available for the job. However, over the past five years, British
governments have arguably placed more emphasis – at least at the discur-
sive level – on finding alternatives for migrant workers than French gov-
ernments have. The British MAC has an articulated system for investigat-
ing whether employers in different sectors are attempting to find alterna-
tives to bringing in foreign workers and governments have introduced
training programmes and schemes which aim to enable/induce resident
workers to take up jobs in sectors which employ significant numbers of
migrant workers.
３.３.１ Britain
Faced with growing complaints about the impact of Eastern European
migration on domestic workers, in June 2007, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown (Labour) famously called for “British workers for British jobs” in a
speech to the GMB Union (Summers, 2009). While the Conservative leader
David Cameron accused Brown of pandering to protectionist fears in 2007-
9, the Conservatives in government have emphasised the need to ensure
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that resident workers can compete with migrants, with a particular focus
on the British low-skilled. In July 2011, referring to new data that more than
half of new jobs in the past year had been taken by foreigners, the Work
and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, asserted that the welfare-to-
work schemes would fail if immigration were not more strictly controlled.
Duncan Smith urged employers to give British workers a “fair chance” and
not to automatically revert to foreign workers (Sparrow, 2011).
The main substitute for labour immigration discussed in the UK is the
training and “upskilling” of the resident labour force in order to provide
employers with the skills they need and reduce demand for foreign skills.
Other alternatives, in particular raising wages and improving working con-
ditions, are less emphasised in the public debate. The focus on skills can be
explained by growing concern about human capital competitiveness in the
UK over the past thirty years. The relative unattractiveness of the alterna-
tive of improving employment conditions is due to the fear that doing so
would reduce profits, employment growth and competitiveness; an unap-
pealing prospect for the economic liberals who dominate the UK political
arena.
Since the late 1990s, within the broad consensus on the need to improve
human capital competitiveness lay a growing focus on competing for the
“best and brightest” migrant workers. However, as numbers of migrant
workers grew over the past decade, concern about a reduction in opportu-
nities for the resident labour force led to a political emphasis on producing
the skills needed by employers within the UK rather than importing them.
This emphasis developed as the approach to immigration shifted from
positive to negative from around 2007-8 (Devitt, 2010). The restrictions
imposed on recruiting non-EEA foreign workers from 2010 have given
further impulse to efforts to produce skills domestically.
The MAC was charged with ascertaining when it was “sensible” to open
up to migrant workers by the Labour government in late 2007. In produ-
cing the shortage occupation list the MAC approach to the concept of
“sensible” is to consider each occupation with reference to whether em-
ployers have explored feasible alternatives to employing immigrants such
as training resident workers, raising wages and working conditions or
changing production processes. It is underlined that not all options are
feasible at all times and that the economic and regulatory environment
can make certain responses to labour shortages difficult; for example pub-
lic budgets can limit wage increases. However, despite this in-depth labour
market analysis, the “sensible” test is of limited weight; only a handful of
occupations are kept off the list if they have already been deemed skilled
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and in shortage (Interview MAC). This points, once again, to a disjuncture
between discourse – in this case on finding alternatives to labour immigra-
tion – and policy outputs in Britain.
In the context of a deepening economic recession, the rise of the ex-
treme right British National Party and upcoming national elections, in late
2008, Gordon Brown announced that when an occupation was put on the
shortage occupation list, the government would review whether and how
more training of resident workers could reduce the need for migrants
(Martin and Ruhs, 2010). However, by November 2009 coordination be-
tween immigration and education and training policy had still not oc-
curred, as evidenced in the Skills for growth: the National skills strategy
report; “Critically, we need to join up their (the MAC’s) work with the
remit we are giving the UK Commission to turn intelligence about
shortages into national training priorities in the skills system.” (BIS 2009,
p.11).
Indeed, according to an official from the Department for Business, In-
novation and Skills, it was not until 2010 that a coordinated policy on
immigration and skills development was formalised and that this was in
large part a reaction to the limits to be imposed on immigration and a
concern with ensuring that employers would be able to source skills in a
context of a more restrictive immigration policy; “The skills strategy 2010
was the first time we set out formally what we would do; because of the
introduction of the cap and the need for some kind of response in that
space” (Interview BIS1). Indeed, new qualifications had been designed for
ethnic catering at the end of Labour’s period in office in order to attempt to
fill chef skill shortages – which accounted for a large proportion of inflows
through the shortage occupation route – with resident workers. However,
this policy was further strengthened when all but the most highly qualified
chefs were taken off the shortage list in 2011.
The Coalition government has also put a lot of rhetorical emphasis on
labour competition from Eastern Europe and part of the policy response to
this is to stimulate the resident unemployed to take up available jobs, thus
reducing intra-EU mobility. The Department for Work and Pensions
(DWP) is trying to engage employers to recruit “UK workers” and disabuse
the latter of misconceptions they might have about certain sectors (Inter-
view DWP2). Indeed, the impending closure of the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Scheme on the 31st of December 2013 led the DWP to introduce a
pilot scheme focusing on training unemployed UK people and persuading
them to take up agricultural work (Interview DWP2). However, this policy
of substituting migrant workers is still relatively small-scale and levels of
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intra-departmental coordination on this issue are limited (Interview BIS2).
Furthermore, employers have questioned the feasibility of the policy, ar-
guing that unlike migrant workers, British school leavers do not have the
required skills and are less reliable (Interview HO).
３.３.２ France
Direct labour migration to France is, as we have seen above, comparatively
limited. As such, until very recently, there has been very little debate on
how to reduce it. Indeed, the policy of reducing demand for migrant work-
ers by means of upgrading and revalorising jobs refuted by domestic work-
ers or providing domestic workers with the skills required by employers
has been dormant in France since the failed attempt made by Lionel Sto-
léru, Secretary of State for manual labour and immigration, in the 1970s
(Interview De Wenden).
The debate between the late 1990s and 2013 has rather been on how
much and what type of labour immigration should be facilitated in France
in order to respond to labour shortages, in the context of relatively high
levels of unemployment. However, while direct labour immigration is re-
latively insignificant in France, it doubled between 2006 and 2008 and the
centre-right government began to emphasise domestic alternatives to mi-
grant workers in 2011 in the context of the current economic downturn.
According to the decree of the 31st of May published by the Ministries of
Interior and Labour, “The priority has to be given to the employment of
jobseekers, of French or foreign nationality, already resident in France.”
This was seen as particularly important given the recent estimate of 23%
unemployment among non-European nationals resident in France. Among
other controls, the prefects were instructed to examine whether it would
be possible to quickly train jobseekers resident in France in an occupation
for which an employer has requested a work permit for a foreign worker (d.
l. o.-m. Ministère de l’Intérieur, des collectivités territoriales et de l’immi-
gration et Ministère du travail, de l’emploi et de la santé, 2011). Further-
more, the constitution of the shortage occupation list for non-EU workers
in 2011 took into account not just the relationship between job offers and
job seekers in particular occupations but also whether workers could be
trained in France in particular occupations. This had been less emphasised
in 2008 (Interview OLI1).
There is, nonetheless, a shared understanding among stakeholders that
migrant workers cannot be replaced by resident workers. Representatives
of two French trade unions, CGT and CFDT maintain that the idea of
substituting immigrants with resident unemployed is not taken seriously
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in France as the jobs migrants do are mainly low-paid and unattractive to
the resident unemployed (CGT2, CFDT2). Furthermore a representative
from the employers’ federation Medef asserted that the high levels of social
protection in France reduce incentives to return to work (Medef).
４ Explaining policy choices
A recent Financial Times article entitled “Britain “open for business and
closed to foreigners”“ exemplifies the strength of the Conservative party’s
anti-immigration rhetoric (Stephens, 2013). Strong anti-immigrant dis-
course, along with the imposition of a cap on immigration for the first
time, among other restrictive measures, certainly give the impression that
Britain has returned to a heavily restrictive immigration regime. However,
the reality is of course much more nuanced. Indeed, the comparison of
British and French responses to foreign labour demand over the past five
years leads me to conclude that both states have protected migrant inflows
during the current economic crisis due to on-going (though varying) de-
mand for migrant workers in both states. This is particularly the case of
official labour migrants in Britain, especially ICTs, and both official and
indirect labour migrants, in particular students, in France. This has not
stopped British governments from also attempting – albeit on a small-
scale – to substitute migrant workers with resident workers by means of
training and persuading people to take up jobs in sectors where migrant
workers concentrate. This search for alternatives to migration has been less
emphasised in France.
In explaining these policy choices, I emphasise converging and diver-
ging dominant economic and social perspectives. Due to the hegemony of
liberalism and the attendant global economic integration, human capital
competitiveness has come to be viewed as the lynchpin of economic
growth in developed economies, which can no longer compete on the
basis of cost (Crouch, 2005). As noted above, highly skilled migrant work-
ers are viewed to be important actors in this global skills competition and
most developed economies have been facilitating their entry since the late
1990s, including Britain and France. This perspective is partly fuelled by
employer groups, in particular those representing multi-nationals, which
lobby for access to skilled mobile workers. It is thus not surprising that,
despite restrictive immigration policy rhetoric and attempts to reduce in-
flows of labour immigrants, the highly skilled migrant categories have been
protected in both states. This is best exemplified by the fact that ICTs are
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exempt from the numerical cap placed on Tier 2 migrants in 2011, despite
the fact that they are the largest group of labour migrants in Britain and are
already exempt from the RLMT. Equally exemplary is the fact that the
Sarkozy government was unsuccessful in its attempt to restrict non-EU
students from being issued with work permits on graduation due to a
strong reaction from stakeholders.
There is, however, an important difference between Britain and France
in terms of labour immigration; Britain receives far higher numbers every
year, approximately 100,000 more than France. This can be partly ex-
plained by a more buoyant, flexible labour market and a more globally
integrated economy; Britain is the second largest destination for foreign
direct investment after the US. Indeed, Britain will continue to be more
open to immigration than France due to light touch labour market regula-
tion and a stronger policy focus on courting global financial investment.
The requirements of a globally integrated economy (i.e. highly skilled
migrant workers) are at odds with the politics of immigration, which have
become progressively contentious in both states. Since the 1980s and emer-
gence of the FN in France, immigration has become highly politicised and
due to continuing high levels of unemployment, any significant opening to
labour immigration has long been off the agenda. This makes “invisible”
indirect labour immigration comparatively important in France. The popu-
list force of the FN also explains the return to restrictive labour immigra-
tion policy rhetoric in 2011, while the tension between politics and the
economy accounts for the fact that, despite policy change, actual inflows
of labour immigrants did not decline. Despite the decade of a positive
consensus on labour immigration in Britain between the late 1990s and
2007, immigration has once again become something for everybody to
point their finger at. In order to attract disgruntled voters in the general
election of 2010, the Conservative party pledged to reduce net migration to
the tens of thousands. Indeed, politics explains the disjuncture between
rhetoric and policy outputs in the British case, as the main focus of the
government has been to reduce long-term migration, which contributes to
net migration, and consequently temporary migration – for example ICTs
coming to the Britain for less than 12 months – has not been restricted to
the same degree.
Finally, British attempts to reduce inflows of labour immigrants by
training domestic workers in skills perceived to be in shortage is explained
elsewhere as having been stimulated by a perceived over-reliance on la-
bour immigration, concerns about the socio-economic impact of labour
immigration and more a generalised preoccupation with raising skill levels
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in the country (Devitt, 2010). More recent efforts to persuade the resident
unemployed to take up jobs in occupations where there are significant
proportions of migrant workers is coherent with the development of active
labour market policy in Britain since the 1980s. British social protection has
become increasingly conditional on efforts to get back to work with the
aim of reducing public expenditure and taxation, increasing the labour
supply and keeping wages low (Bonoli, 2008; King, 1995). The recent at-
tempts to direct welfare recipients to “migrant jobs” is the other half of the
policy of reducing labour immigration by means of immigration controls
(Cameron, 2013). A similar attempt to “re-nationalise” migrant jobs
occurred in France in the 1970s, however, it is generally deemed to have
been a failure. This policy has not been re-activated during the current
crisis due to a generalised understanding that the resident unemployed
would not accept to do the low paid jobs migrants do. This can be under-
stood within the French tradition of social protection, which is more gen-
erous than that of Britain and traditionally more passive, putting less em-
phasis on stimulating/obliging a return to the labour market (Clasen and
Clegg, 2003).
The stronger focus on substituting migrant workers with domestic
workers in Britain is also partly explained by differing levels of labour
immigration in the two states. As noted above, Britain has received far
higher numbers of immigrants and EU citizens from Central and Eastern
Europe over recent years, which has been accompanied by to a rise in anti-
immigration sentiment in the country (Boswell, 2008). Indeed, public opi-
nion shows significantly higher levels of closure to immigration in Britain
than in France, as exemplified by the 2011 Transatlantic Trends: immigra-
tion survey６ (Transatlantic Trends, 2012). British governments conse-
quently have stronger incentives to at least appear to be reducing labour
immigration than French governments have.
５ Conclusion
A basic premise for this article is that we can expect governments to con-
cern themselves with attempting to ensure that employers – both public
and private – have access to supplies of labour. Putting labour supply at the
centre of this discussion of labour immigration policy in the context of
economic downturns enabled me to bring important, hitherto unexplored
aspects of labour immigration and welfare policy into the picture. Existing
studies of immigration policy during bad times tend to focus on the devel-
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opment of restrictive policies and on the outcomes of those policies. An
important finding of previous research is that oftentimes restrictive immi-
gration policy leads to a growth in irregular migration due to on-going
employer demand for cheap, compliant labour. This paper supports the
basic contention of persisting labour demand during economic downturns
and focuses squarely on the role of the state in responding to that demand.
It hypothesises and finds evidence for three further policy responses to
continuing demand for foreign workers during economic crises; protecting
highly skilled labour immigration; facilitating family and student migrants’
access to the labour market; and attempts to substitute migrant workers
with resident workers.
On this basis, I argue that labour immigration policy theory needs to be
updated to take into account how since the late 1990s governments in
advanced economies work firmly within a paradigm of global economic
integration. Within this interpretive framework, the facilitation of the
immigration of highly skilled workers is viewed as a requirement of open
competitive economies. As such, we can expect governments to protect
highly skilled worker immigration even during economic downturns.
Furthermore, labour immigration policy theory needs to expand its per-
spective to take into account the significance of indirect labour immigra-
tion – apart from irregular immigration – in particular, the facilitation of
family and student migrant participation in the economy. Finally, theory
needs to encompass government attempts to reduce demand for labour
immigrants by encouraging resident workers to take up jobs in occupa-
tions or sectors with high concentrations of foreign workers; that is immi-
gration control via active labour market policy.
This paper has also uncovered some of the factors, which currently
generate the liberal constraint on restrictive immigration policies identi-
fied by scholars such as Freeman (1995), Hollifield, (2004) and Joppke,
(1998). As regards skilled labour immigration in Britain, employer and
diplomatic lobbying in the context of governmental prioritisation of
human capital competitiveness ensured that these inflows would be pro-
tected. In France, it appears that the political rhetoric around reducing
labour immigration was mainly a ploy to siphon votes from the competing
FN party and was not reflective of real political will to reduce the already
small numbers of foreign workers entering the country each year. Non-EU
students’ access to the French labour market was protected by protests
from universities and students, with a direct interest in retaining this in-
centive to study in France. Finally, the policy of substituting migrant work-
ers with domestic workers has been constrained in France by a stakeholder
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consensus that the policy is not feasible given differing employment ex-
pectations of migrants and domestic workers. The policy is still marginal in
the UK and its growth has been constrained by similar doubts regarding
the viability of the policy as well as by departmental coordination limita-
tions.
Notes
1 . Migrant workers refer to foreign nationals based abroad who come to a country in order
to work.
2. Employers have to show that the role could not be filled from within the resident
labour market.
3. The European Economic Area (EEA) provides for the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital through three of four member states of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and 27 of 28 member states of the European Union (EU), with Croatia
provisionally applying the agreement pending its ratification by all EEA countries.
4. It is, however, important to note that a significant proportion of non-EU work-related
inflows to Britain is composed of people coming to take up low-medium skilled work via
the Tier 5 Youth Mobility Scheme and non-PBS work visas for domestic workers in private
households, amongst other categories. Scott Blinder, ‘Non-European Labour Migration to
the Uk’, (Oxford: Migration Observatory Oxford, 2013). This differs from the French case,
where the majority of non-EU work-related flows consist of medium and highly skilled
individuals. Ministère De L’intérieur, ‘Les Données De L’immigration Professionnelle Et
Étudiante Document Préparatoire Au Débat Au Parlement’, (Paris, 2013).
5. It is important to note, however, that LFS data probably undercount students, espe-
cially those living in dormitories and other communal dwellings.
6. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey, in 2011, 33% of respondents in France and
57% of respondents in the UK perceived that there were too many immigrants in their
countries.
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Abstract
The article focuses on the negotiation of a new labour migration policy in
Germany in the years 2011 and 2012, and on the role that actors on both the
regional and the European Union levels played in encouraging the introduc-
tion of a more open labour migration framework. Up until now, research has
highlighted the German use of the European level for introducing more
restrictive changes in migration policy. In line with these precedents, during
the negotiation of a European policy for admitting highly-skilled migrants,
Germany advocated a restrictive framework. However, at the transposition of
the EU directive on highly-skilled migrants in national law, the German
government used the directive as an opportunity to introduce a paradigm
change in labour migration policies, establishing a significantly more open
labour migration policy hitherto exclusively associated with Anglo-Saxon
countries. The article will analyse the preconditions for this change, assessing
the value of the goodness-of-fit approach for understanding processes of
Europeanization.
Keywords: Europeanization, labour migration, highly-skilled migration, European
Union, federalism
１ The Europeanization of migration policies
( . . . ) We do not see any need for EU regulation at all. This question should remain
a national competence. There will be no directive on labour migration, since the
Bundesrat will not approve (Innenminister der Länder gegen Blue Card, 2007).
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0469
<CMS1404_04_LAUB_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:22>
469VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
With these words, the minister of the interior the federal state of Lower
Saxony commented in December 2007 upon the European Commission’s
project to introduce an EU-wide residence title for highly-skilled migrants.
However, five years later, the Bundesrat approved of the introduction of
the so-called Blue Card, even opting for a more liberal labour migration
framework than the European directive stipulated. Also, although Ger-
many was one of the member states that took a sceptic stance towards
the introduction of a common labour migration policy, the federal govern-
ment used the provisions of the directive to significantly liberalize the
German labour migration regime.
What happened between 2007 and 2012, and what can be learned about
the dynamics and the tensions of Europeanization from this case? These
are the questions that this article seeks to answer. At the same time, it aims
at addressing the ‘limited empirical foundation about European influences
on national immigration policies’ (Ette and Faist, 2007: 4). Compared to
other policy fields, the field of migration policies has been rather neglected
by research on Europeanization and on multi-level governance processes
in the European Union. This is partly due to the fact that harmonization in
the field of migration has only started comparatively late and is still weaker
than in other policy fields. It is common knowledge in migration research
that migration policies remain a central field of national sovereignty and
an area of competence of the nation-state (Bendel, 2011a; Ette and Faist,
2007). Migration is commonly held to be a policy area ‘where nation states
are least likely to cede control’ (Ette and Faist, 2007: 4). Thus ‘( . . . ) the
transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the European Union in
decisions about migration and asylum, justice and order, continues to be
one of the most surprising task expansions in the European project’ (Bend-
el et al., 2011b: 9).
Still, migration policies have gradually been integrated at the EU level
and since the late 1990s have been characterized by a ‘( . . . ) highly dynamic
legislative process’ (Bendel, 2011a: 371). Migration has become a field of
multi-level governance: ‘( . . . ) transnational co-operation in the fields of
asylum and migration has taken the characteristics of a multilevel govern-
ance regime in the sense that the relevant actors ( . . . ) can be found in
Brussels, in certain national ministries and central agencies, and at the
subnational level’ (Guiraudon, 2000: 257). A central characteristic of the
common migration policy is, however, that much policy-making in this
area has overwhelmingly focused on migration control policies and on
restricting migration to Europe: ‘Since the treaty of Maastricht 1993 (. . . )
the European immigration policy has basically developed emphasizing the
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dissuasive/exclusionary axis of its immigration policy’ (Gsir, 2013: 91). Only
since the year 2000, legal forms of migration and labour migration have
been addressed by European legal projects. However, whereas the harmo-
nization of migration control policies has significantly progressed, a further
integration of labour migration policies in Europe is met by the majority of
member states with a reluctance to give up national steering instruments.
At the same time, research points to the role of domestic factors in bring-
ing about a common European immigration policy. National governments
have used the EU in the field of migration as an arena for circumventing
national constraints, benefitting from operating in international venues
and thereby bypassing national constraints (Guiraudon, 2000). This ‘escape
to Europe’ (Geddes, 2003) accounts for a significant part of harmonization
in the field of migration.
At first sight, Germany seems to be an exemplary case of this escape to
Europe strategy. Research on the relationship between German domestic
migration policies and the EU has overwhelmingly shown the use of the
European level for introducing more restrictive migration policies. ‘Politi-
cal actors in Germany used developments on the EU level in order to
prepare the ground for a domestic policy change’ (Prümm and Alscher,
2007: 77). One of the most significant policy changes, the change of the
German basic law on asylum towards a significantly more restrictive fra-
mework in 1993, was made possible by a partial transfer of competence to
the EU. ‘This shifting of the asylum and refugee policy was a tactical man-
oeuvre by the liberal-conservative government in order to be able to over-
come the existing domestic asylum and refugee policy ( . . . ). Any conse-
quent change to the liberal asylum law in Germany was now no longer a
failure of German politics or the breaking of a taboo, but a consequence of
decisions at the European level’ (Hellmann et al., 2005: 152). The German
Länder, too, have used the emerging multi-level governance field on migra-
tion, although their objective was to prevent an increasing harmonization.
In the context of the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the German
federal states’ co-determination rights in European matters were increased
by the introduction of the so-called Europe article in the German basic law.
Thus endowed with more political power and fearing growing financial
burdens following from the admission of asylum-seekers, they repeatedly
blocked attempts at introducing qualified majority voting, thus effectively
preventing a further European integration (Hellmann et al., 2005: 153).
However, the case of the negotiation of a new labour migration policy in
Germany goes contrary to these findings. The transposition of the “EU
Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country
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nationals for highly-qualified employment”, the so-called Blue Card direc-
tive, entailing a further harmonization of migration policies, was not only
welcomed by federal and regional actors but led to an even more far-reach-
ing liberalization of German labour migration law than the directive stipu-
lates. As the OECD stated in its 2013 report on labour migration, ‘recent
reforms have put Germany among the countries with the fewest restric-
tions on labour migration for highly skilled occupations’ (OECD, 2013: 15).
In order to understand this surprising development, this article analyses
the development of the public discourse on labour migration and the
positions of key actors between 2010 and 2012, the timeframe in which
the EU Blue Card directive was supposed to be transposed, and the role
that the Blue Card directive played in this process.
In order to conceptualize the preconditions for the transposition of the
Blue Card directive into German law, the article uses the goodness of fit
approach. In initial research on the influence of the EU on the domestic
level, goodness of fit, a concept that will be outlined in more detail below,
was one of the most influential approaches for understanding the effects of
European policies on domestic settings. However, after its initial success,
the approach was increasingly criticized, some voices even arguing that it
should be discarded. Contrary to these positions, I argue that the concept
of goodness of fit still provides a valuable framework for understanding the
interaction of the EU and the national context in bringing about policy
change, and appreciating the preconditions for the Europeanization of
migration policies. Taking into account both institutional and actor-re-
lated factors and analytically linking the national and the European level,
this approach is able to capture the complexity of policy change in a multi-
level system.
In order to analyse the preconditions for the use of EU policies as a
motor for change at the domestic level, this article proceeds in three
steps. After outlining the main characteristics of the goodness of fit ap-
proach and the criticism that it has raised, it describes the development
of a common labour migration policy at the EU level. Then, by analysing
positions of key actors and the evolving discourse on labour migration in
the German context, the article argues that a trend towards a convergence
of policy aims between the EU and the German domestic context in the
field of labour migration took place. While up until now a “good fit” be-
tween the EU and the domestic context has been held to prevent major
policy changes, in my analysis I intend to show that in the German case it
was exactly the establishment of a state of goodness of fit that led to a
paradigm change in German labour migration policy.
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0472
<CMS1404_04_LAUB_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:22>
472 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
The analysis is based on a mix of qualitative methods: (1) Expert interviews
with the confederation of German employer associations (Bundesvereini-
gung Deutscher Arbeitgeber (BDA)); the Federal Ministry of the Interior,
Unit of Immigration Law (BMI 1, BMI 2 and BMI 3)１; the Federal Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, Department of labour market policy and em-
ployment of foreigners (BMAS 1); the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
Head of Unit of labour market policy and employment of foreigners (BMAS
2); the Ministry of the Interior of the free state of Saxony (SMI 1 and SMI 2);
the Ministry of labour of the free state of Saxony (SMA); the CDU/CSU
faction of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU). (2) A qualitative content
analysis of articles on labour migration in the national quality newspaper
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ); coverage from 1 January 2010 to 31 December
2011. All articles were analysed that contained the keywords labour migra-
tion, (highly)-qualified workers (hochqualifizierte Fachkräfte), labour short-
age (Fachkräftemangel). (3) A document analysis of press releases and
statements of political parties, employer associations, trade unions, re-
search institutes and expert bodies on migration.２
２ The dynamics of Europeanization: The goodness of fit
approach
Europeanization has been defined as ‘the impact of ( . . . ) EU policy mea-
sures on the existing policies, political and administrative processes and
structures of member states’ (Héritier, 2005: 200). The term Europeaniza-
tion ‘( . . . ) is most often associated with domestic adaptation to the pres-
sures emanating directly or indirectly from EUmembership’ (Featherstone,
2003: 7). In order to understand processes of Europeanization that take
place by the transposition and implementation of EU directives, an expla-
natory model that has been widely used is the goodness of fit (Risse et al.,
2001) hypothesis. Originally formulated by Duina (1997), the goodness of fit
hypothesis holds that ‘( . . . ) smooth adaptation to EU policies depends on
the degree to which these fit existing national policies and institutions’
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006: 332). The original idea holds that the
implementation of EU directives is determined by two nation-specific in-
stitutions: the organization of interest groups and policy legacies, i.e. na-
tional legal and administrative traditions: ‘Implementation has depended
on the relationship between directives and the institutions it targets. When
a directive has demanded major transformations in these institutions, im-
plementation has suffered; when a directive has been consistent with or
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0473
<CMS1404_04_LAUB_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:22>
473LAUBENTHAL
EUROPEANIZATION AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW LABOUR MIGRATION POLICY IN GERMANY
strengthened current institutional arrangements, implementation has
been successful’ (Duina, 1997: 157). Thus the key idea of the concept is
that the higher the degree of convergence between a directive and the
national policy framework, the smoother the directive is transposed into
national law. Other research on Europeanization has pointed to the im-
portance of the similarity between EU and domestic projects and policies
in order to bring about change, too. Radaelli (2003) states that one out-
come of Europeanization can be ‘inertia, ( . . . ) a situation of lack of change.
This may (. . .) happen when a country finds that EU political architectures,
choices, models or policies are too dissimilar domestic practice. Inertia
may take the forms of ( . . . ) delays in the transposition of directives’
(Radaelli, 2003: 37). However, adaptational pressure also serves as a
motor for change: ‘When adaptational pressure is low, because of the con-
tent of EU policy is already present in a member state, there is no need to
change domestic institutions. Simply put, there is a good “fit” between
national policy and the European Union. ( . . . ) At the other extreme, when
the distance between EU policies and national ones is very high, member
states will it find difficult to ‘digest’ ( . . . ) European policy’ (Radaelli, 2003:
45) In other words, a ‘bad fit’ is the precondition for policy change. How-
ever, it also hinders the transposition of a European project on the domes-
tic level.
Further research has gradually extended and modified the goodness of
fit hypothesis. The concept has been expanded and several additional
variables have been introduced. Windhoff-Héritier, et al. (2001) has stated
that the capacity for change is influenced by formal veto positions (institu-
tions) and factual veto positions and supportive coalitions (contending
actors). She has conceived of the implementation of EU directives as a
policy process of goal-oriented actors in a given political context that may
restrict or facilitate implementation (Windhoff-Héritier, et al. 2001: 12).
Radaelli (2003) draws attention to the timing and argues that in field of
public policy the impact ‘( . . . ) of EU public policy is contingent on whether
a country is already involved in a process of reform or not’ (Radaelli, 2003:
47). As additional variables, he conceptualizes modes of legitimation and
supporting discourses.
Most importantly, research that has further developed the goodness of
fit approach has placed a special emphasis on the role of actors. Critical
accounts of the hypothesis have stressed that ‘“fit” is not a static given, but
rather depends on positions and perceptions of actors (Radaelli, 2003: 45).
From a “static” conception, focusing on the specific institutional arrange-
ments of a nation-state, the focus of the concept has been widened to
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actors who perceive a goodness of fit, and/or who use adaptational pres-
sures for promoting their policy aims (Börzel and Risse, 2003): ‘( . . . ) the
misfit between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions
provides ( . . . ) actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue
their interests’ (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58). Duina (2007), too, in a reply to
criticism on his original concept by Mastenbreoek and Kaeding (2006)
emphasizes the role of actors and holds that key actors can push a directive
despite misfit, or vice versa (Duina, 2007). He conceptualizes actors (state
officials and interest groups) as the link between goodness of fit and ease of
adaptation. Thus, both fit and actors matter (Duina, 2007).
Although the idea of “fit” was gradually made more complex and the
concept was expanded towards a more dynamic framework taking into
account various variables, some radical criticism has been formulated.
Thus Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006), referring to a number of empirical
studies that contradict the goodness of fit hypothesis, have diagnosed its
‘disappointing empirical results’ (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006: 334)
and have come to the conclusion that the concept should be discarded.
They suggest concentrating on the domestic context and on domestic
actors’ preferences or beliefs in order to explain the implementation of
EU directives. However, in contrast to this view, I argue that goodness of
fit is a valuable approach in order to capture the dynamics of the Europea-
nization of German labour migration policies between 2010 and 2012.
３ The development of a common EU labour migration
policy
Much earlier than most of its member states and in particular Germany,
the European Union started attempts to develop a common European
labour migration policy. In 2000 which saw a Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community
Immigration Policy, a common EU labour migration policy was proposed
for the first time (Gsir, 2013: 94): ‘( . . . ) the Commission recalled that ( . . . )
emphasis was to be placed on the need to develop an immigration policy
designed to admit migrants mainly for economic reasons, as well as to
address demographic decline ( . . . ). This European discourse was different
from the dominant discourse of Member States in terms of programmatic
ideas and policy solutions at the national level’ (Gsir, 2013: 94). In 2001, the
EU, ‘presenting labour immigration as a solution to demographic problems
dramatically highlighted by the United Nations Population Division report’
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(Gsir, 2013: 94/95) presented a directive on labour migration. However it
was not accepted by the member states. In particular Germany and Austria
were against it. Still, in 2005, the European Commission published a “Green
paper” on an EU approach to Managing Economic Migration’, reasserting a
need for labour migration:
( . . . ) even if the Lisbon employment targets are met by 2010, overall employ-
ment levels will fall due to demographic change. Between 2010 and 2030, at
current immigration flows, the decline in the EU-25’s working age population
will entail a fall in the number of employed people of some 20 million. Such
developments will have a huge impact on overall economic growth, the func-
tioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of EU enterprises. ( . . . )
while immigration in itself is not a solution to demographic ageing, more
sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the needs
of the EU labour market and ensure Europe’s prosperity (European Commis-
sion, 2005).
Several other reports and communications on the EU level assessed the
importance of labour immigration and diagnosed a need because of de-
creasing fertility rates and demographic change:
( . . . ) In a context of an ageing Europe, the potential contribution of immigra-
tion to EU economic performance is significant (. . . ). According to the latest
population projections, by 2060, the working age population of the EU is pro-
jected to fall by almost 50 million even with continued net immigration similar
to historical levels and by around 110 million without such immigration. Such
evolutions present risks for the sustainability of pensions, health and social
protection systems and require increased public spending (European Commis-
sion, 2008).
Also, the EU’s positions on immigration correlated with its Lisbon Agenda
and the goal to become the world’s most competitive economy in 2010:
‘( . . . ) this [Blue Card] legislation aims to make Europe a player on the
emerging global labour market, enhancing its competitiveness and luring
highly skilled workers to Europe – and away from countries like the United
States and Australia’ (Collett, 2008).
In 2005, the policy plan on legal migration re-presented arguments for
labour migration. However, based on the failure of a comprehensive ap-
proach, in its policy proposals the European Commission opted for a sec-
toral approach, proposing three different directives. In 2007 the Blue Card
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directive was presented. The directive provided common rules on entry
and residence for highly-qualified workers and their families. Workers
who meet certain criteria (the existence of an employment offer or job
contract; higher professional qualifications; compliance with a minimum
salary threshold (at least 1.5 times the average of the gross annual salary of
the state) may take up an employment in any EU member state (Gonzalez
et al., 2013; von Weizsäcker, 2006). Although it was expected that the
approval of the directive would take place rather smoothly, in reality it
proved to be controversial. Especially Germany formulated doubts and
stressed that first national labour potential should be exhausted (Meyer,
2010). The admission criteria and salary threshold proposed by the EC also
raised controversy, and ‘( . . . ) a major opponent to the level proposed by the
Commission was Germany’ (Meyer, 2010: 22).
４ The evolution of German labour migration policies
between ２０００ and ２０１０: small changes, small effects
While during the negotiations of the Blue Card in Brussels some changes in
German labour migration policy took place, the German model still re-
mained rather restrictive, prioritizing the national work force: ‘Every uni-
versity graduate with a degree that is recognised in Germany can work in
Germany, if no national is available. That is the German immigration law
in one sentence’ (BMAS, 18.11.2011). This statement summarizes the basic
principle of the German labour migration policy until the year 2010, when
Germany was expected to transpose the EU Blue Card directive into na-
tional law. Despite some changes towards an opening of the labour market
for highly-skilled migrants, the German labour migration law represented a
demand-driven model based on a concrete job offer, and albeit with ex-
ceptions for a very narrow group of people, an overall restrictive frame-
work with a reluctance to create permanent settlement possibilities: ‘The
permanent settlement permit means that if the day after you got it you
become unemployed, you can work as a taxi driver. Then you can kill the
person who gave it to you, and you can still stay. It is as if you meet some-
body and you marry him on the same day, in a country that does not have
a divorce law. I would not do that’ (BMAS, 19.11.2011).
From the beginning of the 1970s until the year 2000, the country’s policy
on labour migration was guided by the principle of recruitment ban and
focused on preventing labour migration to Germany. Although since the
end of the 1980s channels for labour migration from outside the EU have
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existed, only temporary labour migration was admitted. The guiding prin-
ciple of “Germany is no immigration country” was not only reflected in the
lack of integration policies, but also in a restrictive framework on labour
migration, aiming, albeit with a few exceptions, at preventing labour mi-
gration to Germany. Until the passing of the first immigration law in 2005,
only channels for temporary labour migration into specific labour market
segments existed.
In 2005, a change in labour migration policies took place, and in the
following years the preconditions for the access to the German labour
market for highly-skilled migrants were gradually lowered. The ‘Law for
Managing and Containing Immigration and for the Regulation of the Re-
sidence and Integration of EU citizens and Foreigners’ (Gesetz zur Steuer-
ung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts
und der Integration von Unionsbürgern) for the first time established chan-
nels for permanent labour immigration that were conceptualized as a
regular option and not as an exception. Specific channels for the access of
highly-skilled migrants to the labour market were created. This group
could now obtain a permanent settlement permit. However, a high salary
threshold (86,400 Euro) for taking up employment in Germany still re-
stricted the immigration of highly-skilled migrants. Also, the new immigra-
tion law maintained the principle of a general recruitment stop.
In 2007 and 2009, further legal and administrative changes took place
that liberalized the channels for highly-skilled migration. The Law for the
management of labour migration that came into force on 1. January 2009
lowered the required minimum income for highly-skilled migrants under
paragraph 19 from 86,400 to 63,600 Euro.３ However, the legal provisions for
highly-skilled migration had more a symbolic than a material effect. Be-
tween 2007 and 2011, less than one-thousand migrants used the paragraph
19 to take up employment in Germany.
All in all, until the transposition of the Blue Card directive, the overall
framework remained restrictive and prioritized the national workforce.
Changes towards a more open labour migration regime still took place
within a system whose main feature was a conditional labour market
access for third-state migrants. Apart from those using the legal channel
for highly-skilled migrants, all labour migrants were subjected to the so-
called priority check (Vorrangprüfung) that is carried out on a case-by-case
basis for each single job application. In this process, the Federal Employ-
ment Agency and the foreigner’s office examine if a national or an EU
citizen is available for the job. Citizens from outside the EU can only take
up the position if no national worker is available.
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５ The transposition of the EU Blue Card directive into
German law: conflicts and opportunities
However, during the phase of the transposition of the Blue Card directive,
the restrictive German framework was more and more challenged by some
government actors and a new discourse that centered on Germany’s need
to remain economically competitive. The transposition of the Blue Card
directive was supposed to take place in December 2010, in the context of
the transposition of several EU directives, i.e. the returns directive and the
employer sanctions directive. A law project comprising the three directives
had been prepared by the Ministry of the Interior at the end of 2009.
However, in 2010 the Blue Card directive was taken out again of the second
Directives Implementation Law (Zweites Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz)
(Basse et al., 2011). ‘Against the background of public debates on skilled
labour, and debates on the topic within the governing coalition, the direc-
tive on highly-skilled migrants was excluded from the law project’ (Basse et
al., 2011: 363). The reason lay in conflicts within the government, and the
opposition of the Bavarian conservative CSU against the EU Blue Card
(BMI, 22.11.2013). One reason given by the CSU for its opposition was the
fear that the realization of the full freedom of movement for the EU acces-
sion countries in May 2011 would lead to a high amount of immigrants
from these countries (BMI, 22.11.2013). The CSU also embedded its position
in a discourse generally critical of non-EU foreigners. In September 2010 its
chairman stated that ‘Germany is not an immigration country’. Also, he
explicitly positioned himself against a points-based system and against the
introduction of quotas for certain sectors or professions. He demanded
that the evaluation procedure of requests for residence permits should
not only evaluate the qualification of the potential labour migrant, but
also his or her ‘willingness to integrate’ (Die Welt, 16.10. 2010). On the
opposite side, the liberal party FDP was against the transposition of the
directive in the form foreseen by the legal project, arguing that the Blue
Card directive should be used for the introduction of a more comprehen-
sive labour migration framework. Thus for very different reasons, both
smaller coalition partners opposed transposing the directive at this point.
５.１ A changing discourse on labour migration
However, while the transposition of the Blue Card directive became the
object of a controversial debate within the government, the public discus-
sion about a need for foreign skilled labour intensified. Since the year 2010,
various actors have diagnosed the so-called Fachkräftemangel, a shortage
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of skilled labour, and it has become a topic of growing importance both in
the media coverage and in the political sphere. A number of studies and
expert reports were published on the issue, and interest groups increas-
ingly brought the subject into the public sphere. National actors, such as
the Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure) and the
Federal Association of Information Services, Telecommunication and New
Media (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und
neue Medien e.V. (Bitkom)) issued reports stating that their sectors lacked
several tens of thousands of qualified workers. Regional actors, too, pub-
lished figures on labour shortages. The Chamber of Commerce of Stuttgart
declared that in 2014, up to 85,000 skilled workers would be lacking in
Baden-Württemberg (IHK Region Stuttgart, 2011). The Bavarian economic
association (Vereinigung der bayerischen Wirtschaft) identified a lack of
more than 500,000 qualified workers that in 2030 would increase to more
than one million (Scharnitzky, 2011). In the same vain, the Cologne Insti-
tute for Economic Research (Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln) calcu-
lated that in 2020 the shortage in the so-called MINT４ professions would
amount to 426,000. Also, a number of government bodies and research
institutions published projections on the future development of the Ger-
man work force and figures on the immigration level needed to compen-
sate losses due to demographic change. According to the German Institute
for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) Ger-
many needed a net immigration of 500,000 per year in order to secure its
economic force (Newsletter Migration und Bevölkerung, 2010). In February
2011 the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) published
a report on the ongoing Fachkräftemangel. stating that Germany needed to
establish a “welcoming culture” and that a short-term immigration of 0.4
million to 0.8 million foreign workers would be necessary (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit, 2011). Actors such as the Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftun-
gen für Integration und Migration, an expert body founded by several foun-
dations, elaborated a projection on the future evolution of the German
work force. According to this calculation, without any immigration, be-
tween 2008 and 2060 the labour force would decrease by 373,000 per year;
with a medium-level immigration, it would decrease by 313,000 and with a
high level of immigration (plus 200,000 yearly, starting in the year 2020), by
247,000 (SVR, 2011: 44).
At the same time, a consensual discourse emerged that acknowledged
Germany’s need for labour migration. Although positions on which instru-
ments should be introduced sometimes widely differed, key state and non-
state actors all agreed that Germany needed a “welcoming culture” and hat
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to successfully participate in the ongoing “global competition for the
brightest minds”: ‘The competition for the brightest minds is intensifying
( . . . ) Especially regarding the establishment of a welcoming culture, many
things need to be done. Where can the accompanying spouse work, where
are schools for the children, these are important questions for migrants.
( . . . ). At the universities, for scientists, these issues are already well-taken
care of, but in the economic sector, much remains to be done’ (BMI 1,
17.11.2011). ‘German companies are part of a global competition for the
brightest minds ( . . . ). It is clear that we need qualified workers in order to
secure our welfare in the global competition’ (Bundesministerium für
Arbeit und Soziales, 2010): ‘If you have a look at the EU, the competition
for the brightest minds is in full process, and we are already lagging behind
because we have lost the first immigration waves from the EU 8, others
have been faster’ (BDA, 17.11.2011).
５.２ Controversies and pro-liberalization positions within the
federal government
The preparation of the transposition of the EU Blue card into German law
took place during a time when a new dynamic in the political and public
negotiation of German labour migration policies developed. The debate
was characterized by attempts of part of the governing coalition to signifi-
cantly liberalize the existing labour migration framework, and ensuing
conflicts both within and between the governing parties. The controversy
centered on the preconditions that should be attached to the granting of a
settlement permit to highly-skilled migrants.
At the end of 2010 a controversy started between the governing parties
CDU/CSU on one side and the FDP on the other side (Höll and Öchsner,
2010). The liberal party FDP wanted to lower the income threshold for
highly-qualified migrants. The liberal minister of justice criticized its coali-
tion partner: ‘The reluctance of the CDU to tackle the issue of labour
migration management is not proof of a rational immigration policy’
(Preuß, 2011b). ‘Who do we want to invite to Germany? Who can be a
motor for our society? (. . . ) Currently Germany is losing in the competition
for the brightest minds’. Within the CDU, opposing positions on the issue
existed. Both the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Science de-
manded, against the positions of their own party faction in the Bundestag,
the introduction of a points-based system and a lower income threshold
for the highly-qualified. The CDU/CSU faction of the Bundestag and the
CDU Minister of Interior were against these plans (Preuß, 2011a).
Another factor that influenced the debate on the liberalization of labour
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migration was the issue of freedom of movement for citizens of the new
2007 accession countries. Germany had restricted the freedom of move-
ment of citizens from these countries until the 01.05.2011. An important
argument of those actors with a restrictive position was the “fear” of a
mass immigration after the opening towards the EU-8. After the establish-
ment of the full freedom of movement in May 2011, however, immigration
numbers remained low. Key labour migration actors agree that these low
immigration numbers helped to bring about the change towards a less
restrictive labour migration model (BDA, 17.11.2011; BMI 2, 2.04.2012; SMI 1,
7.07.2012; SMA, 21.07.2012):
The first May 2011 certainly demystified the issue ( . . . ) In fact everybody knows
that Germany is not a country where qualified foreigners are queuing up and
where we just have to open the borders and masses will stream in. And one has
seen that now at the opening for the EU-8. The low immigration figures from
the new EU member states have brought a new dynamic into the debate,
making it easier for the government to adopt a more liberal approach, since
fears of being “overrun” have not been justified. (BMAS, 9.02.2012)
Also, the favourable economic situation and the comparatively low unem-
ployment figures served as a window of opportunity for change: ‘The
labour market situation has considerably changed during the last two
years. We have much less unemployed people. And the need for migration
depends on the labour market’ (CDU/CSU, 10.02.2012).
Finally, those parts of the government who were in favour of a more
open labour migration policy gradually were successful. In June 2011, on
the initiative of the Christian-Democratic Minister of Labour, the govern-
ment issued a so-called positive list of professions (Positivliste) that would
not be subject to the priority check anymore. The list included mechan-
ical engineers, electronic engineers and doctors. ５ On 6 November 2011,
the government agreed to yet again reform paragraph 19 Residence Law
and to lower the required minimum income for university graduates to
48,000 Euro.
５.３ The Länder as actors in labour migration policy
During the negotiation of a new labour migration framework and during
the phase in which the transposition of the EU Blue Card directive was
discussed, the position of the representation of the German Länder chan-
ged from a restrictive position towards demands for a significant liberal-
ization of the German labour migration regime. In the German political
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0482
<CMS1404_04_LAUB_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:22>
482 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
system, the representation of the Länder has several competences in the
political process. Legislative projects by the federal government must be
first presented to the Bundesrat; also, it can introduce its own legislative
projects. The Bundesrat must approve those laws that have a direct effect
on the financial or administrative structure of the Länder. It can veto all
other laws; however, this veto can be overridden by the national parlia-
ment. In 2007, confronted with the proposal on the EU Blue Card directive,
it had rejected the idea of a common residence title: ‘The Bundesrat de-
mands to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is upheld and stresses
( . . . ) the competencies of the member states to regulate the access to their
national labour markets ( . . . )’ (Bundesrat, 2007). It also rejected the idea to
allow immigration based on compliance with a minimum salary threshold.
However, in the following years, the representation of the German re-
gions gradually changed its position. One of the first and most active actors
who demanded better and more generous immigration channels for skilled
labour was the free state of Saxony. Saxony is an instance of an Eastern
German federal state where since the reunification the population has
rapidly decreased, and where at the same time a significant economic
growth is taking place. Since 1990, the population has decreased by 15
percent, and projections show that until 2025, it will decrease by another
12 percent. In 2014, more people will leave the employment sector than will
take up an employment. Due to historical reasons, Saxony has a specific,
non-EU migration profile. While in the western federal states a tradition of
intra-EU labour migration from Italy and Spain exists that encourages new
migration from these countries, the Eastern German Länder’s historical
migration ties with Eastern European countries who until recently have
not been in the EU, or who still are not EU members. The main countries of
origin of migrants living in Saxony are Vietnam, Russia, Ukraine and
Poland (Landtag Sachsen, n.d.).
Confronted with the pressure of a lack of skilled workers and the danger
of companies not expanding because of this situation, in 2008 the govern-
ment of Saxony defined and established a new policy field, “Gaining by
migration” (Zugewinn durch Zuwanderung), and set up a corresponding
department in the Ministry of Interior. The existing legal provisions for
the immigration of skilled labour were considered to be ineffective: ‘The
law of 2005 was useless because the salary threshold was too high’ (SMI 1,
7.07.2012). In 2009, Saxony commissioned a study on the future of labour
migration by the research institute Institut der Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA).
The study recommended the introduction of a system with a yearly quota
for immigration, combined with a points system that would take into
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account qualification, language skills and professional experience (Hinte et
al., 2011). In April 2011 the federal state of Saxony brought an initiative
based on the IZA report to the Bundesrat. Although also governed by the
CDU, the proposition of Saxony was contrary to the position of the federal
government and of the CDU on the federal level. However, ‘( . . . ) that is
federalism for you. The interests of the region overpowers party interests’
(SMA, 21.07.2012).
The Blue Card directive both provided a “blueprint” for the initiative of
the Saxon government and helped to draw attention to Saxony’s initiative.
One motive to introduce the Bundesrat initiative was that the Blue Card
directive was not being transposed (SMI, 17.07.2012): ‘We have built our
Bundesrat initiative knowing the Blue Card directive, and we have adapted
elements of the Blue Card directive’ (SMI, 17.07.2012). However, at first
Saxony could not find allies for its proposal amongst other regions. In this
situation, the Blue Card directive served as an opportunity for underlining
the demands of the Saxon government ‘The EU initiative helped us ( . . . ). In
the context of its negotiation, we could draw attention again to our initia-
tive in the Bundesrat’ (SMA 21.07.2012). When Germany was lagging behind
with the transposition, the directive became a “catalyst” (SMI, 17.07.2012).
Gradually, other federal states also developed positions in favour of a
more open labour migration regime. In December 2011 the conference of
the ministers of economy of the 16 Länder demanded a paradigm change in
labour migration policy, towards a welcoming culture and the attraction of
skilled foreign workers (Beschluss der Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz, 2011).
Hamburg established a welcome centre for labour migrants at its aliens’
office. ‘Between 2007 and 2012, it became widely accepted that we will be
confronted with a lack of skilled workers that cannot be addressed by the
national workforce or solely by EU labour migrants. It took the Länder a bit
longer to realize this, but they did’ (BMI, 3 24.02.2014). 2012, in its note on
the federal government’s Blue Card legislative project, the Bundesrat had,
compared to 2007, significantly changed its position on the Blue Card. It
‘explicitly welcomed the introduction of the Blue Card’ and demanded
even more far-reaching changes than the Blue Card directive contained.
The Bundesrat proposed to allow labour immigration of migrants who are
not university graduates but who have a comparable five years professional
experience. It also suggested the introduction of a skills-based labour im-
migration channel, namely the introduction of a ‘job search visa’, a propo-
sition that was taken up by the federal government when it transposed the
Blue Card directive (Bundesrat, 2012).
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５.４ The transposition of the Blue Card directive
In December 2011 the federal government decided on a draft legislation
transposing the EU Blue Card directive into German law. In March 2012 it
announced that it had come to an agreement on the way of transposing
the Blue Card directive, and on the further measures that would accom-
pany the introduction of the Blue Card. ‘Basically the Blue Card directive
only provided a general framework, and it was up to the national govern-
ments to decide on how attractive they would make this new residence
title for highly-skilled migrants. For us, the EU directive was an opportu-
nity. We wanted to lower the minimum income threshold anyway (. . . )’
(BMI 3, 24.02.2014). At the time of the transposition of the directive, the
existing national legal provisions regarding the required minimum salary
for highly-skilled migration were already almost identical to the provisions
of the Blue Card: ‘It was the national decision-making process that was
decisive for the introduction of the Blue Card’ (BMI 3, 24.02.2014). The Blue
Card directive served as a “vehicle” (BMI, 24.02.2014; SMI 2, 01.03.2014) for
bringing about a policy change that already was intended by the federal
government.
In August 2012, the law on the transposition of the EU directive on
highly-skilled migration (Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Hochqualifizierten-
Richtlinie der Europäischen Union) came into force. With it, the federal
government agreed on a new legal framework with far-reaching conse-
quences for the German labour migration regime. The EU Blue Card that
was introduced became a new residence title, replacing paragraph 19 of the
Residence Act. The Blue Card can be granted to university graduates from
outside the EU who earn more than 44,800 Euro/year. For the MINT pro-
fessions, the required minimum income is set at 34,900 Euro. In its trans-
position, the German government lowered the minimum salary threshold
as far as it is made possible by the Blue Card directive. Also, the German
transposition foresees the shortest time frame for processing the Blue Card
(14 days) (Kosc, 2013: 8).6 As opposed to the regulations of the former
paragraph 19 Residence Act, holders of the Blue Card at first only get a
temporary residence title. This can be viewed as a concession to the Bavar-
ian CSU and parts of the CDU. After three years of continuous employment
in Germany, however, the residence title can be transformed into a perma-
nent settlement permit. Blue Card holders with very good German lan-
guage skills may be granted a permanent settlement permit after two
years. Another new regulation that was introduced with the Blue Card
transposition is a so-called job search visa. It gives university graduates
from every country in the world the possibility to obtain a six-month visa
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for a job search in Germany. The introduction of this instrument was
suggested by the Bundesrat and taken up by the federal government. The
only precondition is that they can prove that they have the financial means
to sustain themselves during their stay in Germany. The introduction of
this instrument as §18c into the new immigration act introduces a human
capital based instrument, up until now associated with Canada and the
USA, into the previously solely employment-driven German system (Kolb,
2014b). This represents not only a departure from the long prevailing phi-
losophy that labour immigration to Germany was only possible with a
work contract. It also means that in fact a very basic points system consist-
ing of two accession criteria, i.e. an academic qualification and adequate
means of subsistence during the stay in Germany, was introduced into the
German labour migration regime (Kolb, 2014b: 66).
Furthermore, the law also abolishes the regulation of paragraph 19 Re-
sidence Act according to which self-employed foreigners must invest
250,000 Euro and create five jobs in order to obtain a settlement permit
in Germany. Finally, the legislation also entails a change for foreign stu-
dents. From now on, foreign university graduates may take up any job
during the “search year” in which they are entitled to look for an employ-
ment in Germany (and not only if it is considered to be corresponding to
their degree of qualification). After having been employed for two years,
they can be granted a permanent settlement permit. Also, foreigners who
have been doing their vocational training in Germany may take up em-
ployment in Germany after their training.
６ Conclusion: Preconditions for the Europeanization of
German labour migration policy
With the transposition of the EU Blue Card directive, the German labour
migration regime has been significantly liberalized and has undergone a
paradigm change. By lowering the salary threshold for taking up employ-
ment in Germany as far as made possible by the Blue Card directive, the
concept of “highly-qualified” was redefined and now means migrants with
a salary that is only slightly higher than the national average gross salary.
Furthermore, with the transposition, a skills-based, offer-oriented labour
migration instrument was introduced into the up until now exclusively
demand-oriented German legal framework. The reform significantly in-
creases the possibility of access of third-state migrants to the German
labour market. In fact, in European comparison, in 2012 Germany was the
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country that had issued the highest amount of Blue Cards in the EU (2584),
thus having delivered 86 percent of all Blue Cards (Kosc, 2013: 15).
This transposition of the Blue Card directive must be seen as the final
point of a national development towards a more open labour migration
regime. Since 2010, the debate about the need for skilled foreign labour
gained momentum. In 2010, at the time when Blue Card directive was
supposed to be implemented, a controversial debate on labour migration
took place. Ultimately, those actors who were in favour of a further open-
ing of the German labour market to third-state migrants were successful.
Both key actors on the federal level and at the subnational level demanded
a liberalization of the German migration law. At the same time, a public
discourse on Germany’s need to remain internationally competitive inten-
sified, strongly mirroring the discourse on labour migration at the EU level.
In the German case, some actors used the Blue Card directive as an oppor-
tunity for promoting their ideas. However, at the same time, and maybe
more importantly, a development towards a convergence of political dis-
courses and policy goals between the EU and the German political context
took place. The directive was transposed when the policy preferences by
national key actors and the domestic discourse on the subject had become
almost identical with the content of the Blue Card directive. Then not only
the directive was transposed; rather, EU legislation was used to bring about
a major policy change that represents a paradigmatic shift in German
labour migration policy. In an internationally comparative perspective,
regarding its management of labour migration Germany has changed
from a ‘restrictive maverick to a liberal role model’ (Kolb, 2014a: 91). With
the most recent reforms, a rapid policy change in German labour migration
policy has taken place: ‘After many years of a reluctant position towards
labour migration at best, Germany since 2012 has introduced immigration
channels that in an internationally comparative perspective are liberal and
open’ (SVR, 2014: 15). The German development also fits into a general
international trend towards hybrid models of labour migration regulation
that combine both employer-based and human-capital oriented instru-
ments (Kolb, 2014a; Papademetriou and Sumption, 2011). Austria, which
in the negotiation of the Blue Card on the EU level also took a sceptic
stance, in 2011 introduced a human capital based approach, too. The Rot-
Weiß-Rote Karte is a points system for highly-qualified workers and work-
ers in shortage professions. With the red-white-red card, highly-skilled
migrants can obtain a six month visa to look for employment in Austria.
In order to understand the rapid and paradigmatic change in German
labour migration policy, this article has discussed the concept of goodness
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of fit with the aim of evaluating how valuable the approach still is for
understanding processes of Europeanization and the impact of the EU
level on the domestic context. The case of the German Blue Card transpo-
sition confirms two of the central hypothesis of the goodness of fit ap-
proach: that directives are smoothly transposed if they fit the domestic
institutions and policies; and that actors perceive and use an EU legal
project for promoting their ideas. The German case shows that “goodness
of fit” can (or should) be understood as a process rather than a static
concept: as a precondition for the transposition, EU and domestic policy
aims first had to reach a degree of conformity. Then, this “good fit” encour-
aged a significant policy change in the field of German migration policies,
even transcending the aims of the EU directive. Thus, the German case
shows that an EU directive can also be a vehicle for a broader policy
change. It is another instance of how a government seeking reform uses
the European level (Radaelli, 2003). However, it is also worth noting that
an emphasis on a low degree of (intra-EU) migration (the low immigration
rates after the establishment of the freedom of movement for the 2004
accession countries in 2011) served as an important precondition for the
opening of the German labour migration regime.
The case of the German Blue Card transposition shows that the concept
of goodness of fit, understood as a framework for understanding the inter-
action and the interdependency of the EU and the national level, still is a
useful concept that should not be discarded. Focusing exclusively, as some
authors have proposed, on the national context for understanding the
impact of European politics and policies on the domestic level, would
mean a return to a methodological nationalism that would block the view
for the processes of multi-level governance that undoubtedly take place in
the field of European labour migration. All in all, the case of the German
Blue Card transposition provides a valuable instance to understand pro-
cesses of Europeanization, from a policy field hitherto comparatively ne-
glected by Europeanization research.
Notes
1 . Three interviews took place with representatives of the Ministry of the Interior: one
interview with a civil servant of the unit immigration law (BMI 1) and two interviews
with the head of the unit immigration law (BMI 2 and BMI 3).
2. Most of this empirical material was generated in the framework of the research project
“Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary Europe” (2012 to 2014), directed by Dr.
Ferruccio Pastore, FIERI, Torino and has also been presented in Laubenthal (2012).
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3. Now the salary had to at least correspond to the income threshold to the pension
insurance scheme. In 2012, the income threshold to the pension insurance scheme
was at 67,200 Euro/year in Western Germany and at 57,600 Euro in Eastern Germany.
4. Mathematics, information technology, natural sciences, technology.
5. It is however interesting to note that the already existing law would have permitted the
same, too: professions could have been exempted from the priority check by applying
paragraph 39 (2) Residence Act which states that the Federal Employment Agency of
Labour can agree to the issuing of a residence permit under paragraph 18 if this appears
to be necessary for certain professions or economic sectors.
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Abstract
The international migration of physicians is considered an effective response
to ageing societies. However, the international recruitment of physicians may
be challenged by the protectionist rationale of the medical profession in
many countries. How is the potential contradiction between open recruit-
ment policies and exclusive professional regulations managed in Europe?
What is the role played by foreign credential recognition or language knowl-
edge in the recruitment process? Are there differences among countries?
These questions are analysed by comparing Germany and Spain, which
possess not only two divergent migration regimes but also two completely
different health care systems. The main goal of the article is to explore how
the capacity of national health care sectors to attract and integrate foreign
physicians may affect Europe’s quest for highly skilled health professionals in
the long term.
Keywords: Germany, Spain, labour migration, highly skilled migration, health care
system, physicians, foreign credential recognition, human capital
１ Introduction
Immigration is often suggested as the best possible way to meet the grow-
ing demand for highly skilled professionals in ageing societies. In view of
this, the formerly restrictive immigration policies prevailing in European
immigration countries have given way to increasing efforts to respond to
economic and demographic needs through active labour migration poli-
cies. However, as with many types of migration processes, the interna-
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tional migration of highly skilled workers is a multifaceted process invol-
ving several actors interacting at the state level. Employers’ strategies, la-
bour market structures, language skills and foreign credential recognition
processes must be taken into account when assessing a nation state’s ca-
pacity to attract (and integrate) highly skilled foreign labour (Jinks et al.,
2000; Peixoto, 2001; Bommes et al., 2004; Hoesch, 2012).
This article analyses to which extent internal barriers to workers’ selec-
tion such as foreign credential recognition, assessment of professional qua-
lifications or language knowledge may challenge increasing openness to-
ward the recruitment of highly skilled workers in the European Union. To
do this, the analysis focuses on the recruitment of foreign physicians in
Germany and in Spain. The reasons for this choice are twofold. First, the
medical profession is one of the professions with the most restrictive access
in comparative perspective (Freidson, 1970; Tousjin, 2009). In addition,
health care markets have “unique characteristics” that “imply great com-
plexity in developed economies involving government intervention, licen-
sure, regulation, and (quasi-) union activity” (Grignon et al., 2012:3). Second,
the choice of Germany and Spain as suitable comparative cases is based on
their divergent migration histories (an old versus a new immigration coun-
try) and the different structure of their health care systems (a social security
financed system in Germany versus a tax-financed system in Spain).
The first objective of the article is to assess to what extent the interna-
tional demand for high-skilled health professionals can be fulfilled in a
highly regulated sector, such as health care, and which factors may hamper
recruitment procedures and labour market insertion. The second objective
is to shed light on the reasons for divergence in recruitment policies in the
European Union, where 27 different health care systems coexist in different
socio-economic contexts with different professional regulations. The ana-
lysis focuses on structural conditions such as foreign credential recogni-
tion, language requirements or salary standards without disregarding the
influence of other contextual variables such as a country’s economic situa-
tion, which is considered particularly relevant to the Spanish case.
The empirical material collected for the analysis consists of a series of
expert interviews conducted with professional and institutional represen-
tatives in Spain and in Germany between the spring and summer of 2013 as
part of the project ‘Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary
Europe’ (LabMigGOv) (Finotelli, 2014). The interviewees include in parti-
cular representatives of organisations indirectly involved in the design
and/or implementation of labour migration policies such as regulation
bodies in Germany and trade unions in Spain. The interviews are comple-
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mented by administrative memos, which have been particularly useful for
the German case.
The first section provides a brief overview of the existing debates on
foreign recruitment of physicians. The second and third sections of the
article analyse the recent evolution in the health care regimes of Germany
and Spain respectively, focusing on those factors that contributed to “open-
ing” the medical profession over the past few years. In the fourth and fifth
sections, the analysis considers which types of inclusion barriers persist in
Germany and Spain despite more open recruitment regimes. The final
discussion explores the ways in which the recruitment and integration of
foreign physicians into national health care systems can affect Europe’s
quest for human capital.
２ The International Recruitment of Foreign Physicians:
A Brief Overview of Policies and Challenges
It is widely acknowledged that ageing populations, new technologies and
the unattractiveness of health care professions to young doctors represent
major challenges for European health care. The international recruitment
of physicians is seen not only as the most effective way to respond to
demographic challenges but also as an opportunity to improve healthcare
systems and enhance their competitiveness (Forcier et al., 2004; Buchan,
2006). As declared by the EU Commission in its “Green Paper on the
European Workforce for Health”, “to respond adequately to these chal-
lenges requires health systems to have efficient and effective work forces
of the highest quality as health services are very labour intensive” (EU
Commission, 2008:1).
In accordance with this goal, the recruitment and integration chances
of foreign physicians have been improved in the European Union within
the regulation framework approved to foster the intra- and extra-EU mo-
bility of academics. Since 1975, EU members almost automatically recog-
nise academic degrees obtained at any officially recognised university in
the European Union. The EU directive 2005/36/EG of 7 September 2005
regulates the recognition of specialty training after a degree in medicine,
allowing automatic recognition of specialty training carried out in an EU
member state and so lifting a further labour market barrier to the intra-
European circulation of EU physicians and other professional practi-
tioners.１
Recruitment opportunities for non-EU physicians and other highly
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skilled professionals have been also recently improved by approving the
so-called ‘Blue Card’ directive, n. 2009/50/EC, which allows recruitment of
highly skilled workers (including physicians) from non-EU countries and
defines common employment conditions across Europe. Undoubtedly, the
directive represents a milestone of the new European migration regime
after 25 years of restrictive orthodoxy. The directive’s principal aim is to
increase EU attractiveness to highly skilled non-EU migrants to enhance
Europe’s “international strength” (EU Commission, 2007: 1) and consolidate
Europe’s transformation into a “competition state” (Lavenex, 2006). Not-
withstanding the remarkable progress achieved by EU regulation in the
last decade, the mechanisms that promote the international mobility of
foreign physicians remain an underresearched topic. As Wismar et al.,
(2011) highlight, little is known about the dimensions of health professional
mobility, its driving forces and the corresponding country responses. In
fact, much scholarly attention has been devoted to the ‘brain drain’ effects
of physician recruitment on the immigrants’ countries of origin (Docquier
and Bhargava 2006).
In contrast, knowledge is more limited on policies and obstacles related
to physician recruitment and labour market inclusion in host countries
(Dussault et al, 2010; Glinos, 2014). In this respect, Den Adel et al, (2004)
have been among the first to argue that international recruitment in the
health care sector is deeply embedded in the structural conditions of des-
tination countries. Different sources of financing and degrees of corporat-
ism can, for instance, explain why some countries are more reluctant than
others in recruiting non EU-physicians (Hoesch, 2012). Other scholarly
works have focused on the relevance of the recognition of foreign creden-
tials, showing that Member States traditionally have fewer possibilities to
create employment barriers in the non-regulated ICT sector (Kolb et al.,
2004) while the recognition of foreign credentials of non-EU foreigners is
very relevant to practice in regulated professions (Bommes et al., 2004;
Ribeiro, 2008a). In most countries, engineers, lawyers and physicians
must indeed pass strict foreign credential assessments (Sumpton, 2013;
Dixon, 2013). Despite this, physicians seem to have a special status among
them since medicine, as Eliot Freidson noted, “even in circumstances
where it is not fully free of state control, it is at the very least formally
free to control the content if not the terms of its own work” (Freidson,
1970: 18). The medical community has developed several methods of reg-
ulation, such as ethical codes or credential recognition procedures, to keep
a certain level of trust in the medical profession and protect recognised
community members from the “infiltration” of unqualified candidates.
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Scholars have highlighted that the high degree of protectionism affecting
the health care sector may have a negative impact on the labour market
integration of foreign physicians, who may be considered “system outsi-
ders” by national medical communities. A noteworthy example in this
respect are Canada and Australia, where the strict norms of licensing
bodies in health professions have long constituted a barrier to the employ-
ment of physicians, despite the openness of their internationally praised
human capital models (Iredale, 2001; McGrath, 2004; Boyd and Schellen-
berg, 2007). Besides foreign credential recognition, the knowledge of the
host country language is considered particularly relevant for performance
in the health care sector while in the high-tech or engineering sector,
interaction is often possible in English. However, the question of language
proficiency has been often analysed as a barrier to access to health care
services (Kale and Raza Syed, 2010) but seldom as a barrier to recruitment
and successful labour market inclusion of foreign physicians.
Overall, this brief overview of the existing debates on foreign recruit-
ment in the health care sectors reveals that there is an increasing need to
deepen knowledge on the potential contradiction between inclusive
recruitment policies for third-country nationals in the European Union
with exclusionary practices related to credential recognition or language
requirements. A comparison between the Spanish and the German recruit-
ment models is expected to provide some insight into this particular policy
field.
３ International Recruitment in the German Health Care
Sector
Germany has a statutory social-security-based health care system, where
state health insurance (gesetzliche Krankenversicherung) is financed by
social security contributions to different insurance companies, which cov-
ered two-thirds of health care spending in 2011 while the remaining one-
third is mainly privately financed (Paris et al, 2010). Organisationally, the
German health care sector is characterised by a high degree of corporatism
and self-administration, in which representatives of social insurance and
doctors negotiate contributions and performance at the margins of the
national state budget. The high level of autonomy of professional corpora-
tions and the independence from state budget concerns have transformed
this sector into an independent sub-system in which physicians’ corpora-
tions are particularly well-organised (Hoesch, 2012). Physicians can work
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either in a hospital or in independent practices, for which the number, type
and distribution are stipulated by the regional organisations of indepen-
dent physicians (Kassenärztliche Vereiningungen). Individual physicians
charge social insurance for their services and thus, many German medical
practices function as small enterprises mainly interested in financial bene-
fit (Hoesch, 2012).
Access to the medical profession is regulated by each Land, the German
federal unit. To work in Germany, physicians need a full licence to practice
(Approbation) issued by the state health authorities (Oberste Landes-
gesundheitsbehörde) of the respective federal unit. The full licence to prac-
tice is conditio sine qua non to practice as a generic doctor, start medical
training and to practice then as a specialist. Until 2012, however, §3 of the
German regulation of the medical profession (Bundesärzteordnung) stated
that only German and EU citizens could apply for the full licence to prac-
tice. In addition, Germans or EU citizens that had studied in a non-EU
country or ethnic Germans had to pass a state of knowledge exam (Kennt-
nisstandprüfung) to get a full licence (Englmann and Müller, 2007). Issuing
the full licence to non-EU citizens was only possible under a restricted
number of exceptional circumstances, whose interpretation was highly
discretionary and almost always ended with the application’s withdrawal
(Schiller, 2010). The nationality criterion was considered a matter of “na-
tional interest” because physicians practicing in Germany were expected to
understand the way of life and the needs of their patients and to know
about customary therapies as well as to possess knowledge about the
juridical norms regulating the practice of the medical profession (Espeler,
2000). However, restrictions also applied to non-EU citizens that had been
studying at a German university and to third-country nationals that had
undergone specialty training in Germany, all of whom could be assumed to
be familiar with German medical practice but did not have the right to
apply for a full licence (Yamamura, 2009). The power of medical corpora-
tions, the independence of the German health care system from politics
and the long-lasting German non-immigration dogma all contributed to
maintaining the nationality requirement for many decades. In this period,
non-EU physicians could practice only on the basis of a temporary licence
to practice (Berufserlaubnis) that was geographically and temporally lim-
ited. It was generally issued for a maximum of seven years and could only
be renewed under a limited number of exceptional circumstances (Yama-
mura, 2009). Temporary licences were limited to the activities of an assis-
tant doctor and did not allow foreign physicians to open their own clinics
on German territory. In addition, the issuance of a temporary licence was
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not dependent upon a comprehensive state of knowledge examination but
only on the individual assessment of certified information about medical
training abroad.
Overall, the temporary licence helped to solve the problem of the de-
mand for physicians in hospitals and some rural areas, accomplishing at
the same time an immigration policy based on temporal and geographical
limitations to avoid immigrants’ permanent settlement. Clearly, the inter-
national migration of physicians was seen as a temporary phenomenon to
fill gaps in hospitals, but the same were excluded from the possibility of
settling in the country and participating in the medical business by open-
ing their own practices (Hoesch, 2012).
The strict regulation of the medical profession contrasted with the
growing debate on (and concern for) the shortage of physicians in
Germany. In 2001, the Federal Chamber of Physicians (Bundesärztekam-
mer) declared that the increasing number of retiring doctors, the high
emigration figures for German specialists (by 2010, 17,000 doctors had al-
ready left Germany, mainly to work in Switzerland or the USA) and the
growing feminisation of the medical profession were enhancing the de-
mand for certain specialties (especially general practitioners) in Eastern
German Länder and rural areas (Kopetsch, 2010; Blüm and Löffert, 2010).
The contradiction between an oversupply in metropolitan areas and an
undersupply in rural areas explains why German scholars were increas-
ingly worried about shortages, despite a ratio of 3.84 doctors to 1,000 in-
habitants in 2011, one of the highest in Europe (OECD, 2011). No considera-
tion, however, was devoted to the question of international recruitment.
Rather, the Federal Chamber focused on the search for functional alterna-
tives, such as increasing the attractiveness of a medical career to young
students, improving working conditions for doctors in German hospitals or
enhancing intra-EU circulation.
Only since 2010 have the restrictions on the entry of foreign physicians
started to relax. The idea that the health care sector should be open to non-
EU physicians was supported by the new German immigration Zeitgeist. In
2012, the German government ratified the ‘Blue Card’ directive, allowing
highly skilled professionals to enter the country if minimum salary condi-
tions were fulfilled. ‘Blue Card’ applicants in MINT professions (Mathe-
matics, Informatics, Natural Sciences and Technology) and physicians
were exempted from the labour market check. Moreover, for MINT profes-
sionals and physicians, Germany lowered the minimum salary require-
ments to 36,192 euros (instead of the 46,400 euros for other highly skilled
occupations). Such a salary, which is far below the amount that many
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German (but also EU) physicians would accept to work in Germany, allows
the hiring of young doctors in their first year of specialty, which would not
have been possible under the previous salary requirements.２ Further, the
new law for the recognition of foreign credentials (Berufsqualifikationena-
nerkennungsgesetz, BQFG) established the right of every non-EU citizen to
apply for foreign qualifications in Germany. This goal was achieved by
transposing the recognition rules for EU citizens, as regulated by directive
no. 36/2005/EU, onto the new German recognition law, extending their
validity to third-country nationals. Since then, foreign credential recogni-
tion in Germany has no longer depended on the applicant’s nationality but
on the country in which the applicant has obtained his or her medical
degree. Finally, German legislation declares that doctors must possess “ne-
cessary knowledge of the German language” but does not provide informa-
tion on what level of language is required or how such knowledge is to be
assessed. The German Länder have informally agreed on the intermediate
level B2 as a minimum level for foreign physicians. Then, it is up to the
recognition office to decide whether a simple language certificate suffices
or if an additional language test is required.
The new provisions were particularly significant for foreign physicians
because, for the first time, doctors from non-EU countries had the right to
apply for foreign credential recognition and therefore obtain a full licence
to practice in Germany. Clearly, as the president of the Federal Chamber
noted, the new recognition law could not coexist with the old §3 of the
Federal Medical Regulation, where nationality (and not the country where
the degree was obtained) was the main criterion to apply for a full license
in Germany (Bundesärztekammer, 2011a).
The approval of the new recognition law, however, should not be con-
sidered a surprise but rather the outcome of the interplay between deep
changes affecting the German migration and health care sectors. First, a
widespread consensus on the need for highly skilled migrants had grown
in Germany (Laubentahl, 2012; Kolb, 2014). Second, as Döhler and Manow
(1995: 151) highlighted, federal intervention had increasingly put the
German health care sector “under stress” since the health system reform
of 1992 (see also Hoesch, 2009). Third, European integration had contrib-
uted to the development of a “dual” recognition system with respect to
medical careers equalising the medical degrees and medical training of
EU citizens to German degrees if obtained in an EU country. Moreover,
since 2007, medical degrees obtained in Australia, Israel, Japan, Canada
and New Zealand were considered objectively equivalent (objektive Gleich-
wertigkeit) to German degrees. In view of the aforementioned changes, it is
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therefore no surprise that applications for credential recognition by non-
EU physicians were accepted as the inevitable consequence of the evolu-
tion towards a more open immigration approach, from which non-EU
physicians could hardly be excluded.
４ The Internationalisation of the Spanish Health Care
Sector
The Spanish National Health System, created in 1986, is based on universal
insurance and is financed through tax allocations and assignments from
general state budgets. Nonetheless, Spanish citizens are allowed to obtain
private insurance. Tax funding and a very low degree of professional cor-
poratism make the health care system highly dependent on state politics
(De Miguel, 1982). Although health competencies have almost completely
been transferred to the Autonomous Communities (the Spanish federal
units), the organisation and development of medical careers lie within
the power of the central government and, in particular, the Ministry of
Health. In fact, the central government in Spain still plays a major role in
designing access to medical training and in regulating foreign credential
recognition, whereas the employment of health professionals after speci-
alty training is a function of the Autonomous Communities. The central
administration organises the medical profession and decides who may
practice. This control inevitably weakens physicians’ control over the pro-
fession and makes recruitment more dependent on general immigration
policy concerns than in Germany (Rodriguez, 1981).
Before being employed as physicians in the Spanish health care system,
young graduates must complete a five-year medical training period at a
Spanish hospital. Physicians’ access to medical training to become an “in-
ternal resident doctor” (medico interno residente, MIR) depends on their
rank after taking a state examination (the so-called MIR exam). Training
slots are assigned by the Ministry of Health to each university hospital
based on requests presented by the Autonomous Communities. The state
examination results determine the choice of specialty: the higher the score
on the state examination, the greater the chances the candidate will be
able to pursue the desired specialty in the desired hospital. In contrast to
Germany, third-country nationals have been allowed to apply for their
degree recognition to take the state exam. However, the access of non-EU
foreigners to medical training has been formally limited by a “cap for
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foreigners” (cupo de extranjeros) on the total slots available, which could
not exceed 10 per cent of all available training slots.
The nationality criterion clearly had a limiting function that started to
be questioned only at the beginning of the new century because of the
growing “feeling” that Spain needed more doctors (Confederación
Española de Sindicatos Médicos (CESM), medical trade union, personal
communication, October 17, 2011). Such “feeling” was embedded in a deep
mismatch. On the one hand, Spain has a ratio of 4.1 practising physicians
for 1,000 inhabitants, one of the highest in the European Union (OECD,
2011). On the other hand, physicians in Spain tended to concentrate in
Madrid or in other important urban centres, while hospitals in the interior
regions and on the islands remained understaffed because they were un-
attractively located (Amaya Pombo and García Pérez, 2005). Such disparity
was exacerbated by autonomous governments profiting from the “spend-
ing euphoria” during the economic boom by building new hospitals in
rather isolated regions without increasing human resources. Moreover, a
sizeable number of Spanish physicians had left Spain to practice or do their
medical training in other countries such as Portugal (Ribeiro, 2008b).
Family and Community Medicine (FCM) was particularly undersupplied,
because it was considered less prestigious than other specialties; it also
provided fewer chances for professional development (González López-
Valcárcel et al., 2011).３
As a result, several training slots in unattractive specialties, often lo-
cated in isolated regions of the Spanish interior, remained vacant. Conse-
quently, the Spanish Ministry of Health in 2007 modified the regulation of
the medical training exam, eliminating the cupo for non-EU citizens after
increasing the number of training slots from 5,200 in 2003 to 6,388 in 2007.
The only requirement was to have a valid residence or study permit and
foreign credential recognition being processed at the time of the exam.
Moreover, non-Spanish speaking applicants were requested to certify suffi-
cient knowledge of the Spanish language. If successful, the applicant was
required to legalise his or her position according to the requirements of
each Autonomous Community. The new regulation triggered substantial
growth in foreign credential recognitions processed by the Ministry of
Education. In 2010, 34 per cent of the applicants for available training
slots were foreigners, most of them from non-EU countries.
Apart from the recruitment of resident doctors, it was possible to recruit
non-EU specialists abroad because certain types of medical specialties had
been included in the Catalogue-of-Hard-to-Find-Occupations.４ In such
cases, labour market insertion also depended on specialty recognition.
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The recognition procedure for specialists, possible only for applicants with
a recognised academic degree in medicine, was centrally regulated and
carried out by an evaluation commission of specialists whose members
are chosen by the Spanish Ministry of Health (R.D. no. 459/2010). Several
observers agree that specialty recognition was more time-consuming than
degree recognition; the general tendency is to reject the application of non-
EU citizens if their specialisation is not equivalent to European standards.
Currently, no statistics about specialty recognition are available. However,
the Ministry of Health seems to have a large application backlog, which
confirms that specialty recognition is a particularly burdensome channel
to practicing medicine in Spain (Ramirez, 2013; Consejo General de Cole-
gios Oficiales de Médicos (CGCOM), professional corporation, personal
communication, Madrid, July 24, 2013).
Overall, the opening process experienced by the Spanish health care sector
is remarkable considering that the Spanish immigration model has been
mainly targeted at attracting low-skilled workers. As with other types of
highly skilled migration, Spanish policy-makers, aware of the widespread
criticism about the recruitment of foreign physicians, preferred to avoid a
public debate on the issue. Scholars had warned of the consequences of
increasing the number of training slots without carrying out structural re-
forms, warning that it would be difficult to absorb the larger number of
medical school graduates in the long term (Amaya Pombo and Garcia
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Figure 1: Recognition of foreign medical degrees in Spain (excluding specialty
recognition)
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Perez, 2005). Trade unions were also against the new recruitment scheme.
According to a representative of the Spanish physician trade unions, the
solution for structural problems did not rest in the recruitment of profes-
sionals from non-EU countries (Confederación Española de Sindícatos
Médicos (CESM), medical trade union, personal communication, Madrid,
October 17, 2011). Similarly, the representative of the Spanish “General
Workers’ Union” (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) expressed serious
concerns about the recruitment of non-EU physicians, arguing that they
would not be employed in hospitals or ambulatories but rather in private
centres for the care of elderly or dependent people “as a way to reduce
costs” (Unión General de Trabajadores, trade union, personal communica-
tion, Madrid, May 27, 2011). Finally, it was argued that the Spanish health
care system could not solely rely on the recruitment and employment of
resident doctors often endorsed with duties far beyond their actual com-
petence and a gross salary, which ranged from 900 to 1,500 euros, depend-
ing on the Autonomous Community (Consejo General de Colegios Oficales
de Médicos, professional corporation, telephone interview, July 24, 2013).
However, as with many other issues related to labour migration in Spain,
any criticism was overshadowed by euphoria about the economic boom,
which was reflected by an annual GDP growth rate of 4 per cent in 2006
(http://data.worldbank.org). Only the economic crisis brought to light the
contradictions and shortcomings of international labour recruitment in
the Spanish health care sector and, with it, the barriers to the recruitment
and insertion of foreign workers.
５ International Recruitment of Health Professionals in
the Crisis
During the economic boom, the Spanish health care sector developed into
an “employment bubble” without taking into account the long-term con-
sequences of training an increasing number of physicians. In this context,
the decision to attract resident doctors from third countries can be seen
more as a “reactive” measure, which was used to correct the symptoms of
labour market dysfunction without addressing the causes. Little considera-
tion was given to the possibilities of long-term employment after medical
training. Permanent employment in the Spanish public health sector, as
with all permanent positions in the Spanish civil service, is usually limited
to Spanish nationals and EU citizens. Therefore, for non-EU physicians,
employment in the public sector was often limited to temporary employ-
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ment as long as the medical profession was included in the Catalogue of
Hard-to-Find Occupations; the only possibility of getting a permanent con-
tract was in the private sector. In this respect, the position of non-EU
doctors in Spain was not very different from that of many non-EU doctors
in Germany before 2012, who could be employed only with a temporary
licence to practice.
The situation worsened with the economic crisis in 2009, when GDP
growth rate plummeted to -3.8 per cent and unemployment increased to
16.8 per cent (www.ine.es, www.worldbank.org). Budgetary restrictions re-
duced the possibilities of employment in Spanish hospitals for specialists,
while the fear of unemployment made unattractive specialties, such as
Family Medicine, more attractive to young natives (Harris et al, 2013).
Consequently, the Spanish government decided to restrict again the access
of non-EU physicians to the Spanish health care sector by eliminating
physicians from the Catalogue and limiting the access of non-EU foreigners
to medical training. Not surprisingly, the decision had a reactive character,
as an interviewee of the Spanish doctors’ trade union commented: “Now
that the ministry has decided to return to the previous situation, the feel-
ing is that there are too many doctors in Spain” (Confederación Española
de Sindicatos Médicos (CESM), medical trade union, personal communica-
tion, Madrid October 17, 2011). However, the cap on third-country nationals
has been re-introduced and it has been considerably reduced in compar-
ison with the past. According to the current regulation, only four per cent
of non-EU citizens who pass the state examination are allowed to choose a
medical training slot in Spain. This means that non-EU citizens may be
denied access to medical training despite having a recognised degree and
achieving a good ranking position on the state examination. The cap also
applies to non-EU citizens who obtained their medical degree at a Spanish
university, a decision that has been sharply criticised by professional
bodies, such as the CGCOM, and whose exclusionary character is similar
to the German provisions before the recent legislation changes. The
CGCOM officially complained about this restrictive rule, to which the Min-
istry of Health reacted, stating that coming to Spain for medical training is
an immigration matter and therefore depends on the applicant’s national-
ity, not on where the degree was obtained (Consejo General de Colegios
Oficiales de Médicos, professional corporation, telephone interview, Sep-
tember 13, 2013).
After the recent reforms, non-EU physicians have very few possibilities
of working in Spain. In fact, they not only have limited access to medical
training but also few chances to work in the public and private sectors.
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First, the employment of non-EU physicians in private and public institu-
tions is now subject to a foregoing labour market check. Second, the few
permanent positions offered in the public sector are still restricted to
Spanish and EU citizens. The nationality criterion inevitably draws atten-
tion to the role of naturalisation and the discriminatory character this
requirement may have on the general recruitment of non-EU physicians
in Spain. According to current citizenship law, Spanish nationality can be
obtained after ten years of legal residence. However, citizens of South
American countries, Portugal, Equatorial Guinea and the Philippines can
apply for Spanish citizenship after two years of legal residence. The asym-
metrical treatment in favour of Latin Americans may turn naturalisation
into a strategy to access the medical profession despite unfavourable la-
bour immigration rules. Positive discrimination in favour of Latin Ameri-
cans may also be strengthened by recent language requirements. Since
2011, physicians from a country whose official language is not Spanish
must demonstrate sufficient knowledge of Spanish (Level C1 or C2) accord-
ing to either the classification of the Cervantes Institute or the official
language institute in the applicant’s country of origin. This novelty has
been explained by the need to improve communication skills between
doctors and patients and the necessity to adapt to requirements set by
the EU directive on the recognition of professional qualifications. With
this new rule, however, language requirements may turn into a further
instrument of positive discrimination favouring the recruitment of natur-
alised Latin Americans to the detriment of other national groups, includ-
ing, paradoxically, EU citizens.
As recent developments show, new nationality-based restrictions to
select residents in Spain were introduced despite the new European Zeitge-
ist in favour of highly skilled migration; this shows how Spanish health care
reform (and its selection mechanisms) was deeply embedded in national
contingencies and structures. In this regard, Spain experienced a reverse
trend with respect to Germany: Spain became more restrictive by strength-
ening nationality requirements for medical training, while Germany lifted
its nationality-based entry barriers for physicians and other highly skilled
foreign workers. Nevertheless, enthusiasm about the ground-breaking
character of any new recruitment opportunities should not prevent a ser-
ious reflection on hidden shortcomings and contradictions to assess to
what extent new forms of control a posteriori may emerge in the future
German immigration model.
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６ Germany: The New Promised Land for Foreign
Physicians?
Germany’s new immigration regime represents one of the most recent
significant novelties in the European migration panorama. As a recent
OECD report observes, Germany now belongs to “the OECD countries
with the fewest restrictions on labour migration for highly skilled occupa-
tions” (OECD, 2013: 15). Such a shift is particularly relevant for non-EU
physicians, in a sector where the high degree of corporatism was consid-
ered a major obstacle to the opening of the health care sector to foreigners
(Hoesch, 2012). German physicians’ organisations viewed with scepticism
the recruitment of non-EU physicians. Still, in 2008, the Marburger Bund,
the German non-governmental organisation of hospital physicians, argued
against the recruitment of non-EU doctors, “since this professional group is
urgently needed in their country of origin to take care of the native popula-
tion” (Marburger Bund 2008: 4-5). Few, however, would have imagined that
three years later, the German law would allow foreign recruitment of non-
EU doctors without the need for a previous labour market check and, at the
same time, lift the nationality requirement for non-EU doctors to apply for
a full licence.
However, this shift did not prevent the Federal Chamber from demand-
ing more restrictive recognition procedures for applicants from non-EU
countries. In particular, the Chamber suggested that non-EU physicians
must pass the complete state of knowledge examination in the case of
major differences between German medical training and the applicant’s
training. In a subsequent letter, the Chamber reiterated its request, stating
that stricter recognition requirements for degrees obtained in non-EU
countries would be useful to preserve the quality and level of the German
education system (Bundesärztekammer, 2011b). Clearly, the Federal Cham-
ber requested the adoption of different evaluation criteria depending on
the country where the degree was issued to keep control over the inclusion
of outsiders.
The Chamber prevailed in its claim. Degrees obtained in an EU country
are automatically recognised if the applicant provides an “education certi-
ficate” (Ausbildungsnachweis) issued by the country where he or she ob-
tained the degree. In the case of degrees obtained before 20 December 1976
and only if deficits are observed, applicants with an EU degree have to pass
a partial examination. By contrast, all non-EU citizens must pass a com-
plete examination if deficits are detected.５ In this way, state chambers and
state governments keep control a posteriori of the recognition of foreign
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credentials of non-EU physicians. Even though the number of foreign doc-
tors has been increasing since 2010 (figure 2), very few data have been
provided about recognition procedures to date.
Hence, it is too early to assess whether the requirement to pass the state of
knowledge exam could become a new barrier for the labour market inte-
gration of non-EU doctors in Germany. However, interviews suggest that
such a possibility cannot be excluded because education and specialty
training of non-EU doctors are usually considered incomplete by the
institutions in charge of evaluating credentials. As a member of a German
Integration for Qualification Network noted regarding the case of non-EU
applicants, “Deficits are almost always identified, so that to compensate for
such deficits, it is necessary to pass a state of knowledge exam, which is
comparable to the German state exam and concerns the subjects Medi-
cine, Surgery and a subject of free choice” (Integration durch Qualifikation
Netzwerk, personal communication, Eastern Germany, April 16, 2013).
With respect to specialty training, a member of a State Chamber noted
that training carried out in non-EU countries is usually one or two years
shorter than the training period expected by German authorities, which
always implies that the applicant is required to do complementary training
or to pass the specialty exam (Physicians Chamber, personal communica-
tion, Northern Germany, April 19, 2013).
While the specialty recognition of EU-citizens from old EU countries is
based on a “38-year-long recognition practice”, there seems to be concern
about automatic recognition of specialty degrees obtained in new EU
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Figure 2 Evolution of the number of physicians in Germany
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Member States: “Despite the formally recognised equivalence of medical
training in the European Union, the content of medical training in EU
Member States is still not known in full, nor compared or coordinated.
Equivalence with respect to duration and content cannot always be inves-
tigated or guessed” (Physicians Chamber, personal communication, North-
ern Germany, April 19, 2013). Finally, information suggests that some ad-
ministrations are more restrictive than others in regard to assessing appli-
cants’ foreign credentials. The vice-director of the human resources depart-
ment of a large hospital in Northern Germany, for instance, seemed very
concerned about the attitude of the public office responsible for credential
recognition,
They say that they are overworked, but our feeling is that arbitrariness also
plays a role . . . and . . . and I do not think that they do not check carefully . . . I
think that they check more over-carefully . . . But it is such a bureaucratic
structure . . . if they had a service attitude, then it would be easier for them and
for us, too. They are often impossible to reach and only at limited times . . . They
do not respond to e-mails . . . It takes about five days for a Berufserlaubnis to be
sent by ordinary mail, and when we ask them to fax it, they say they don’t do
that . . . (Human Resources Department, Hospital, personal communication,
Northern Germany, April 18, 2013).
The hospital manager’s statement contrasted with information provided
by a representative of the office concerned, who responded that such dif-
ferences had mainly to do with the staff available and that some Länder are
more lax than others. In this respect, he noted that while his office assessed
the authenticity of a document requiring certain forms of authentication,
other Länder accepted a copy of the document. Such different practices are
reflected in the numbers because the number of applicants increased more
in some Länder than in others (State Health Ministry, Department respon-
sible for degree recognition, Northern Germany, telephone interview, July,
15, 2013). Apart from foreign credential recognition, other factors may chal-
lenge the labour market inclusion of foreign doctors. For instance, it re-
mains to be seen to what extent the new rules will affect the number of
self-employed foreign doctors with their own practice in Germany.
Taking over a practice not only represents a significant financial invest-
ment (even for German doctors) but also requires a certain degree of
integration into informal medical networks. A recent study conducted on
the professional expectations of young doctors in Germany indicates that
more than half of the survey participants had already collected some prac-
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tice experience in the health sector before beginning their medical studies
while almost 60 per cent had parents that were physicians themselves or
had other physician relatives (Gibis et al., 2012). In view of this, the possi-
bility for foreign doctors (including those coming from EU countries) to
take over an attractive practice in an urban area is more limited in com-
parison to German citizens or foreigners who have conducted their medi-
cal studies in Germany and who already have an established network with-
in the German health care sector.
For the time being, the only possibility to be a self-employed doctor is to
take over a practice refused by German natives; these businesses are
cheaper and far less attractive because they are often located in rural
areas. This may also explain why in 2012, only 3,652 of 26,034 practicing
foreign doctors were self-employed (niedergelassen) and more than half of
them (2,124) were European citizens (Bundesärztekammer, 2012). Finally,
the language issue is now hotly debated by policy makers and scholars in
Germany. Particularly in the case of doctors, the ambiguity of the language
requirement has been perceived as an important contradiction in the cur-
rent immigration approach. As an interviewee of the state recognition
office noted, it is difficult to explain why it is necessary to have a profi-
ciency level corresponding to C2 to study in Germany while it suffices to
have B2 to work as a physician (State Health Ministry, Department respon-
sible for degree recognition, Northern Germany, telephone interview, July
15, 2013). In addition, experts observe that many B2 certificates are often
only graded ‘sufficient’, meaning that foreign doctors do not possess good
language abilities despite passing the required language exam,
There is the requirement to pass the B2 examination, preferably at the Goethe-
Institute . . . I think that, despite what they ask . . . I think that most of them
really learn to understand and talk, and have the courage to talk, here . . . With
some people, you think, “Have they understood me? Have they not understood
me? Then you find out that they understood something completely differently,
but did not want to talk about it . . . I was often under the impression that we
use figures of speech they do not know. If somebody comes to Germany, he or
she has a lot to face (Human Resources Department, Hospital, Northern Ger-
many, personal communication, April 18, 2013).
As a consequence of the increasing debate on this issue, several State
Chambers have initiated programmes to improve German language skills.
The individual state ministries of health have also agreed on introducing a
common evaluation mechanism to check the language proficiency of full
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licence applicants. However, talk about increasing language requirements
is characterised by widespread inertia that, so far, contrasts with the grow-
ing concern for the problem (Laubenthal, 2012). According to a civil servant
of the Federal Office for Immigration and Refugees, postponement of in-
creasing language requirements relates to the fear that increased require-
ments could affect Germany’s attractiveness to foreign physicians (Bunde-
samt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, telephone interview, September 17,
2013). Similarly, another state government official observed that the lan-
guage issue may cut two ways because no one will come to Germany if the
prerequisites are too high (State health ministry, Department responsible
for degree recognition, Northern Germany, telephone interview, July 15,
2013). In any case, the slowness of German authorities in tackling this
problem is striking considering the relevance of the language factor in the
overall integration debate in Germany and Europe.
７ Discussion and Conclusion
This article analysed how recruitment of highly skilled foreign workers can
be managed in a traditionally exclusive field such as the medical profes-
sion, using Germany and Spain as comparative examples. As was seen,
both countries allow the entry of non-EU physicians. This notwithstanding,
the analysis showed that structural factors play a major role in determining
to what extent a more open immigration process occurs.
The centralized organisation of the Spanish training system, together
with the weak corporatism of the medical profession, allowed for quick
reaction to the entry of highly skilled migrants as the cap for specialty
training access was lifted during the economic boom. The same centralized
organisation was also fundamental when it came to restrict, though not
forbid, medical training for non-EU foreigners after the economic crisis. In
this respect, the Spanish case reflects the expected relationship between
international recruitment and strong economic fluctuations usually as-
sumed in the case of tax-based systems (Hoesch, 2012). The German case,
by contrast, experienced an unexpected evolution. Social-insurance-based
systems such as Germany’s, where individual financial turnover plays a
major role, are generally considered less favourable in promoting interna-
tional recruitment. However, the strong corporatist character could not
prevent the exceptional opening of the immigration policy that Germany
experienced after years of closure, which also affected the health care
sector.
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Analysis has also shown that health care systems always keep control of
their workers despite more flexible recruitment channels. Before the eco-
nomic crisis, specialty recognition represented a difficult obstacle for those
who had carried out their medical training abroad and wanted it recog-
nised in Spain. Moreover, employment in the public health care sector has
always been “reserved” for Spanish natives and non-EU citizens, similar to
many other positions in the public administration. This outcome suggests
that the medical profession in Spain is still linked to the idea of “national
service” and “national interest”, which is, at least for now, not the case in
Germany anymore. However, German licensing bodies still keep consider-
able power in the process of foreign credential recognition. The different
recognition practices implemented in the German Länder, after lifting the
nationality requirements, may turn foreign credential recognition into an
important recruitment barrier to labour market integration. The require-
ment to pass a state of knowledge exam in the case of assessed education
gaps may considerably delay the recruitment process and challenge an
efficient match of demand and supply. In addition to the use of nationality
requirements and credential recognition as ex ante and ex post control
instruments, respectively, the impact of less debated factors, such as lan-
guage, on the employment of foreign physicians has been taken into ac-
count. It has been shown that scant knowledge of German is considered
one of the reasons for the difficult labour market integration of foreign
doctors and is currently one of the most debated challenges to Germany’s
attractiveness to highly skilled foreign workers. By contrast, language in
Spain has never represented an obstacle to full access to the medical pro-
fession due to the high presence of Latin Americans among resident phy-
sicians.
Clearly, the internationalisation of the Spanish and German health care
sectors, although in different stages, experienced a reverse trend in which
national citizenship and foreign credential recognition represent the main
instruments to “ration” the access of non-EU foreigners. Another less evi-
dent limitation of these recruitment regimes concerns the type of workers
to be recruited. As was seen, in both countries, the demand for foreign
physicians is limited to certain geographic regions of destination and cer-
tain specialties. Family medicine represents by far the least attractive med-
ical specialty in both countries because it is less prestigious and has fewer
opportunities for additional income compared to other specialties. In Ger-
many, family doctors receive the lowest premiums from German insur-
ance, whereas in Spain, they earn less than other types of specialists and
have fewer possibilities to open their own private practice. In other words,
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the demand for physicians in both countries exists in the less attractive
positions, which also influences the types of positions offered. As was seen,
Spanish international recruitment schemes are mainly focused on speci-
alty training while Spanish and EU nationals have always had priority in
obtaining the “good” permanent positions in the public system both before
and after the economic crisis. In this respect, Spanish recruitment reform
was not an avenue to attract human capital for long-term employment but
was rather an avenue to bring the least expensive category of physicians
into the country. It is also legitimate to question to what extent the current
reforms in Germany will contribute to human capital enhancement or
simply “fill in the blanks” of unattractive positions since the reduction of
the minimum salary requirement mainly favours the recruitment of young
non-specialised doctors rather than that of more experienced (and expen-
sive) specialised doctors.６
This result suggests that Germany is following a pattern similar to
Spain, where the opening of the health care sector to non-EU foreigners
mainly concerns medical training. Second, the emergence of internal bar-
riers based on foreign credential recognition may put the German case
closer to Canada, where effective integration into the labour market is
difficult despite the existence of more generous entry rules. It also remains
to be seen to what extent foreign doctors will be able to open their own
practice as self-employed specialists, considering the relevance that private
networks have in the process of “practice-takeover”, which represents the
more profitable business in the German health sector (Hoesch, 2012). In
view of all this, it could eventually be argued that the recruitment policies
in these countries are not aimed at attracting valuable human capital but
rather at responding to the “segmented” structure of the respective health
care systems where immigrants, most of them from third countries, have to
fill the less attractive niches while the most attractive positions remain
concentrated in the hands of natives and privileged nationals.
Notes
1 . Academic recognition refers to the university degree obtained after the study of medi-
cine while the recognition of professional qualification refers to specialty training car-
ried out after having obtained a degree in medicine. In Germany and Spain, physicians
are allowed to practice as specialists only after having concluded their specialty train-
ing.
2. According to the current wage agreements, the minimum gross salary for resident
doctors to earn in their first year of training is of 4,023 euros monthly.
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3. In fact, candidates with a poor ranking position in the state examination repeated the
training exam, hoping to achieve a better score instead of starting medical training in
less attractive specialties, such as FCM.
4. The immigration reform of 2004 in Spain introduced the possibility of circumventing
labour market checks for occupations included in the “Catalogue of Hard-to-Fill Occu-
pations” (Catalogo de ocupaciones de dificil cobertura). According to this new proce-
dure, if a vacancy refers to a type of job listed in the Catalogue, an employer can
immediately initiate the hiring process without the need for a labour market check.
For further details, see Finotelli (2012).
5. See § 3 of the current Regulation of the Medical Profession.
6. It may also be argued that such a low minimum salary may favour international recruit-
ment in Eastern German regions, where doctors in hospitals are supposed to earn less
than in the Western part of Germany; opening a practice in Eastern Germany is less
lucrative because of a lower number of private patients.
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Abstract
European societies are currently facing serious challenges in responding to a
large and growing demand of long-term care services. To a varying, but
overall substantial, extent this increasing demand is satisfied through migra-
tion, with migrant women workers representing everywhere a considerable
share of the workforce available in the care sector. In this paper two key
questions arising from these observations will be addressed: What has been
the specific role of migration in addressing labour shortages in the care sector
across Europe? And, secondly, what are the drivers of the different immigra-
tion policy approaches adopted? Drawing on EU-LFS data I will describe the
main entry channels of migrant care workers, also distinguished by skill and
occupational level, to highlight the specific immigrant labour supply policy
mix adopted by national governments. Recent theories of managed migra-
tion policies will be critically assessed to ultimately discuss their ability to
explain the immigrant labour supply policy mix in the care sector.
Keywords: care, migrant workers, immigration policies, managed migration, care
regimes, Italy, Europe
１ Introduction１
Population ageing resulting from deep and long-lasting demographic and
socio-cultural transformations currently represents one of the major chal-
lenges for most European societies. Beside a steadily shrinking workforce,
and its consequences on labour markets dynamism and on welfare state
sustainability, the rapid and massive increase of older cohorts is also hav-
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ing (and will increasingly have) important consequences in terms of grow-
ing demand of personal and household care services to support dependent
people and their families. Indeed, demographic ageing is among the causes
of the crisis of traditional informal care systems, revolving around the
central role of family members, and primarily women among them: declin-
ing size of households and families, transformation in family structures
and living arrangements, increasing female participation in labour markets
have jointly resulted in a reduction of available caregivers within families.
At the same time, European welfare states are undergoing an enduring
process of restructuring and withdrawal, gradually downsizing the direct
provision of care services. As a consequence of this complex mix of societal
processes, new markets for care services have emerged and developed. The
development of professional care and personal services has even been
lately identified by the European Commission as one of the sectors with
the highest job creation potential: ‘The size and fast growth of these sectors
(twice the employment growth overall) suggests they will remain a key
driver in providing new jobs in the years to come’ (European Commission,
2012, p. 6).２ A large part of the emerging care needs concerns, in particular,
people in their old-age (over-65), namely the demographic group showing
the most rapid and remarkable growth. Therefore the long-term care (LTC)
sector (encompassing both health as well as personal and social care activ-
ities) is the one displaying the greater expansion (Colombo et al., 2011).
During the last decades, migrant labour has substantially contributed to
the expansion of employment in this sector, although to a different extent
and in various forms across European countries. This trend has persisted
throughout the current economic crisis: in a general context of rising un-
employment, especially for migrant workers, employment of foreign-born
workers in domestic or residential care services has increased respectively
by 20% and 44.5% between 2008 and 2012 in the European OECD countries
(OECD, 2013).
The growing contribution of migrant labour to LTC workforce has at-
tracted increasing attention of scholars and researchers with different dis-
ciplinary backgrounds. Much scholarly work has been focused at explain-
ing the emerging demand for care labour by looking at the intersection
between care and employment regimes in determining labour shortages in
the care sector in a macro perspective (Kilkey et al., 2010; Williams, 2010),
or by comparing the micro-determinants of migrant care labour demand
by type of employers and by country (Anderson, 2007; Moriarty, 2010). Less
attention has been devoted at explaining the characteristics of the labour
supply and the role of migration policies in determining these features.
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This contribution aims at filling this gap by looking at the articulation of
Immigrant Labour Supply policies in the care sector across Europe, and
more specifically in the LAB-MIG-GOV research project’s target countries.
What has been the specific role of migration in addressing labour shortages
in the LTC sector across Europe? Which specific policy mixes for Immi-
grant Labour Supply have been adopted in response to an expanding de-
mand for LTC services? And which factors may explain the different policy
approaches adopted? These are the key questions that this contribution
will attempt to answer.
I will first review the existing literature that has focused on explaining
the emerging demand for migrant care labour in Europe to highlight its
inadequate consideration of immigration policymaking. Therefore, starting
from a critical assessment of recent immigration policy theories, I will
propose an analytical framework centred upon the concept of Immigrant
Labour Supply policy mix and I will explain why and how it can better
explain the differentiated contribution of migrant labour to the LTC work-
force across Europe; secondly, I will draw on original estimates produced
in the context of the LAB-MIG-GOV project３ to describe the recent con-
tributions of migrant workers in the care labour markets across Europe,
giving special attention to the distribution of migrant labour across the
skill spectrum in LTC labour markets; I will then describe the main entry
categories of migrant care workers (MCWs) in the main target countries, as
a proxy indicator for immigrant labour supply policies across Europe; fi-
nally, I will advance some hypothesis on the main drivers of the different
policy choices adopted.
２ The internationalization of European care regimes: an
analytical framework
The key contribution of migrant workers to the labour markets for care in
Europe has not gone unnoticed to scholars and researchers. The scientific
interest for the increasing internationalization of care labour has soared in
the latest decades, prompted by feminist research on the racialised and
gendered divisions of care in contemporary western societies. Global care
chains linking the poor global south and the affluent ageing north in an
international division of reproductive labour (Parreñas, 2000) have been
analyzed in depth by a wealth of feminist studies (Yeates, 2012).
More recently, scholars of comparative welfare studies have claimed the
importance to look at the dynamic intersection of care, employment and
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migration regimes to explain the emerging care deficit in European welfare
states and the increasing contribution of migrant labour in tackling care
needs. Authors in this body of research have thus highlighted the specifi-
cities of national contexts in framing and shaping the different forms of
migrant care labour: indeed, as Williams, (2012: 370-1) stressed, it is impor-
tant to look at ‘specific forms of migrant care labour that any individual
care regime generates’. European care regimes greatly vary in the organisa-
tion, provision and financing of care４. At a first level, European care re-
gimes differ in the relative weight and respective roles of State, family,
market and no-profit actors in providing care to people in need. Other
major interconnected dimensions on which variations emerge are: settings
of care, namely whether care is mainly provided at home or in some kind
of residential settings (Colombo et al., 2011), and funding, where care may
be publicly funded (through in-kind services or some form of monetary
support), resort on private resources of families or, as in actual arrange-
ments, rely on a mix of public and private resources (Da Roit et al., 2007).
Furthermore, important differences are found on the regulation and provi-
sion of care for different types of recipients, namely childcare or long-term
care for elderly or disabled: in particular, whereas childcare has been in-
cluded in the framework of the new ‘social investment’ strategy underpin-
ning welfare reforms in most European countries, elderly care has re-
mained largely excluded from this framework.
At the same time, despite still substantial differentiation across Eur-
opean care regimes, more recent contributions have instead highlighted
the emergence of ‘converging variations’ towards the marketization of care
as well as the appearance of ‘routed wages’ in care work (Ungerson 2003;
Williams 2010; Williams and Brennan, 2012). In particular, Bettio and Ver-
ashcaghina (2010), identify the main developments of (western) European
care regimes in progressive shifts i) away from institutionalized care to-
wards home care; ii) away from public provision and towards private or
mixed services backed up by cash transfers; iii) in favour of services that
complement rather than replace informal care. The marketization process
has targeted long-term care to a greater extent than childcare: in line with
the social investment approach adopted in the Lisbon Strategy, decreasing
public investments in care for older people compared to childcare are
observed and, consequently, a greater marketization of elderly care work
(Brennan, Cass et al., 2012). These processes, inspired by neo-liberal ideol-
ogies and urged by rising public budgets constraints, have been creating
markets, or ‘quasi-markets’ (Le Grand, 1991), for care services: it is precisely
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here that a new space for the employment of migrant workers in the care
sector has been opening in many European countries.
In fact, the interaction between care and employment regimes largely
explains the existing segmentation within and outside care labour markets
and the magnitude of care labour shortages in each national context.
Simonazzi (2009) describes ‘national employment models’ in the care sec-
tor by complementing characteristics of the care regimes with specific
labour market regulations concerning pay, working and employment con-
ditions or skills, training and credentials in the care sector: these aspects
largely determine the attractiveness of this kind of work for native workers,
who tend to shun those jobs with poorer employment and working condi-
tions, lower wages, and bad social recognition. And long-term care is a
typical example of a marginal labour market sector where low pay５, poor
working conditions, little opportunity for career development, and high
vacancy and turnover rates prevail (Fujisawa and Colombo, 2009). In gen-
eral terms, a greater role of state-provided care services, either in institu-
tional or domiciliary settings, usually entails better employment and work-
ing conditions (in terms of wages, employment protection, working hours,
etc.), a greater labour supply by native (women) workers and a limited role
of migrant labour. Conversely, the widespread use of cash transfers, with
no or low conditionality upon their use, lower employment protection or
poor regulation of care work, creates strong incentives towards the often
irregular employment of care workers and makes care work unattractive
for native workers: this is where the role of migrant care labour is greater.
In this complex and dynamic context, authors in this thread underline
the key role of migration regimes in shaping migrant care labour force
characteristics and affecting patterns of labour market integration of
MCWs. Shutes and Chiatti (2012), drawing on a comparison between el-
derly care systems in UK and Italy, reveal how trends towards marketiza-
tion of care – although starting from two very different models – and
specific configurations of immigration policies have converged towards a
wide use of migrant labour in LTC services. In particular, the authors high-
light the role of immigration policies in shaping the employment of mi-
grant care workforce. Thus, irregular migrants can only enter the informal
labour markets where low wages and poor or exploitative working condi-
tions are widespread and, at the same time, holders of regular residence
permits face different sets of constraints and restrictions in their occupa-
tional mobility (Cangiano, 2014b). As a result of the different intersection of
care and migration regimes, employment of migrant care labour is concen-
trated in the private sector (including private hospitals and residential care
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0523
<CMS1404_06_SALI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:57>
523SALIS
A CRUCIAL TESTING GROUND
homes in particular) in the UK and in private households in Italy, where it
is shaped both by irregular status and by the terms and conditions under
which regular immigration status can be obtained. Similarly, in another
comparative study on UK, Italy and the Netherlands, Van Hooren (2012)
has identified three different models of migrant care labour, originating
from specific features of the national care regimes that shape the labour
demand in the sector: Italy, where a ‘migrant-in-the-family’ model of care
has emerged (Bettio, Simonazzi et al., 2006) as a consequence (among
other factors) of the prevalence of unconditional cash allowances; UK,
with a ‘migrant-in-the-market’ model, explained by the larger use of
means-tested cash allowances and outsourcing of public domiciliary care
services by local authorities to private service providers, and the Nether-
lands where none of the two has been observed and the employment of
migrant workers in the care sector remains negligible. Van Hooren (2012),
also looks at the role of immigration policies in setting up these three
different models and she concludes that ‘labour migration policies for
care workers only had a limited impact on the employment of migrant
workers’ since ‘many migrants employed in the social care sector rely on
residence permits unrelated to employment or [ . . . ] are already living in
the country as irregular migrants’ (p. 143).
The literature on comparative analysis of care regimes has thus consid-
erably contributed to explain why and how labour shortages in the care
sector have emerged as well as the peculiar characteristics of the labour
demand in this labour market sector and the main variations observed
across European States. Potential employers of care workers greatly vary
from public sector agencies to non profit voluntary associations, from for-
profit service providers to private households. In the latter case it is even
problematic to speak of ‘employers’ since, as much research has showed,
‘the employers of domestic [and care] labourers often do not see them-
selves as employers’ rather declaring to pay for some help or to buy services
instead of labour (Pannell and Altman, 2009, p. 5; see also Ambrosini and
Cominelli, 2005). Demand for care labour is thus highly diffuse, atomized
and fragmented across a wide range of actors, with little opportunities to
access the venues of policy-making or to effectively influence decision-
making processes, especially as far as immigration policies are concerned.
However, and most importantly for the goals of this contribution, one
critical element of comparative care regimes analysis is that it lacks a
sound analysis of immigration policy-making and the extent to which this
is shaped by specific features of national care and employment regimes. In
most cases, immigration regimes are in fact introduced in the analysis as a
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static and independent factor that care and employment regimes adapt to.
The emergence of labour and skill shortages in the care sector, stemming
from actual care and employment policies and their dynamic evolution, is
indeed a powerful factor to explain relative openness or closure of national
labour immigration policies. Nonetheless, it is not the sole factor to ac-
count for and immigration policies are typically the outcome of complex
mediations between competing interests and concerns. Recent evolutions
towards the revival of labour migration in the pre-crisis decade have been
reflected in significant changes in immigration policies that have favoured
economic migration inflows over allegedly unproductive family or huma-
nitarian categories (Pastore, 2010). Aiming at explaining this revival, recent
theoretical approaches have explained the shift from a ‘zero-immigration’
to a ‘managed migration’ policy approach by looking at specific features of
national ‘varieties of capitalism’, or models of political economy (Menz,
2008; Menz and Caviedes, 2010). According to this literature, the neo-liber-
al competition state would aim at maximising its ‘competitiveness’ by en-
suring a business-friendly climate (Lavenex, 2006): managed migration fits
into this new framework by framing migrants as potentially valuable
human resources (Menz and Caviedes, 2010). Labour migration policies
have consequently revived as a key tool to source labour and skills deemed
useful for the national economy, through the key lobbying and mediation
efforts of labour market interest associations (i.e. employers’ and workers’
organizations). As Menz (2008) argues, the more employers organizations
are internally united and structured the more effective and successful their
policy demands for open immigration policies will be. Therefore, in general
terms, coordinated market economies (CMEs) and, to some extent, mixed
market economies (MMEs) tend to accept only skilled and highly skilled
labour migrants and to close their doors to low-skilled migration, while
liberal market economies (LMEs) need labour migrants at both ends of the
skills spectrum. Among our target countries, Germany and UK represent
paradigmatic cases of, respectively, CME and LME whereas France is typi-
cally classified among mixed market economies, combining elements of
both ideal-types.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the (lack of) management of care migra-
tion contributes to raise some criticism on the ability of the political econ-
omy of managed migration approach to give full and accurate account of
the strategies through which European States source their labour needs
abroad while, at the same time, enriching the analytical framework. In
fact its restrictive focus on labour migration policies stricto sensu (i.e.
those regulating the admission of third-country nationals for employment
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purposes) as part of a competitiveness strategy do not allow to understand
how and why States admit a substantial share of their migrant workforce
through alternative channels. Consistently with the analytical framework
used in the LAB-MIG-GOV research project, I will instead adopt here a
broader focus on the complex and dynamic policy mix in what may be
defined as a migrant labour supply (MLS) policy field (Pastore, 2014 and
2010). I will therefore look at both official labour migration policies addres-
sing MCWs and at what we have defined as their ‘functional equivalents’,
i.e. policies regulating other relevant entry channels. With the latter I es-
sentially refer to national policies managing the admission and labour
market access of EU newly accession countries’ nationals and other profiles
as diverse as family migrants, different types of humanitarian migrants,
international students, so-called co-ethnics (e.g. Aussiedler in Germany or
descendents of emigrants in Italy). Some attention will be also given to
what we have called ‘functional alternatives to labour migration policies’,
defined as all policies and measures (mainly situated in the labour market,
education or training policy fields) which are explicitly meant to reduce
the dependency on migrant labour and increase the presence of resident
workers in given employment sectors. My argument here is that this broad-
er analytical framework is particularly suitable to account for the manage-
ment of care migration due to the specific characteristics of this labour
market sector. One the one hand, as previously highlighted, the demand
for care labour is highly dispersed and fragmented across a wide range of
actors and private households hold a primary role here. This makes the
translation of care labour demand into effective lobbying efforts for more
open labour migration policies towards care workers a particularly challen-
ging task. Hence, we can expect that alternative admission channels are
more relevant for MCWs than for other more ‘valuable’ categories. On the
other hand the traditional depiction of care work as unskilled or low
skilled work prevent its inclusion into the framework of managed migra-
tion as a competitiveness strategy aimed at sourcing skills and talents
useful for the national economy (Kofman, 2013).
A second source of criticism is more related to the empirical grounds on
which theories on the political economy of managed migration are based.
In fact, the southern European cases hardly fit in the framework proposed
by Menz and his colleagues: even if EU Mediterranean countries have been
among the forerunners in the revitalization of labour migration policies in
the pre-crisis decade, this has in no way been framed as part of a competi-
tiveness strategy. Southern European countries have not participated in
the ‘global race for talents’, competing to attract highly skilled immigrants
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0526
<CMS1404_06_SALI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 22-12-14 ▪ 14:51>
526 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
deemed beneficial for their economies. Rather, they included loosen ele-
ments of skill selectivity in their official labour migration policies, de facto
admitting huge inflows of low skilled labour. Mass immigration for work-
ing purposes has been driven mainly by demographic rather than econom-
ic competitiveness factors: in other words, migrant workers have been
admitted to substitute for a native workforce that was shrinking in abso-
lute terms rather than to contribute to enhancing the productivity of a fast-
growing economy. Immigration has been part more of a survival rather
than a growth-oriented strategy and, I argue, care migration has signifi-
cantly contributed to this.
３ The growing contribution of migrant care labour in
European care regimes: empirical evidence
The main focus of this paper is on the overall long-term care migrant
workforce, primarily differentiated by skill level rather than sub-segment
of the care labour market (i.e. whether in institutional, residential or dom-
iciliary activities). Since the main goal of this article is to analyse the Im-
migrant Labour Supply Policy mix adopted in selected EU countries and
thereby critically assess recent immigration policy theories, I believe that a
fine-grained distinction between different categories of care workers across
sub-sectors is not particularly relevant here. The analysis will draw on data
provided by EU-LFS and in particular by information contained in the 2008
ad-hoc module (AHM) on labour market situation of migrants on reason
for migration, used as a proxy indicator for entry channels. Thanks to
information provided in the 2008 AHM of the EU-LFS it is thus possible
to provide data on the main recruitment pools of MCWs relative to main
entry routes in the various EU countries６ (Cangiano, 2014b). As for the
geographical scope of the comparative analysis, this will be limited to the
five largest European countries, namely Germany, France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Spain, plus Sweden. These were in fact the target countries of
the LAB-MIG-GOV research project from which this article originates (see
Pastore, 2014).
Although highly differentiated in forms and extent, the contribution of
migrant labour to care labour markets across Europe has been everywhere
significant, and it has increasingly been so in the past decade. Empirical
description and analysis of the LTC workforce and of migrant labour in-
volvement in it in comparative perspective is a highly challenging task.
Researchers in this field are in fact confronted with serious methodological
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constraints: first, significant differences in labour market structures, skills
or classification of occupations within LTC sector in different European
countries make a sound comparison difficult to achieve (Fujisawa and
Colombo 2009; Simonazzi 2009); secondly, a straightforward identification
of MCWs is made difficult by existing shortcomings in the definitions of
who is a migrant in each individual country (Cangiano, 2012); finally, care
work is often carried out in irregular forms (and by irregular migrants),
especially when performed in private homes, which makes it difficult if
not impossible to fully detect it in official statistics (Schwenken and Hei-
meshoff, 2011; Ambrosini, 2013a; Triandafyllidou, 2013). Despite acknowl-
edging all these methodological challenges, Geerts (2011) proposes to iden-
tify LTC workers using data from the EU-LFS by singling out four occupa-
tional groups on the basis of the ISCO-88 groupings at 3 digits level: nursing
and midwifery professionals (ISCO-88 category 223), nursing and midwif-
ery associate professionals (ISCO-88 category 323), personal care and re-
lated workers (ISCO-88 category 513) and domestic and related helpers
(ISCO-88 category 913) (see also Cangiano, 2014a for further discussion of
methodological constraints). However, it must be noticed that these four
categories are likely to overestimate LTC workers since they encompass a
larger spectrum of occupations also related to child-care, health-care or
home-care work. At the same time, EU-LFS is likely to underestimate the
immigrant workforce due to well-known methodological limits such as the
exclusion of irregular migrants from the sample or the different definitions
of immigrants adopted in different EU countries (Cangiano, 2012).
In this contribution I adopt the same approach proposed by Geerts
(2011) for the identification and analysis of the care workforce, while I
draw on the method proposed by Cangiano (2012) to identify migrant
workers in the 2008 EU-LFS sample７: in the context of this paper, then,
migrant workers are individuals born outside their countries of residence,
with both parents born abroad, and who have entered the host country
when they were 15 or older.
With all these caveats in mind, here below I will sketch a picture of the
migrant labour contribution in care labour markets across Europe in the
last decade. Figure 1 shows that in 2009 the share of the migrant workforce
in the LTC sector was substantial in all the target countries considered,
exceeding 15% everywhere up to nearly 50% of the total workforce in the
sector in Italy. Besides, the percentage of MCWs over total has consider-
ably increased, though with important cross-national differences in the
extent of the change: in Italy migrant workers represented around 3% of
the overall workforce of the sector in 1999 while their increase in the
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following decade has been dramatic, to reach 48% in 2009; a similar,
though slightly weaker, increase is observed in Spain (from 6% to 31%).
Conversely, France and Germany have not witnessed significant changes,
with the share of the migrant care workforce over total increasing only by 2
percentage points in both cases (respectively from 14 to 16% and from 20 to
22%). The UK and Sweden represent intermediate cases where the weight
of the migrant care workforce has nearly doubled though remaining at
lower levels than in Italy and Spain (respectively from 9 to 17% and from
11 to 21%).
Figure 1 Migrant share (%) of the care workforce in LAB-MIG-GOV countries, all
occupational categories included, 1999 and 2009
Source: Courtesy of Alessio Cangiano; calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey
If the contribution of MCWs has been substantial, in purely quantitative
terms, it is also important to look at more qualitative aspects of care
migrant workforce, namely the positions occupied by migrants across the
occupational spectrum in the care sector. We may then ask what has been
the role of migrant workers in the different occupational categories within
the LTC labour market across EU countries. The table 1 below describes the
distribution of MCWs in the six LAB-MIG-GOV target countries across the
three main broad ISCO-88 occupational groups in 2008: nursing and mid-
wifery professionals and associate professionals (highly and medium
skilled), personal and related care workers (low-skilled), and domestic
workers (unskilled), also distinguishing between those who entered the
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host country before 1998 (old migrants) or in the 1998-2008 decade (recent
migrants).
Table 1 Relative share of migrant workers across broad occupational groups in the care
sector, EU-15 and LAB-MIG-GOV countries, 2008 (%)
Nursing and midwifery
professionals
(ISCO-88 223+323)
Personal care and related
workers (ISCO-88 513)
Domestic and related
helpers (ISCO-88 913)
GER recent migranta 1% 5% 12%
old migrantb 10% 9% 33%
Total 11% 14% 45%
SPA recent migrant 0% 14% 39%
old migrant 2% 4% 6%
Total 2% 17% 45%
FRA recent migrant 1% 1% 6%
old migrant 5% 8% 18%
Total 5% 10% 23%
ITA recent migrant . . . 15% 37%
old migrant . . . 10% 23%
Total . . . 25% 60%
SWE recent migrant 2% 4% 16%
old migrant 7% 11% 15%
Total 9% 15% 30%
UK recent migrant 11% 8% 18%
old migrant 9% 5% 6%
Total 20% 13% 24%
Tot EU15c recent migrant 3% 6% 21%
old migrant 7% 7% 16%
Total 11% 14% 37%
Source: Courtesy of Alessio Cangiano; calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey
a ‘Recent migrants’ are those arrived in the period between 1998 and 2008.
b ‘Old migrant’ are those arrived before 1998.
c Excluding Finland.
In general terms, migrants are concentrated in the lower ladders of the care
labour markets while they are underrepresented in highly skilled occupa-
tions. In the EU-15 overall, migrants represented over a third of total un-
skilled care workers (ISCO-88 category 913), around 14 per cent of the
medium category of personal care workers (ISCO-88 category 513) and 11
per cent of the highly skilled care workers (ISCO-88 categories 223+323).
The share of migrant domestic workers exceeded the EU average only in
Italy, Spain and Germany, representing respectively 60%, 45% and 45% of
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0530
<CMS1404_06_SALI_1Kv27_proef2 ▪ 19-12-14 ▪ 14:57>
530 VOL. 2, NO. 4, 2014
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
the total workforce in the subgroup. In Italy and Spain most of migrant
domestic workers have arrived after 1998 while the opposite is observed in
Germany. Albeit UK and Sweden display a weaker role of migrant workers
as domestic helpers, it has to be noticed that migrants’ share in the sub-
group has grown considerably in the 1998-2008 decade: 18% and 16% of
migrant domestic workers in the UK and Sweden respectively have entered
the countries after 1998. The share of personal care and related workers
significantly exceeds the EU-15 average in Italy and Spain (respectively 25
and 17% against 14%) while in the remaining four countries the weight of
migrant workers in this category is roughly in line with the EU-15 average.
Finally, the UK is the only country where the share of migrant nurses and
associate nursing professionals exceeds 20% of the total workforce in the
sub-group, most of which arrived after 1998, whereas in Germany and
Sweden the relative share remains in line with the EU-15 average and in
France, Italy and Spain migrant nurses only represent a small to negligible
part of the total.
４ Migrant care workers and migration policies: main
entry channels
Whether migrant workers have entered the host countries for reasons of
employment, either with or without a job offer in hands, family reunifica-
tion, as a freely circulating EU citizen or as an asylum-seeker is likely to
have a strong impact on their capacities to get a job, to change employer or
sector of employment or to move upward in the occupational ladder
(Cangiano, 2012; Büchel and Frick, 2005). Indeed the State, through its
policies on immigration and in other domains, plays a major role in the
recruitment of migrant workers, by categorizing migrant workers on the
basis of their skills sets or national origin. Furthermore, by constraining
migrant mobility through different means, State regulations contribute to
create and maintain labour market stratification and segmentation along
ethnic lines (Anderson 2010; McGovern, 2012).
Figure 2 below allows to describe the main recruitment pools of MCWs
in the year 2008. At the EU-15 level, around 15% of the migrant care work-
force is represented by EU mobile citizens, over a third of MCWs has
entered the host country for reasons of employment and another third for
family reasons; all other entry categories are only represented in minor
percentages. Unsurprisingly, entry routes related to employment seem to
have been more important for care workers in Italy, Spain and, to a lesser
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extent, in UK, namely the three large EU countries that have showed a
greater openness to labour migration in the pre-crisis decade (Pastore
and Salis, 2013). On the contrary, given their generalized closure to eco-
nomic migration until very recently, France, Germany and Sweden have
sourced MCWs from alternative entry routes (i.e. functional equivalents),
especially family reunification, intra-EU mobility and humanitarian migra-
tion. Also, ancestry-based immigration has had a greater role in Germany.
Figure 2 Composition of the migrant care workforce by entry category.(a) EU-15 and
LAB-MIG-GOV countries (2008)
Note: (a) The category EU includes nationals of EU-15 countries and post-enlargement EU-10 migrants
(nationals of EU accession countries who moved to the selected destination countries in or after 2004).
Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe who moved before 2004 are included in one of the other
entry categories for non-EU nationals.
Source: Courtesy of Alessio Cangiano; calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey
Unfortunately, given the limited size of national samples, it is not possible
to disaggregate MCWs simultaneously by occupational category and entry
routes in individual countries. However, a look at the pooled sample at the
EU-15 level allows us to see what have been the main entry categories in
each occupational sub-group of care workers at the EU level (see figure 3):
around a quarter of skilled and highly skilled MCWs have entered the host
country for employment reasons, often upon the availability of a job offer
before entry (in around 23% of cases), while intra-EU mobility, family
reunification or ancestry-based immigration have been other relevant
entry channels. It is worth noting that within this sub-group, the share of
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workers entered for study reasons and of intra-EU-15 citizens, is greater
than for the other two sub-groups implying that most of them have prob-
ably gained training and credentials for the exercise of their profession
while already in the EU.
Figure 3 Distribution of care migrant workers at the EU-15 level, by occupational
category and entry route, 2008 (%)
Source: Courtesy of Alessio Cangiano; calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey
Entry routes for employment reasons have been much more relevant for
unskilled MCWs in the ‘domestic and related helpers’ sub-group. However,
the vast majority of them have entered the host country without a job
offer, therefore presumably through irregular avenues８. Compared to the
other two occupational sub-groups, post-enlargement intra-EU mobility
has been more significant for migrant domestic workers. Within the inter-
mediate positions of ‘personal and related care workers’ the mix of entry
channels has been more varied, although with a greater role of family
migration routes.
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５ The immigrant labour supply policy mix in the care
sector: what drives it?
The picture sketched through data presented above largely mirrors the
actual configuration of immigrant labour supply policies adopted by
major EU countries in the pre-crisis decade. In the first place, these data
confirm that labour migration admission channels have only had a second-
ary role in the growth of migrant labour supply in the LTC sector (Van
Hooren, 2012). Alternative migration channels such as family, humanitar-
ian or study entry routes or intra-EU mobility (especially post-enlargement
waves) have contributed to a larger degree to increase the ranks of migrant
care labour in the EU as a whole. However, the relative weight of alterna-
tive immigration routes is not homogeneous across the various EU coun-
tries. Indeed, as expected, southern European countries are those which
have showed a greater openness to MCWs. Italy represents here as an
exemplary case where the labour market for domestic and care services
has rapidly become the main entry door of labour migration into the
country with the adoption of ad-hoc entry quotas and mass regularizations
for domestic and care workers during the most recent years (Salis 2012;
Castagnone, Salis et al., 2013). Since the early phases of the Italian immi-
gration experience migrant domestic workers have benefited from prefer-
ential provisions in admission procedures (Einaudi, 2007). Between 2005
and 2010 a considerable share of new work permits issued through annual
quotas targeted jobs in the domestic and home care sector: from around a
third of the total in 2005 to over 70% in 2008. After the 2002 ‘great regular-
ization’ through which around 300,000 irregular domestic workers ob-
tained legal status (i.e. almost half of the total regularized population), an
ad hoc regularization for domestic and care workers was adopted in 2009,
despite the rising unemployment caused by the economic crisis. Although
less noticeably, Spain as well made the domestic sector a major entry door
into the national labour market by either opening up job-search entry
routes for domestic workers or through its general regime and mass or
individual regularization schemes (i.e. so-called arraigo ) (Arango and Fi-
notelli, 2009). At the opposite end, among the LAB-MIG-GOV target coun-
tries, France stands out as a case where job vacancies in the care sector
have been scarcely filled by migrant labour and, in most cases, MCWs did
not enter France for employment reasons. Indeed, this is in line with the
general closure to labour migration adopted by France since the late 1970s
to the mid-2000s, when a shift from ‘immigration subie’ to ‘immigration
choisie’ was claimed by the then President Sarkozy (Devitt, 2012). There-
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fore, as Condon et al., (2013, p. 16) effectively put it, social care policies in
France have in no way relied upon immigration policies. Other major
destination countries lie somewhere in between these two extremes, with
only small avenues open to MCWs, usually at the higher skill levels, and a
relative openness to care labour migration from new EU member states
after 2004: in the UK pre-2008 work permit system, senior care workers
(with qualifications at level 3 of the National Qualification Framework)
were eligible for admission and in the period between 2001 and 2006 over
22,000 new work permits were issued to migrants meeting the established
criteria９. At the same time, a fairly high number of low skilled jobs in the
social care sector was filled by citizens from the A8 countries between 2004
and 2009. In Germany a pilot program of ‘controlled migration’ for home
helpers was introduced in 2002 but only 3,000 workers were sourced
through it, whereas the overall number of migrant elderly care workers
was estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000 (Lutz and Palengal-
Möllenbeck 2010). Most of these foreign care workers were nationals of
the newly accessed Eastern European Member States entering with tourist
visas or exploiting the loopholes of EU mobility regulations by working as
self-employed or employment agency care workers (Shire, 2014).
What does explain the diversity of the policy approaches adopted? The
varieties of care and employment regimes and their effects in terms of size
and characteristics of emerging shortages are certainly a powerful,
although partial, explaining factor. Thus the still relevant role of publicly
provided care services or, alternatively, a still strong regulation of care
work, as observed in Nordic or Western Europe’s care regimes translates
into a still limited demand for migrant care labour. Here labour migration
policies have therefore remained overall closed to care workers, by sour-
cing the few necessary ones through less visible and politically controver-
sial entry channels. At the opposite end, strongly familialistic care regimes
as those characterizing Mediterranean EU countries, with their reliance on
unconditional cash-for-care schemes and poor regulation of professional
care work are characterized by huge unmet labour needs in the care sector:
immigration policies here have addressed this new labour demand by
opening their front (and back) doors to care migrant workers.
However, a closer look at the variation of entry routes across the differ-
ent occupational categories allows to provide a more accurate account of
the different degrees of openness or closure to care workers migration. As
predicted by the political economy of managed migration accounts, LMEs
such as the UK have opened their doors to both highly skilled MCWs,
through official labour migration channels, and low skilled or unskilled
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workers, preferably recruited among freely circulating new EU citizens
from Eastern countries or other ‘functional equivalents’ of labour migrants.
Conversely, CMEs, such as Germany, and MMEs, such as France, have
remained overall close to low skilled MCWs while opening some narrow
avenues for qualified care workers. Both countries have addressed their
care deficits either through ‘functional equivalents’ to labour migrants
such as commuter migration or posted workers from neighbouring Eastern
countries, as in Germany (Morokvasic, 2004; Shire, 2014), or by developing
strategies ultimately engendering ‘functional alternatives’ to labour migra-
tion, as in France (Devitt, 2014). In the latter case, personal and household
care services have been the object of various waves of reform since the
early 1990s, explicitly framed as a strategy to enhance the high employ-
ment creation potential of this sector, thereby investing in the regulariza-
tion and professionalization of care work. This has resulted in a reduced
dependence on migrant care labour compared to other national care re-
gimes (Condon et al., 2013).
Drawing on the analytical framework proposed by political economy
accounts of the managed migration paradigm (Menz, 2008; Menz and
Caviedes, 2010), this general closure to immigration of care workers, except
for small segments in the upper skill levels, is largely explained by two
main elements. On the one hand by the still lacking recognition of care
work as skilled work. Despite remarkable pressures and efforts made to
enhance the professionalization and qualification of care work in the most
recent years, throughout Europe (although with differences) it generally
remains framed and depicted as unskilled or low-skilled work, as a tradi-
tional ‘women’s work’ for which no specific or technical skills are required
(Anderson, 2012). As Kofman (2013) argues, this is based on gendered dif-
ferences in the configurations of knowledge and skills in the contemporary
circuits of globalization, exemplified by two emblematic figures: domestic
and care workers are mainly bearers of different types of skills, defined as
embodied and encultured, which are valued differently from encoded or
embrained skills１０ associated with ICT workers. Therefore, in managed
migration policy approaches different types of skills are arguably assessed
differently and ‘soft’ or ‘embodied’ skills, such as those crucially used in care
work, are by no means considered in official immigration policies
(Cangiano and Walsh, 2013). On the other hand, the general closure of
labour migration policies to MCWs is also explained by the specific fea-
tures of the labour demand that they are deemed to meet, that I have
defined above as diffuse, atomized and fragmented across a wide and
diverse range of actors (e.g. public or private hospitals, nursing homes,
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labour agencies or households). This makes particularly hard to effectively
translate a labour demand into a policy demand for more open labour
migration policies. The relative exception represented by relative openness
to highly skilled care workers (i.e. professional nurses or nursing associate
professionals) in some countries actually seems to confirm the rule: indeed
professional nurses are more often employed by public or private hospitals
or residential homes, that is large employers that could find themselves in
better positions for political lobbying.
What does not seem to fit easily in the analytical framework proposed
by the political economy literature on labour migration are the Mediterra-
nean cases, and especially the Italian one. As a matter of fact, Italy has
made the care sector the main entry door into the Italian labour market, by
granting preferential access to migrant domestic and care work through
both its official immigration policies (i.e. annual entry quotas) and their
main functional equivalent (i.e. mass regularizations). And, quite surpris-
ingly, this has continued even during the most recent years throughout the
crisis. Latest estimates show that over half of migrant women active in the
Italian labour market are employed as domestic and care workers (Minis-
tero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2012). I argue that this may be
explained as a legitimization and consensus-building strategy adopted by
State authorities. Indeed, care work provided by migrant women has been
an effective and low-priced response to the structural deficiencies of the
Italian elderly care system, which has allowed the State to recurrently
postpone the necessary and highly expensive reforms that demographic
ageing would have imposed (Sciortino, 2004; Naldini and Saraceno, 2008).
MCWs have been recurrently depicted as good and useful for the Italian
society and economy, thereby increasing their acceptability on the general
public opinion (Ambrosini, 2013b). This has been and still is a key element
of what has been described as a ‘low-cost’ immigration model, that is one
in which immigration has been part of a sort of survival strategy instead of
being used to enhance the productivity of the system: it has allowed to
maintain the status quo and postpone the necessary structural reforms at a
quite low price in political and economic terms (Da Roit and Sabbatinelli,
2013; Pastore, Salis and Villosio, 2012; Naldini and Saraceno, 2008). Further-
more, although ad hoc research on this is still lacking, there is the reason-
able doubt that a great number of those admitted or regularized as domes-
tic or care workers in the recent years are de facto employed in other
economic sectors and working in irregular forms while officially registered
as domestic and care workers. In fact, not only opportunities were greater
in this sector through ad hoc quotas or regularizations, but the regulariza-
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tion costs, often borne by the workers themselves, were lower there. Some
partial evidence to support this hypothesis can be drawn from data on the
applications presented during the 2009 regularization campaign, a large
number of which concerned nationalities of countries such as Morocco
(around 36,000 applications), China (around 21,600 applications) or Sene-
gal (around 13,600 applications) that are only marginally represented
among officially registered or surveyed domestic workers. Furthermore, in
many cases applicant employers were immigrants themselves: around
8,000 Moroccans, 5,000 Senegalese or 3,000 Chinese (Pasquinelli and Rus-
mini, 2010). Similar clues emerge from official data relative to the 2012
regularization campaign: among the almost 116,000 applications concern-
ing domestic workers (two-thirds of the total), almost 70% concerned male
workers, especially from Bangladesh (14,279), Pakistan (10,369) or Morocco
(10,285) while migrant men only represented around 10% of officially regis-
tered domestic workers in 2011. Therefore, the openness towards MCWs
has, at least partially, allowed the Italian authorities to open the doors to
all other labour migrants while presenting them as good and useful for the
Italian society.
The Italian case, with its use of labour migration policies addressing
MCWs as part of a legitimization and survival strategy rather than a com-
petitiveness strategy, is therefore strongly questioning the extent of the
validity of theoretical accounts based on an overarching managed migra-
tion paradigm.
６ Conclusion
The original data presented in this paper have shown the complex mix of
Immigrant Labour Supply policies adopted by different European coun-
tries to meet a growing labour demand in national markets of care. This
has represented a first attempt to apply a more articulated analytical fra-
mework to the study of labour migration governance across Europe in a
crucial labour market sector. I have critically assessed the ability of recent
theoretical accounts of managed migration approaches to provide a sound
explanation of the diversity of policy mixes adopted across Europe, by
pointing out strengths and weaknesses. The overall picture stemming
from the analysis helps me to point out three different issues, with both
important theoretical and policy implications, that will need further con-
sideration in future research. First, the key and controversial role of skills in
official labour migration policies design. In the pre-crisis decade but,
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although less vocally (Devitt, 2014), also in more recent years, the latter
have been increasingly framed as a tool for enhancing the competitiveness
of national economies, in line with the goal of a knowledge economy
promoted by the Lisbon strategy. In this framework, soft and embodied
skills such as those that are key for the quality of care work have been
downplayed and neglected, determining the general closure of official la-
bour migration channels to care migrant workers. However, the trends
towards the professionalization of care work, including a growing recogni-
tion of formal and non-formal competences, could contribute to change
the consideration of care work as low-skilled. Combined with persistent
labour shortages related to demographic processes this could also impact
on the design of labour migration policies by redefining the notion of skills
and its use in labour market analysis underpinning immigration policy-
making.
Secondly, the consequences of the different immigrant labour supply
policy mixes adopted in each national context on socio-economic integra-
tion paths and outcomes of MCWs should be addressed in future research.
Indeed, entry routes and admission procedures, with the diversified set of
constraints attached to each immigration status, seem to be relevant fac-
tors in influencing subsequent integration trajectories of migrant workers
(not only in the care sector): for instance, as recent research has shown,
entry through irregular immigration avenues, often used by MCWs not
only in Southern European countries, force many of them to accept em-
ployment in the most labour-intensive segments in the care labour market
(e.g. live-in care work) whereas the shift towards regular status typically
imply an improvement in labour conditions (e.g. in domestic services on
an hourly basis) (Castagnone, Salis et al., 2013; Gallotti and Mertens, 2013).
Besides, immigration regulations in combination with broader care, educa-
tion and labour market policies, concerning for instance recognition of
credentials and qualifications, access to training or support to career devel-
opment, are likely to have a significant impact on the possibilities offered
to MCWs to upgrade their skills, change employment sector and, ulti-
mately, achieve a reasonable level of integration in host societies.
Finally, the specificities of the Mediterranean models of labour migra-
tion management, inadequately addressed by theoretical accounts of man-
aged migration, need to be further investigated. On the one hand, the
hypothesis advanced in this paper concerning the use of labour migration
policies for care workers as a legitimization or consensus-building strategy
has to be refined and tested with more robust methodological tools. On the
other hand, cross-country comparative analyses within the Mediterranean
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region could help to highlight existing variations in a supposedly homo-
geneous immigration model, especially as far as care labour migration
management is concerned. Furthermore, recent evolutions related to the
differentiated effects of the economic crisis and of different paces in the
immigrants’ settlement processes across southern European countries will
need further investigation.
Notes
1 . This article stems from original research produced in the framework of the LAB-MIG-
GOV research project (2011-2014) funded by the Europe and Global Challenges funding
initiative promoted by three European foundations: the Italian Compagnia di San
Paolo, the German Volkswagen Stiftung and the Swedish Riksbankens Jubileumsfond.
More detailed information on the project may be found at www.labmiggov.eu
2. In two separate accompanying documents to the referred EC Communication, chal-
lenges for job-creation in professional healthcare and personal and household services
are addressed. With respect to the expansion of the healthcare workforce, the European
Commission suggests to: (i) improve forecasting mechanisms, (ii) anticipate new skills
needs in the health professions related to changes in care delivery models, (iii) develop
good practices on effective recruitment and retention of health professionals and (iv)
address issues of ethical recruitment of third country nationals health professionals. In
relation to personal and household services the main policy challenges identified are (i)
to improve work-life balance mechanisms, hence women’s employment, (ii) to exploit
the potential of job-creation in this sector with a low cost for public finance (iii) to
improve the quality of services and the quality of work.
3. I am grateful to Alessio Cangiano, member of the LAB-MIG-GOV research team, for
providing me with these original estimates on the migrant care workforce.
4. Various typologies of European care regimes have been proposed that largely echo the
families of welfare states identified in the path-breaking work of Esping-Andersen
(1990); See for instance Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Antonnen and Sipilä, 1996; Lister
et al., 2007; Kraus et al., 2010.
5. In most EU countries the wage of care workers with basic formal skills is found to be 50-
70% of the average comparable salary. The main exception is Denmark where the care
workers’ wage is aligned to the average salary. Skilled care workers are generally better
paid but a pay gap relatively to workers with comparable skills is however found in
most Western and Southern European countries (Bettio and Verashchagina 2010: Tab.
A5 pp. 162-4)
6. Entry categories used here are derived by the methodology used by Cangiano (2012) in
its analysis of the 2008 AHM of the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). The variable
relative to the immigration category was built by combining information provided by
the core LFS module on country of birth, nationality and years of residence, with AHM
2008 variables on the country of birth of parents (COBMOTH and COBFATH), main
reason for (last) migration (MIGREAS) and the year of acquisition of citizenship (YEAR-
CITI). Thus nine immigration categories were identified: Descendants of emigrants (i.e.
individuals born abroad but citizens of the country of destination from birth; and
migrants whose father and/or mother were born in the country of destination); EU-15
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/ EFTA (i.e. migrants born in another EU-15 or EFTA country, including both foreign
nationals and those who have acquired citizenship of the country of destination); Post-
Enlargement EU-12 (i.e. individuals born in the EU-12 who moved to the country of
destination between 2004 and 2008); Employment, job found before migrating (includ-
ing intra-company transfers); Employment, no job found before migrating; Study; Asy-
lum (international protection); Family (including both marriage and family reunifica-
tion); Other.
7. Identification of migrant workers here is based on the methodology proposed by Can-
giano (2012). Here country of birth was preferred to nationality as the operational
criterion to identify migrants combined with information on the year of (last) entry,
country of birth of parents and, for naturalized citizens, the year when citizenship was
acquired. As a consequence, the target population here is only first-generation immi-
grants, namely foreign-born individuals who migrated to the country of destination
when they were 15 or older.
8. Given the predominant use of demand-driven admission policies granting access only
to individuals explicitly requested by a specific employers, our assumption is that those
entered for employment purposes but without a job offer have entered irregularly and
have subsequently been regularized, either through mass regularization campaigns or
individual regularization procedure.
9. However, eligibility criteria for senior care workers’ admission were restricted after 2008
(Cangiano, Shutes et al., 2009).
10. Drawing on a typology proposed by Williams (2006), Eleonore Kofman (2013, p. 584)
discusses different types of knowledge to explore their unequal valorization in the
global economy and the consequences in terms of immigration regulations. She then
distinguishes between embrained knowledge, i.e. that dependent on conceptual skills
and cognitive abilities, encoded knowledge, i.e. that embedded in signs or symbols to
be found in books, manuals, codes of practice etc., embodied knowledge, i.e. that result-
ing from experience gained from physical presence, practical thinking, material objects,
sensory information and learning-by-doing, and, finally, encultured knowledge, i.e. ‘soft
skills’ based on shared understandings, responses, ways of behaving and communicat-
ing.
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